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THESIS ABSTRACT
NAME: Ahmad Tariq Sheikh
TITLE OF STUDY: An Integrated Approach for Soft Error Tolerance of Com-
binational Circuits
MAJOR FIELD: Computer Science & Engineering
DATE OF DEGREE: April, 2016
With fabrication technology reaching nano-scale, systems are becoming more prone
to manufacturing defects with higher susceptibility to soft errors due to the expo-
nential decrease in device feature size. Soft errors, which are caused by radioactive
decay and cosmic rays, can ip the output of a gate, resulting in a soft error if it is
propagated to the output of a circuit. This work is focused on analyzing, modeling
and designing combinational circuits for soft error tolerance with minimum area
overhead. The rst idea is based on analyzing random pattern testability of faults
in a circuit and protecting sensitive transistors, whose soft error detection prob-
ability is relatively high, until a desired circuit reliability is achieved or a given
area overhead constraint is met. Transistors are protected based on duplicating
and sizing a subset of transistors necessary for providing the protection. In the
xiv
second approach, the objective is to improve reliability of combinational circuits
based on the double modular redundancy scheme. As opposed to TMR, where each
module is triplicated followed by a voter, each module in the proposed Double Mod-
ular Redundancy (DMR) scheme is duplicated followed by a AND/NAND masking
gate. Modules are synthesized by either synthesizing the true or the complement
function to maximize soft error masking. The third technique is based on taking
advantage of implication relations to maximize the masking probability of a set of
critical gates that will maximize the masking of a large number of faults in the
circuit. A logic implication denotes an invariant relationship between logic gates
in a circuit. Finally, in hybrid scheme, the transistor sizing method is applied
to both DMR and implication based technique to further improve the reliability
of these methods. Additionally, a novel gate level reliability evaluation technique
is proposed that provides similar results to reliability evaluation at the transistor
level (using SPICE) with orders of magnitude reduction in CPU time.
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 ملخص
 أحمد طارق شيخ   الاسم:
 في الدوائر التوافقية الوقتيه الأخطاء نهج متكامل لتحمل عنوان الدراسة:
 علوم وهندسة الحاسب  الاختصاص: 
 6102ابريل  تاريخ الشهادة: 
 
 ارتفاع عم التصنيع في لعيوب عرضة أكثر الأنظمة أصبحت نانومترال مجال الى التصنيع تقنية وصول مع
 والتي قتية،الو الأخطاء. المصنعة الأجهزة حجم في الهائل للانخفاض نتيجة الوقتية للأخطاء للتعرض القابلية
 الى يؤدي مما البوابة قيمة عكس الى تؤدي أن يمكن الكونية، والأشببعة الإشببعاعي الانحلال بسبببب تحدث قد
 وتصببميم ونمذجة تحليل على العمل هذا يركز. الدائرة مخرجات أحد الى الوصببول الى تمكن اذا مؤقت خطأ
 تعتمد .الدائرة في الاضببببافية المسبببباحة من الأدنى الحد اسببببتخدام مع الوقتية الأخطاء لتحمل التوافقية الدوائر
 والتي ساسة،حال الترانزستورات وحماية دائرةال في عشوائيةال الأخطاء عبور قابلية تحليل على الأولى الفكرة
الوصببول  وأ المطلوبة الدائرة موثوقية تحقيق يتم حتى نسبببيا، مرتفعة الوقتية للأخطاء اكتشببا  احتماللديها 
 زئيةج مجموعةل والتحجيم الازدواج أساس على الترانزستورات حماية تتم. ضافيةالا مساحةلل معينالى حد 
 توافقيةال الدوائر موثوقية تحسبببببين هو الهد  الثاني، النهج في .الحماية لتوفير اللازمة الترانزسبببببتورات من
 الوحدات تكرار عكس وعلى .مزدوجتين كدائرتين واسبببببببتخدامهما الكهربائية الدائرة تكرار أسببببببباس على
 واسبببببببتخدامهما وحدة كل تكرار يتم،  )RMT(كثلاث وحدات وربطها مع ناخب واسبببببببتخدامهما الكهربائية
 عن إما وحدات تجميع تميو. )RMD( المقترح النهج في DNAN/DNA متبوعة ببوابة  مزدوجتين كوحدتين
 على نياتالتق احدى وتسبببببببتند .حجب الأخطاء الوقتية لتعظيم مكملةال أو القيمة الحقيقيةالقيمة  تجميع طريق
 الأخطاء ورعب احتمالية تقليل من قدر أقصبى تحقيق إلى الدائرة بوابات بين الموجودة العلاقات من الاسبتفادة
 في الأعطال من كبير عدد اخفاء من قدر أقصببببببى تحقيق شببببببأنها من التي الهامة البوابات من مجموعة عبر
 كل ارتكر تقنية على كل من  الترانزسببببببتور تحجيم أسببببببلوب تطبيق يتم هجين، مخطط في وأخيرا، .الدائرة
 بوابات بين الموجودة العلاقات من الاستفادةالمقترحة وتقنية  RMD مزدوجتين كوحدتين واستخدامهما وحدة
 على قيةموثوال تقييمل تقنيةتم اقتراح  ذلك، إلى بالإضبببببافة .الأسببببباليب هذه موثوقية تحسبببببينمن أجل  الدائرة
) برنامج سبايس دامباستخ( الترانزستور مستوى على موثوقيةال لتقييم مماثلة نتائج توفر التيو بوابةال مستوى
 بالاضافة الى تخفيض الوقت اللازم للتقييم بشكل كبير. 
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the year 2000, mysterious system crashes started to infect the internet and
telecommunication systems across United States. The crashes mostly occurred in
the high-end Sun Microsystems servers. This incident was serious enough that it
caught the major headlines in media [12]. More recently in 2010, a small glitch in
the voyager 2 space mission forced NASA engineers to suspend its operation [13].
The root cause for both these events was found to be Soft Errors.
We are living in an era of smart phones and smart devices that have the
computing power of desktop PCs of few years back, yet, they can be occupied
in our palms. This shrinking of area is still continuing, posing challenges to the
design of ecient synthesis tools. Recent years have witnessed a tremendous
development in the eld of VLSI. This development is directly correlated with
Moores law [14], which states that the number of transistors that can be fab-
ricated in a chip gets doubled every 18 months. As the CMOS technology is
continuously improving and shrinking to the nanometer scale, quantum mechani-
1
cal eects come into the picture barring the additional scaling of CMOS devices.
This has opened new avenues of research to investigate new technologies for circuit
design. Nanotechnology-based fabrication of devices and circuits promises extra
density and performance. However, studies have indicated that high-density chips,
upto an order of 1012 devices=cm2 are increasingly accompanied by manufacturing
defects and susceptible to dynamic faults during the chip operation [15,16]
Nanoscale devices are limited by several characteristics, most dominant are the
devices higher defect rates and the increased susceptibility to soft errors. These
limiting characteristics are due to two sources [17]:
1. Inherent randomness in the bottom-up manufacturing process, which results
in a large number of defective devices during the fabrication process.
2. Reduced noise tolerance of these devices which is responsible for inducting
device malfunctions by external inuences like EMI (electromagnetic inter-
ference), thermal perturbations and cosmic radiations.
Generally, errors can be categorized as either permanent or transient errors.
Permanent (hard) errors may occur during manufacturing process or during the
lifetime of a device. Transient (soft) errors can arise due to multiple sources like
high-energy particles, coupling, power supply noise, leakage and temporal circuit
variations. The transient error can last for one or many clock cycles. Soft error is
a phenomena that suddenly changes the data or signal bits of an electronic system
for a specic period of time. During this time, the output of the system could
remain in an erroneous state. Once the eect of soft error is vanished, the system
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returns to its normal operation as if nothing had happened. There is no certain
pattern regarding the occurrence of soft errors. However, the relative ux at a
terrestrial altitude is used to quantify the intensity of sources of soft errors [5].
Both of the aforementioned types of errors i.e., hard and soft errors, aect the
reliability of a circuit if they are not tolerated. Reliability of a circuit can be
dened as its ability to function properly despite the existence of such errors. In
this chapter, we discuss dierent manifestations that result in soft errors
1.1 An Overview of Soft Errors
Soft errors rst started to appear in electronic systems in the 19700s. It was
actually rst theorized by Wallmark et al. [18] that the silicon device dimensions
would be limited to 10m due to cosmic rays in the atmosphere. Soon, reports
emerged that highlighted the eect of cosmic-ray induced errors in space elec-
tronics [19]. Later on, the proof of cosmic-neutron-induced soft errors was also
recorded at the ground level in Cray-1 computers in 1976 [20]. Three years later in
1979, alpha-particle-induced upsets were also recorded in dynamic random mem-
ories (DRAM) [21].
Transient faults (SET/SEU) are mainly caused by cosmic-ray neutrons or al-
pha particles through the materials of ICs. They can either hit in the combina-
tional logic or ip ops of a sequential circuit block. If it happens in the combi-
national circuit it results in a Single Event Transient (SET) fault. On the other
hand, if it happens in the memory cell, it results in a Single Event Upset (SEU)
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fault. Both SET and SEU pose serious challenges in the reliability of circuits and
require due diligence.
To understand the implications of soft errors, consider a scenario when a
charged particle strikes a sensitive region in a memory cell, such as a drain of
a transistor in the OFF operation mode. In this case, a transient current pulse is
generated that can cause a bit ip in the memory cell. A memory cell stores two
states i.e. either logic 0 or 1 values. In each state, two transistors are ON and
two are OFF. Fig. 1.1 illustrates how an energetic particle can reverse the state
of transistors in a circuit, resulting in a bit ip.
Figure 1.1: Single Event Upset (SEU) eect in an SRAM memory cell.
A single event transient (SET) occurs when a charged particle hits the com-
binational logic, resulting in a transient current pulse. This can change the logic
level of a gate. If this transient has enough width and magnitude, it can result
in an erroneous value to be latched. Once it is latched, a single event transient
becomes a single event upset (SEU). It is worth to mention that a single SET can
produce multiple transient current pulses at the output. This is due to the logic
fan-out in the circuit. Hence, SETs can produce multiple SEUs in the memory
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elements.
For more details on how a transient soft error can change the state of transistor,
consider the NMOS transistor shown in Figure 1.2a. The transistor is assumed to
be in the OFF state. During normal operation, a current will ow from the drain
to the source that makes the transistor ON. If an alpha particle strikes the drain
of the NMOS transistor, it loses its energy as it travels along the path inside the
semiconductor material. In this period, the particle ionizes the material around
it, which results in the generation of electron-hole pairs. Consequently, the holes
are collected by the (p+) substrate and the electrons are collected by the drain as
shown in Fig. 1.2b. This results in a prompt component of current at the drain
in shape of negative pulse. If this prompt current has a high enough charge, this
will lead to discharging the voltage at the drain for a very short period of time
lasting in the order of 100 to 200 picoseconds [22]. Hence, the state of transistor
is changed to ON state in that period of time.
In the previous generations of CMOS technologies, the sizes of CMOS tran-
sistors were large enough to neglect the eect of the resulting prompted current.
However, with device dimensions shrinking to nanometer scale, SET and SEU
faults are no longer considered a small attenuation. Instead, they will be consid-
ered as normal circuit signals. Therefore, tolerance of soft and transient errors is
no longer limited to specic applications like aerospace applications, and they can
no longer be ignored.
In the following sections we will discuss dierent mechanisms responsible for
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1.2: NMOS transistor hit by ion particle.
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the occurrence of soft errors in digital systems.
1.1.1 Single Event Transients
When an energetic particle strikes a semiconductor, usually the sensitive region
is the reverse-biased pn junction [3,4]. The charge generated as a result of particle
strike is due to either direct ionization or indirect ionization. In direct ionization,
when a charged energetic particle strikes the semiconductor it frees electron-hole
pairs along its path. In indirect ionization, usually a light particle interacts with
the silicon nuclei to generate various heavy ions and charged particles, which in
turn can produce charge through direct ionization.
The distance travelled by the energetic particle in semiconductor is measured in
terms of Linear Energy Transfer (LET). The LET denes the amount of energy
loss per unit length of a particle as it passes through the material [3]. LET is
expressed in the units ofMeV=cm orMeV  cm2=mg if normalized by the material
density [23]. In silicon, energy of 3.6eV is required to generate one electron-
hole pair and the LET of 97 MeV   cm2=mg results in the charge deposition of
approximately 1pC/m. A curve of particular interest is the LET of a particle
versus the depth it travels through the material. Fig. 1.3 shows one such example.
The peak in the charge deposition is referred to as the Bragg Peak and it occurs
when a particle reaches an energy near  20MeV   cm2=mg.
The energy of a particle is highly correlated to the amount of distance it travels
through the device. Fig. 1.4 shows the eect of particle strike on a semiconductor
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Figure 1.3: Linear energy transfer (LET) versus depth curve for 210-MeV chlorine
ions in silicon [3].
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Figure 1.4: Charge generation and collection [4].
material. It can be observed that, once the initial strike happens, numerous
electron-hole pairs are generated as the particle travels through the material. The
rapid collection of charge happens near the depletion region and a high current
value is observed due to drift action. The drift denotes the speed and magnitude
of current observed as a result of particle strike. Once the particle loses its energy,
the slower charge collection happens due to diffusion action. The overall current
pulse due to drift and diffusion is shown in Fig. 1.4d. Baumann [4] and Dodd
et al. [3] discussed in detail about the charge collection process in semiconductor
materials.
The eect of particle strike can be either transient (soft error) or permanent
(hard error). We will now briey discuss each one of these error types.
Soft Errors
A single event transient (SET) occurs when a charged particle hits the com-
binational logic, resulting in a transient current pulse. This can change the logic
level of a gate. If this transient has enough width and magnitude, it can result in
9
Figure 1.5: Technology generation eect on Qcrit.
an erroneous value to be latched. The minimum amount of charge that can cause
a SET is called a Critical Charge or Qcrit of the device. Shivakumar [24] modeled
the eects of soft errors on memory devices and logic devices and demonstrated
that with increasing technology generation, soft errors will increase by orders of
magnitude in logic devices. He also showed that Qcrit is also going to be reduced
with technology improvement and with the advent of low-power devices, as evident
from Fig. 1.5.
Due to aggressive nodes and voltage scaling, the eect of transient fault is no
more constrained to a node where the incident particle strikes. This could result in
the possibility of deposited charge being simultaneously shared by multiple circuit
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nodes in the circuit [25{27] leading to the Single Event Multiple Upsets or SEMUs,
also referred to as Multiple- Bit Upsets or MBUs [3]. Therefore, soft errors are
going to play a critical role in the reliability of modern low-power devices.
Soft Error Rate (SER) is used to quantify the amount of soft errors encountered
by a device. The SER of a device also depends on its geographical location.
Ziegler et al. [5] presented intensive experimental study over the period of 15
years to evaluate the radiation-induced soft fails in Large Scale Integrated (LSI)
electronics at dierent terrestrial altitudes. They observed that soft failure rates
scale directly with the cosmic ray intensity and the energy and density of cosmic
rays increases with increase in the altitude. The particle density measured at New
York is approximately 100,000/cm2/yr [5]. SER can also be expressed as Failure
in Time (FIT) or as Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). 1 FIT is equivalent to
1 failure in 109 hours of continuous device operation. MTBF denotes the number
of hours between individual failures (1 MTBF = 114,077 FIT). Be noted that,
\failure" here is not equivalent to a \soft error", since a \soft error" might not
always result in a system failure.
It has been observed that the SER can easily exceed 50,000 FIT/chip if not
mitigated [4]. An SER of 50,000 FIT/chip is equivalent to one soft failure every
2 years. For commodity applications, this SER is perfectly tolerable, and even
if it occurs, it goes unnoticed. However, if we consider the enterprise, defense,
telecommunication etc. systems where there are numerous number of chips per
system. Due to the nature of their functionality, the reliability requirements of
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such systems are very high. Since all the chips are used in parallel, the situation
exacerbates due to the fact that the SER eect is multiplicative i.e., SER of one
chip is multiplied by the total number of chips to get the SER of a system. For
example, in a system with 100 chips, the SER of one soft fail every 2 years will
be reduced to one failure per week for that system [4]. Such systems must be
provided protection at any cost as their failure will cost grave nancial losses to
the companies. Fig. 1.6 shows the monthly SER as a function of the number of
chips in the system and the amount of memory integrated in each chip. Chapter
2 discusses in detail about soft error tolerance techniques.
Hard Errors
If the striking particle is large enough and has high energy, it can not only
result in soft error, but it can also permanently cause defect in the system known
as Single-Event Gate Rupture (SEGR). In SEGR, the electric eld across the
transistor gate oxide surpasses the the critical breakdown eld allowed [28]. This
results in the permanent breakdown of oxide and causes the short circuit through
the oxide. For modern CMOS processes at ground level, SEGR is no more of a
concern. Single-Event Latchup (SEL) occurs when a particle strikes in the vicinity
of two neighboring nmos pmos transistors. It then activates the parasitic PNPN
structure formed by the nmos-pmos pair, thereby creating a short impedance path
between the power and the ground of the circuit, which could potentially de-
stroy the circuit. Once SEL occurs, it can only be removed by restarting the
power supply [28]. SEL can be removed by properly insulating each individual
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Figure 1.6: Monthly system SER as a function of the number of chips in the
system and the amount of embedded SRAM per chip [4].
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transistor. Silicon-on-Insulator (SOI) silicon processes provide inherent tolerance
against SEL. Sexton [29] discusses in detail about various permanent single-event
eects in semiconductor devices. The focus in this work is to deal with soft errors
only.
1.2 Sources of Radiation
In this section, we will discuss about the dierent sources of radiation respon-
sible for soft errors in devices. The three dominant sources of soft errors are [4]:
1. Alpha particles,
2. High-energy cosmic rays,
3. Low-energy cosmic rays.
We will now briey discuss each dominant source one by one.
1.2.1 Alpha Particles
Alpha particles are emitted from the traces of radioactive impurities found in
the packaging material of semiconductor devices. The most common radioactive
impurities are uranium 238U, 235U and thorium 232Th. These impurities emit
alpha particles in the range of 4 to 9 MeV. An alpha particle with 10-MeV of
energy travels a distance of  100m. Therefore, alpha particles emitted by the
packaging and device materials must be considered. Fig. 1.7 shows the energy
spectrum of alpha particles emitted from the surface of 232Th. The broad energy
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Figure 1.7: Alpha energy spectrum emitted from a thick foil of Th-232 [4].
spectrum depicts the energy loss while travelling dierent random distances before
reaching the surface and being detected. The peak LET of alpha particle is 16
fC/m. Fig. 1.8 shows the eect of a single radioactive atom decay on computer
memory. The gure is a snapshot of the readout portion of 64Kb DRAM memory
chip. Initially, the memory was lled with all ones and then a radioactive element
was brought closer to it. It was found and can also be observed that a single
alpha-particle was able to change the contents of four memory locations from
logic \1" to logic \0" [5].
There are two ways to mitigate the eect of alpha particle: 1) purication of
15
Figure 1.8: Eect of a single radioactive atom decay on a computer memory [5].
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all production materials in close proximity to the device, 2) methods to reduce
the probability of alpha particles reaching the sensitive parts of the device [4].
Fabrication companies constantly scrutinize their manufacturing processes and
raw materials to meet the requirements of ultra low alpha i.e., alpha emission rate
from materials must be < 0:001=h cm2. To achieve that level, 238U and 232Th
impurity level must be around 1 part per 10 billion. If manufacturing process and
packaging materials of the CMOS devices could be puried so that together they
achieve the alpha emission rate of < 0:001=h cm2, then this corresponds to the
SER reduction of approximately 20%. Further reduction in emission rate would
be extremely expensive beyond this point as cosmic rays are still the dominant
source of soft errors in digital circuits.
1.2.2 High-Energy Cosmic Rays
High-energy cosmic rays are the most dominant source of soft errors in digital
systems. The origins of the primary cosmic rays are galactic. They react with the
Earth's outer atmosphere, which results in the generation of cascade of secondary
particles. At sea level, less than 1% of primary ux reaches which is mostly
composed of muons, protons, neutron and pions [5]. Fig. 1.9 shows the distribution
of cosmic rays at the ground level. It can be observed that neutrons have the higher
ux component and are most likely to cause a soft error at terrestrial altitude.
The neutrons only generate energetic particles through indirect ionization when
they interact with silicon or other dopants present in the chip [4]. The neutron
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Figure 1.9: Theoretical sea-level cosmic rays [5].
ux is highly dependent on the altitude. For example, at 10,000 ft. from sea level,
the cosmic ray ux increases 10. However, the trend is not linear and starts to
saturate at 50,000 ft. Therefore, while designing systems to tolerate soft errors,
the altitude factor must also be taken into account as this could have a signicant
impact on the perceived and real SER.
Unlike alpha particles, the eect of neutron ux cannot be reduced at the chip
level using conventional methods like shielding or high-purity materials: one foot
of concrete reduces the neutron ux by merely 1.4 [30]. Also, multibit upsets
(MBU) and single-event latchups (SEL) mainly occur due to high-energy neutrons
as the LET threshold of these events is above 16 fC/m. Therefore, SER due to
cosmic rays must be mitigated by reducing the device sensitivity which could be
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achieved by employing either design or process modications.
1.2.3 Low-Energy Cosmic Rays
The third most dominant source of ionizing particles in electronic systems is
the low energy neutrons or thermal neutron generated as a result of interaction
of low-energy cosmic ray neutrons ( 1 MeV) and boron. Boron consists of two
isotopes: 11B (80.1% abundance) and 10B (19.9% abundance). The 10B isotope is
unstable when interacted with the neutrons and has the thermal neutron capture
cross section higher than other isotopes by three to seven orders of magnitude.
When a 10B nucleus interacts with thermal neutron, it breaks into and Lithium-7
(7Li) recoil nucleus and an alpha particle that can induce a soft error. Boron is
used as p-type dopant and also as an implant in the phosphosilicate glass (BPSG)
dielectric layers (three orders of magnitude higher than silicon). Therefore, in
conventional BPSG-bases processes, BPSG is the main source of soft errors due
to boron reactions. The SER due to 10B interaction can be reduced by either
completely eliminating the BPSG from silicon processes or by enriching BPSG
11B isotope [31]. The reaction cross-section of 11B is million times smaller than
10B and its reaction with neutron produces gamma rays which lack energy cause
any damage.
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1.3 Motivation
In this chapter, we discussed about dierent manifestation responsible for the
occurrence of faults in digital systems. It is clear that soft errors are the most
challenging types of faults to encounter. With process technologies reaching nano-
levels and near threshold operating ranges, the SER due to soft errors is becoming
a dominating factor more than ever. Hard errors or permanent faults have been
dealt with improvements in the process manufacturing and to a certain extent SER
due to soft errors caused by alpha particles and low-energy cosmic rays can also
be mitigated with advanced manufacturing processes but at the expense of hefty
cost. It is shown that the major source of soft errors is the high-energy cosmic
rays which are challenging to deal with due to the variations in their energy levels
at dierent terrestrial altitudes.
The focus in this work is to tolearte the eect of soft errors due to high-
energy cosmic rays present in the atmosphere at sea-level. Many techniques have
been proposed in the literature to combat soft errors in digital circuits and are
discussed in detail in Chapter 2. The motivation here is to propose a set of
techniques that could reduce the eect of soft errors in combinational circuits
by selectively and smartly adding redundancy. The three proposed techniques
lie in dierent design space of digital circuit design. The rst technique applies
protection against soft errors at the circuit/transistor-level. The second technique
applies redundancy at the gate-level. Both techniques exploit logical masking in
combinational circuits to reduce the eect of soft errors. The third technique
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benets from the inherent implication relations present between dierent gates
of a circuit for soft error tolerance. Then, integrated approach is proposed that
combines the rst technique with the second and third technique further improve
the reliability of combinational circuits. Finally, a gate-level reliability evaluation
method is also proposed that achieves reliability measures very similar to the
transistor-level simulations (using SPICE) with order of magnitude less time.
1.4 Problem Statement
Given a combinational logic circuit, the objective is to increase the reliability
of this circuit against soft errors while keeping the area overhead as minimum as
possible.
1.5 Thesis Contributions
The development of an integrated soft error tolerance framework is proposed
to tolerate the soft errors in combinational circuits. The proposed framework is
developed based on the evaluation of three proposed techniques where the three
techniques are utilized to provide the required soft error tolerance at the minimum
possible area overhead. For that matter, the following objectives for this thesis
are laid out:
Selective Transistor-Redundancy (STR) Based Fault Tolerance Technique
The focus in this method is to protect only the critical transistors of a
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circuit. Asymmetric transistor sizing is applied to the most sensitive
transistors of the circuit by considering that particles can hit any transistor
of a logic gate. The algorithm protects the sensitive transistors or the ones
with high probability of failure of the circuit. The proposed algorithm can
be utilized in two capacities; 1) apply protection until the probability of
failure (POF) of circuit reaches a certain threshold, 2) apply protection
until certain area overhead constraint is achieved. The research objective
is to quantify the reliability for dierent protection thresholds and area
overhead constraints.
Double Modular Redundancy (DMR) Based Fault Tolerance Technique
In this method, we propose a double modular redundancy (DMR) technique
that aims to achieve high reliability with area overhead of nearly double
the original area. This method oers signicant improvement to the Triple
Modular Redundancy (TMR) technique as double instead of triple modular
redundancy is used. In this method, redundancy is applied at the gate-level
and selectively at the transistor-level. The technique is based on identifying
the probability of occurrence of logic \0" or \1" at each output of a circuit
and then synthesizing the circuit based on these probabilities.
Implication Based Redundancy Insertion Fault Tolerance Technique
The purpose of this method is to benet from the inherent implication
relations present between dierent gates of a circuit for soft error tolerance.
An implication from a source gate to a target gate indicates that a value
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assignment at the source gate forces a consistent value assignment at the
target gate. For a given target gate, source gates with high probability
of \1" or \0" in the logic cone of the target gate are identied. Then,
implication relations between the identied source gates and the target gate
are explored. If such implication relations are found, then the probability
of masking of the target gate can be increased by inserting appropriate
extra connections reecting the identied implication. This approach
is an attractive approach as it has the least area overhead over other
approaches. However, its eectiveness relies on the ability to identify
eective implication relations.
An Integrated Soft Error Tolerance Framework Finally, an integrated
framework is developed that combines the STR technique with the DMR
and the Implication based fault tolerance technique. It is observed that
the DMR and the Implication based fault tolerance techniques are unable
to improve the reliability of circuits beyond a certain point. Therefore,
the hybrid approaches are proposed to further improve the reliability of
circuits. Additionally, the combined application of STR technique with
existing techniques results in signicant improvement in reliability.
Gate level Reliability Evaluation Technique A novel method to compute
the reliability of a circuit at the gate level is proposed. The circuit level
simulations performed using SPICE are accurate but become very slow as
the circuit size increases. However, there isn't much of an impact of cir-
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cuit size in gate level simulations. The proposed technique bridges the gap
between the circuit level simulations and the gate-level simulations. The
proposed gate level reliability evaluation method achieves similar results in
comparison to circuit level simulations (using SPICE) with orders of mag-
nitude reduction in CPU time.
1.6 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized into the following chapters. The litera-
ture review is presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses the rst proposed
technique i.e., Selective transistor redundancy based fault tolerance technique.
Double modular redundancy technique is presented in Chapter 4. Implications
based fault tolerance method is proposed in Chapter 5. The results and discus-
sion for each proposed method are contained in their respective chapters. A novel
reliability evaluation technique is proposed in Chapter 6. Finally, the thesis is
concluded in Chapter 7 along with the possible future directions of the current
work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, a detailed review is presented about fault tolerance techniques.
First, a discussion about inherent error masking types in circuits is presented. Sec-
ondly, it wil be shown that fault-tolerant techniques can be classied into three
major categories: hardware redundancy, synthesis-based, and physical character-
istics based techniques. Literature review of each of the aforementioned category
will then be discussed in detail.
2.1 Error Masking Types
Although the incident alpha particles cause voltage transients, these transients
must propagate through a certain path to get latched and result in soft errors.
The following are three types of masking that shield the SEUs from propagating.
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2.1.1 Logical Masking
Logical masking prevents the SET from propagation from fault location to
primary outputs of a circuit because of path gate inputs that stop logical transition
of the gates output. As shown in Fig. 2.1, there is a particle strike at the output
of the A1 gate which results in a wrong logic value of \1" instead of logic value
\0". This wrong value is one of the inputs of the A2 gate.
Figure 2.1: Logical Masking.
When one of the inputs of the A2 gate is tied to logic \0", the output of A2
gate is always logic \0" irrespective of the other input. Therefore, this input of A2
gate is called controlling input. The transient caused by the alpha particle strike
is logically masked. Hence a correct value is latched by the following memory
element.
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2.1.2 Electrical Masking
Electrical masking attenuates or completely masks the SET signal due to elec-
trical properties of gates. The voltage transient caused by the particle strike is
attenuated as it propagates through a series of gates. The transient error gets
attenuated to an extent where it is ignored by the following memory element.
Figure 2.2: Electrical Masking.
As shown in Fig. 2.2 , the voltage pulse generated at the output of the gate
n1 attenuates as it passes through gates n2, n3 and n4. The attenuation is due to
the parasitic capacitances of succeeding gates. A pulse with duration more than
the gate delay attenuates as it propagates [6].
2.1.3 Latching Window Masking
In latching window masking, if a SET doesn't arrive on time, then it will be
masked; this depends on the hold and setup times of the target memory element.
This is a timing-related masking technique. For a voltage transient to get latched
by a memory element, the pulse should be available exactly at the latching window.
The transient is masked if it arrives before or after the latching window. As shown
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in Fig. 2.3, the value of \out" changes only when the glitch is available at the
latching window. In all the other cases, the output is error free.
Figure 2.3: Latching window masking [6].
2.2 Fault Tolerance Mechanisms
There are two dominant mechanisms in order to reduce soft error failure rate.
2.2.1 Fault Avoidance
The traditional approach to achieve reliability in systems is mostly based on
fault avoidance mechanisms [32]. The purpose of fault avoidance mechanism is
to ensure that a part, subsystem or a system doesn't fail. In this mechanism,
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defective modules are identied and replaced by other modules. Two widely used
methods to perform fault avoidance through conguration are [33]: 1):Hardware-
oriented methods, where the faulty components are replaced by a spare using ad-
ditional wires, switches and controllers, 2): Reconguration-oriented, where fault
avoidance is applied through reconguration and partial mapping modication.
There are several situations in which the fault avoidance approach clearly does not
suce. These include situations where the frequency and duration of repair time
are unacceptable, or where the system may be inaccessible to manual maintenance
and repair activities. Fault avoidance is often used for handling defects in digital
circuits. An alternative approach to fault avoidance is that of fault tolerance.
2.2.2 Fault Tolerance
This approach involves the use of protective redundancy. A system can be
designed to be fault tolerant by incorporating additional components and special
algorithms, which attempt to ensure that occurrences of erroneous states or erro-
neous output do not result in later system failures. The degree of fault tolerance
depends on the success with which erroneous states, which corresponds to faults
are identied and detected, and the success with which such states are repaired or
replaced [34]. The fault tolerance mechanism is aimed at either to mask, or to re-
cover from faults once they have been detected [35]. This mechanism attempts to
maximize the probabilities of the three masking mechanisms i.e., logical, electrical
and latching window masking. Therefore, fault tolerant designs are required for
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reliable systems that will operate correctly in spite of transient dynamic faults.
All fault tolerance approaches rely on some sort of redundancy; otherwise, there
is no way to guarantee that a device will not fail if a fault occurs.
2.3 Soft Error Tolerance
Fault tolerance techniques work on circuit level or higher levels of abstractions
to achieve soft error rate (SER) improvement. Fault tolerance techniques for
combinational circuits can be classied into three major categories: hardware
redundancy, synthesis-based and physical characteristics based techniques.
In this section, a survey of the current fault-tolerant methods to tolerate
SEU/SET in combinational circuits are discussed.
2.3.1 Hardware Redundancy Techniques
Hardware redundancy methods are based on adding redundant hardware. Mul-
tiple modules are used to represent the same function in order to maximize mask-
ing of errors. Multiple copies of either the entire circuit or part of the circuit
are used as redundant hardware. Redundancy can be added at the module-level,
gate level, transistor-level [36] or even at the software level. At the software level,
certain software transformations are applied to reduce the vulnerability of critical
instructions of a program [37].
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Von Neumanns Multiplexing
John von Neumann in the 1950s [38] rst initiated the idea of reliable systems
using unreliable components. His idea is based on replacing the processing unit
by multiplexed units. A unit consists of an executive stage and the restorative
stage. The basic functions of the unit are performed by the executive stage, while
the error correction is performed by the restorative stage due to the errors caused
by the executive stage. In the executive stage, a unit is replaced by N multiplexed
units having N copies of every input and output of the unit. The inputs are
randomly paired together to feed the N units. For example, consider the case
when the processing unit is a single 2-input NAND gate, with N=4, Von Neumann
multiplexing is shown in Fig. 2.4. The unit U represents a random permutation
of the input signals. The two inputs of each NAND gate are selected randomly
from the rst and second inputs X and Y respectively. The restorative stage is
constructed the same way as the executive stage. However, the outputs of the
executive stage are duplicated and used as inputs for the restorative stage. Note
that, this approach will invert the result if its used only once, thus, two steps are
required. By dening some critical level  such that 0 <  < 1=2, if the number
of lines carrying a positive state (logic 1) is larger than (1 )N , it considers
this as a positive state of the bundle, if it was less than , it interprets this as
negative state (logic 0). In cases where the number of positive state lines does not
meet either of these criteria, then the output is not decided, and so a fault will
occur.
31
Figure 2.4: Von Neumanns logic for 2-input NAND gate with N = 4.
Giving a probability of failure  for each gate, Von Neumanns structure requires
a large amount of redundancy and a low error rate for individual gates. For deep
logic with a gate failure probability  = 0:01 and N = 100, it is shown in [39] that
a circuit failure probability in the order of 10 6 can be obtained. This required
amount of redundancy is huge and is considered impractical. In order to reduce
this large amount of redundancy, the works in [40,41] combine NANDmultiplexing
with reconguration.
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
Triple Modular Redundancy is one of the most well-known techniques to tol-
erate soft/hard errors in combinational circuits [42, 43]. Its a special case of the
NMR system. An NMR system (also known as M-of-N system) is a system that
consists of N modules and needs at least M of them for proper operation. TMR
is a system where M=2 and N=3, which consists of three functionally identical
copies of the original circuit that feed a 2- out-of-3 majority voter as shown in Fig.
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Figure 2.5: A Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) structure.
2.5. If 2 modules out of 3 produce expected correct results, then the majority of
the modules produces correct results, and so the error in the third module will be
masked. However, TMR suers from high overhead in terms of area and power
(more than 200%).
In a structure where M=2 and N=3, the voter selects the majority vote. If a
single voter is used, that voter becomes a critical point of failure and the relia-
bility of the TMR structure is limited by that of the nal arbitration unit (i.e.,
voter), which makes the approach dicult in the context of highly integrated
nano-systems [17]. Despite this limitation, TMR is heavily used in practice, espe-
cially when single faults are needed to be protected. Even in the case of multiple
faults, some of these faults could be masked due to electrical and logical masking
in each module.
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Interwoven Redundant Logic and Quadded Logic
Pierce [44] suggested another scheme called interwoven redundant logic. This
scheme considers two types of faults 0! 1 and 1! 0 faults. The error correction
mechanism in interwoven redundant logic depends on asymmetries in the eects
of these two types of binary errors. The eect of a fault depends on the value of
the input and the type of gate. Consider a NAND gate, for an instance, if the
value of one of the inputs is 0 while it should be 1, the output of NAND gate will
be 1 regardless of the values of other inputs. In this case the output will be stuck
at 1. On the other hand, if an input value is 1 while it should be 0, the output will
depend on other inputs and the output will not be stuck. The type of faults that
cause the output to be stuck is considered as critical; the other type is subcritical
in the sense that its occurrence alone does not cause an output error. Hence,
alternating layers of NAND (or NOR) gates can correct errors by switching them
from critical to subcritical.
Quadded logic [45] is an ad hoc conguration of the interwoven redundant
logic. It requires four times as many circuits, interconnected in a systematic way,
and it corrects errors and performs the desired computation at the same time. A
quadded circuit implementation based on NAND gates replaces each NAND gate
with a group of four NAND gates, each of which has twice as many inputs as the
one it replaces. The four outputs of each group are divided into two sets of outputs,
each providing inputs to two gates in a succeeding stage. The interconnections
in a quadded circuit are eight times as many as those used in the non-redundant
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(a) Original circuit. (b) Quadded logic circuit.
Figure 2.6: Quadded logic example.
form. In a quadded circuit, a single critical error (1 ! 0) is correctable after
passing through two stages of logic and a single sub-critical error (0! 1) will be
corrected after passing a single stage. In quadded logic, it must be guaranteed
that the interconnect pattern at the output of a stage dier from the interconnect
patterns of any of its input variables. While quadded logic guarantees tolerance
of most single errors, errors occurring at the last two stages of logic may not be
corrected. Fig. 2.6 shows an example of a quadded logic circuit.
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Partial Error Masking Scheme Based on TMR
In [7], a partial error masking scheme is proposed based on TMR shown in Fig.
2.7. It targets the nodes with the highest soft error susceptibility. Two reduc-
tion heuristics are used to reduce soft error failure rate, namely, cluster sharing
reduction and dominant value reduction. Instead of triplicating the whole logic
as in TMR, only the nodes with highest soft error susceptibility are triplicated,
the rest of the nodes are clustered and are shared among the triplicated logic.
The dominant value reduction heuristic exploits the fact that the logic value \0"
and logic value \1" soft error susceptibility of certain primary outputs is highly
skewed. Such outputs are identied and the triplication is replaced by duplica-
tion. The 2-out-of-3 majority is replaced by AND (OR) logic. The Generalized
Modular Redundancy (GMR) [46] scheme takes into account the probability of
occurrence of each combination at the output of a circuit. The redundancy is then
added to only those combinations that have high probability of occurrence, while
the remaining combinations can be left un-protected to save area.
Fault Tolerance Based on History Index of Correct Computation
A more recent technique based on TMR maintains a history index of correct
computation (HICC) module to select the correct result [8]. Instead of using
merely majority voting to transmit results, HICC module uses the history indices
of redundant units to transmit the correct computation. It represents a measure
of a hardware units reliability. The most reliable unit is the unit with the highest
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Figure 2.7: Partial error masking scheme [7].
history index. The computations of other redundant units that implement the
same function are ignored.
Fig. 2.8 shows an example that demonstrates the concept of the HICC module.
In the gure, an ALU module is triplicated as units A, B, and C. The result
selector decides the unit with the correct result based on stored history index of
each unit. The unit with the highest index is considered to be the most reliable
unit, and its result is transmitted. When all units have the same history index
value, a bitwise majority voting is used to decide the result. After that, the
history index of each unit is incremented by 1 if its result is identical to the result
of majority; otherwise it is decremented by 1. The HICC logic is distributed within
the modules themselves. Hence, unreliable modules are identied simultaneously
in real time and are ignored.
Maximizing the reliability of a system based on nano-devices may require a
combination of techniques [47]. Previous results that used error correcting codes
(ECCs) and TMR at the bit and module levels demonstrated that recursive TMR
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Figure 2.8: HICC module [8].
Figure 2.9: Enhanced majority voting with parity checking at the module level [8].
at both levels has the best resilience to noise [48]. Thus, they combined redun-
dancy and reconguration to make the system more tolerant of faults. To increase
the fault tolerance of the error-prone decision units at the module level, a second
copy of the result is stored with an additional parity bit, as illustrated in Fig. 2.9
and Fig. 2.10. The parity checker transmits the even parity result. History indices
also have an additional parity bit. The index is updated if even parity is detected.
They have stated that without such extra redundancy at the module level, HICC
performance is deteriorated.
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Figure 2.10: Enhanced HICC unit with parity checking at the module level [8].
Double Modular Redundancy (DMR)
Teifel [9] proposed a Double/Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) scheme that
utilizes voting and self-voting circuits to mitigate the eects of SETs in digital
integrated circuits. A Self-voter shown in Fig. 2.11 is a 3-input majority voter
congured to vote on two external inputs and with the state of its current output.
The output of a self-voter goes high when both its inputs are high and becomes
low when both inputs are low. The output remains unchanged when inputs to the
self-voter dier.
Figure 2.11: Self-voting majority circuit: schematic and standard-cell circuit [9].
The Bayesian detection technique from the communications theory has been
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applied to the voter in NMR, called soft NMR [10]. In comparison to NMR, voter
in Soft NMR is composed of a detector as shown in Fig. 2.12. The underlying as-
sumption in Soft NMR is that each processing element (PE) or redundant module
is a noisy channel, and the detector acts as a slicer. In most cases, it is able to
identify the correct output even when all duplicated modules are in error, but at
the expense of very high area overhead cost of the soft voter.
Figure 2.12: Block diagram of: (a) NMR and (b) Soft NMR [10].
Design diversity is a mechanism in which the redundancy is applied by imple-
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menting functionally equivalent but structurally dierent designs to potentially
protect a circuit from multiple faults. Mitra et al. [49] proposed the use of de-
sign diversity mechanism in modular redundancy to detect common mode failures
(CMFs). To quantify the diversity between redundant logic, various methods
have been proposed. To understand the mechanism of design diversity, consider
an example logic function shown in Fig. 2.13 which implements the logic func-
tion Z = AB + AC in two dierent ways. The faults are mentioned as f1 = w
Stuck-at-0 (written as w/0) in Fig. 2.13a and f2 = y Stuck-at-0 (written as y/0)
in Fig. 2.13b. The input combinations ABC = 111; 101 and 110 will produce an
error at Z1. However, the only input combination that causes an error at Z2 is
ABC = 101. So, in a duplex system consisting of design from Fig. 2.13a and
Fig. 2.13b, only an input pattern ABC = 101 will result in the system failure or
results in the failure of both systems. Therefore, due to this input pattern, the
fault goes undetected. If we consider that all input patterns are equally likely then
the diversity value of duplex systems consisting of (f1; f2) will be 1  18 = 78 . The
applications of diversity design in DSP and communication systems is discussed
by Reviriego et al. in [50].
Smith [51] proposed a DMR technique based on the use of a single-event tran-
sient (SET) suppressor circuit to each primary output of the circuit. The SET
suppressor consists of two gates (AND, OR) and a simple two input multiplexer
with its output connected to its own select line to select between AND(OR)
gate output when the combinational circuit primary output is logic 0(1). The
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Figure 2.13: Example of design diversity.
AND(OR) gates are fed by the outputs of the two functionally equivalent mod-
ules and are used to suppress SET from propagating to the primary output when
the primary output is producing logic value 0(1).
A similar scheme has been proposed by Rezgui [52] to protect combinational
and sequential circuit from SETs by utilizing C-Element [53]. The C-Element [54]
is an asynchronous logic component which preserves the previous state of the
logic circuit when the two modules produce dierent values shown in Fig. 4.5.
The application of C-Element in modular redundancy is shown in Fig. 2.15.
Soft Errors in Sequential Circuits
El-Maleh et al. [55] proposed increasing sequential circuit reliability by intro-
ducing redundant equivalent states to states with high probability of occurrence
in sequential circuit behavioral machine. To maintain the same operation of the
unprotected FSM, the newly added redundant states have the same input, next
state, and output as the original states. Other states with low probability are
42
Figure 2.14: C-Element.
kept without protection to minimize the area overhead. The author divided the
original states of the state machine into protected states with high probability
of occurrence, and normal states with low probability of occurrence. For each
protected state, equivalent redundant states are added to guarantee single soft
fault tolerance. The author developed an algorithm to determine the number of
bits needed to encode protected, redundant and normal states. The algorithm
will also provide states codes. It was found that failure rate of sequential circuits
which involves protecting states with high probability of occurrence is less than
the ones involving protecting random or lower state probability.
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Figure 2.15: DMR with C-Element.
Defect-Tolerant Transistor Structures
A defect tolerant technique that adds redundancy at the transistor level of the
circuit is proposed in [56]. The N2 structure is a generalization of the quadded-
transistor structure. In the quadded-transistor structure, each transistor, A, is
replaced by a structure that implements either the logic function (AA) + (AA)
or the logic function (A+A)(A+A). In such structure, any single transistor defect
is tolerated. However, in the N2 structure, N blocks are connected in series such
that each block contains N parallel transistors. If number of defects is less than
or equal to (N-1), N2 structure guarantees the tolerance of all those defects. It
was shown that this technique achieves higher defect tolerance compared to gate
level based techniques such like quadded logic and TMR.
Soft error protection of combinational logic can be achieved by adding redun-
dancy at the transistor-level. Nicolaidis [57] proposed a scheme where a circuit
is duplicated containing all but last stage gate where the last stage gate is im-
plemented as a code word preserving gate. This last stage gate is either a NOT,
NAND or NOR gate with each transistor duplicated and connected in series to pre-
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serve the fault-free state that the output had before the transient fault occurred.
More recently,
Implication Based Redundancy Addition for Fault Tolerance
Recently, there has been a growing interest to investigate the gate-level in-
variant relationships to solve multitude of CAD problems. Error detection and
correction is one of the challenging problems. For memory elements it is quite
simple as all that is required to check is the comparison of data being read and
the data that is already stored. For memories it is usually employed using error
correction codes (ECC). For logic circuits it is quite complicated to check for the
errors as the correct answer is not known a priori. To circumvent this issue in logic
circuits, Alves et al. [58{60] used logic implications for online error detection. If
any invariant relation is violated the checker hardware will detect and signal an er-
ror. This resulted in very high fault coverage with very less area overhead. Use of
logic implications for power optimization is proposed by Bahar et al. [61] in which
high-power dissipating nodes are eliminated to reduce the switching activity. This
results in the reduction of power dissipation of the entire circuit.
There has also been an interest to use logic implications for soft error tolerance.
The mechanism is simple: if a SET occurs and distorts a signal, then the added
functionally redundant wire will attenuate this eect from propagating to the
primary output. Mukhaizim et at. [62] proposed a gate-level soft error mitigation
technique by adding functionally redundant wires (FRWs). The proposed method
rst nds the implication relation between the sensitive wires-the wires that have
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high probability of fault detection-and all the other wires. The implication is
added to the target gate if it reduces the soft error rate (SER) of the entire circuit.
In order to nd the implication that reduces/minimizes the sensitivity of the
target gate, fault simulation has to be repeated for each found implication between
the sources and a target. This results in signicantly high computation time.
Zhou et al. [63] proposed an improvement which considered electrical and timing
window masking eect besides the logic masking. To eliminate the necessary fault
simulation in order to quantify the value of an implication in [62], the authors
in [63] employed a SER relation to do so. Additionally, the priority is given to the
non-invert implication paths as the invert implication paths costs more hardware
due to an extra inverter which introduces a new site for potential SET.
2.3.2 Synthesis-Based Fault Tolerance Techniques
In the synthesis-based techniques, the combinational circuit is restructured in
order to maximize masking properties of the circuit. Logical masking is the main
masking property to be maximized
Localized Circuit Restructuring Tolerant Technique
In [64], logic masking of errors is increased by taking the advantage of con-
ditions already present in the circuit, such as observability don't cares. Two
techniques are used to improve reliability: dont care-based re-synthesis and local
rewriting. In the rst method, high-impact nodes are identied. A node has high
impact if many observable faults ow through it. High-impact nodes are used to
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select areas of the circuit for restructuring, in which a vulnerable node is replicated
by adding a single gate. Local rewriting is also used to optimize small sub-circuits
to obtain overall area improvements.
Reliability-Driven Dont Care Assignment Method
In [65], two algorithms are proposed to improve input error resilience. They
focus on input error due to propagated failures from previous blocks. Both algo-
rithms determine 0/1 assignments for the most critical Don't Care (DC) terms.
Consider the correct input vector for a circuit is 0100, if a fault happens that
fails the third input, the 0110 vector will be applied to the logic circuit. If the
implementation is identical for these two vectors, then the error will be masked.
If 0110 is a don't care, then the assignment of this minterm to either 0 or 1 will
determine the masking of an error on the third input of the 0100 vector. Given
a circuit with a set of don't care minterms, the output after applying proposed
algorithms is the circuit with new on-set minterms, new o-set minterms and new
don't cares set.
Redundancy Addition and Removal Technique
In [66], a framework is proposed based on redundancy addition and removal for
soft error rate (SER) reduction. It performs a series of wire addition and removal
by searching for redundant wires in the circuit. It will go through an iterative
process trying to keep wires/gates with higher masking impact and to remove
wires/gates with higher error impact; this will be guided using some metrics. The
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masking impact takes into account the three masking mechanisms.
Sub-circuit Extraction & Synthesis
El-Maleh et al. [2] proposed a scheme in which small sub-circuits are extracted
from the original circuit, re-synthesized and merged back in the original circuit
in order to maximize the probability of logical masking when a soft error occurs.
Once each sub-circuit is extracted, the probabilities of its input vectors to occur
are computed. Based on this input occurrence probability a new two-level circuit
is produced which is then merged with the original circuit.
In [67], a circuit simplication method is proposed for error tolerant applica-
tions. In some applications such as images, video, audio and graphics many faulty
versions of a chip can be used. In this work, the original combinational circuit
is given with a dened error threshold, and the minimum area simplied circuit
version is derived such that the error it produces is within the given threshold.
2.3.3 Physical Characteristics Based Fault Tolerance
Techniques
The physical characteristics based techniques attempt to reduce SER based
on the physical characteristics to maximize the electrical masking.
Many methods found in literature attempt to reduce SER based on the physical
characteristics to maximize the electrical masking and latching-window masking.
Gate resizing strategy [68] reduces SER by modifying the W/L ratios of transistors
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in gates. To achieve signicant improvement in SER, potentially large overheads
in area, delay, and power are introduced. In [69], a related method is introduced,
which uses optimal assignments of gate sizes, threshold voltages, supply voltages,
and output capacitive loads to get better results while keeping overheads smaller.
Nevertheless, the design complexity is increased in this method in addition to
the possibility of making circuit hard to optimize at physical design. Another
scheme [70] focuses on the selection of ip-op from a given set. It increases
the probability of preventing faulty transients from being registered by selectively
lengthening latching-windows associated with ip-ops, but it doesn't consider
logical masking and electrical masking. A hybrid approach [71] combines ip-op
selection with gate resizing to achieve SER improvement.
Lazzari [1] proposed an asymmetric transistor sizing technique i.e., nmos and
pmos transistors are sized independently of each other of the most sensitive gates
of the circuit, but they considered that incident particles strike only the drain of
transistors connected to the output of a gate. Sizing parallel transistors according
to the sensitivity of their corresponding series transistors can signicantly improve
the fault tolerance of combinational circuits [72, 73]. Variable sizing among all
transistors in a gate is a viable option if particle strikes of varying charge are
considered. To further improve the fault tolerance, more up sizing quota is given
to the most sensitive gates [74].
A more recent technique is presented in [75] that attempts to increase electrical
masking. In this method the impact of using reliability-aware logic synthesis to
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reduce both the pulse width and the drain area of a circuit is analyzed. The idea
here is to replace highly vulnerable cells with alternative cells or logical functions
to reduce overall vulnerability of a circuit. The pulse width and drain area are
used in this study as the reliability metrics to rank cells. The strategy is as follows:
circuits are synthesized to a given cell library, then, the frequently used and highly
vulnerable cells are identied; those identied cells are removed from library and
are replaced with alternative implementations. Thus, an improved cell library is
created.
To protect memories and latches from soft-errors, cell hardening tech-
niques [76{78] have been used. An example of this approach is a DICE memory
cell [76] that uses twice the number of original transistors (i.e., 12 transistors as
compared to 6 transistors). The limitation of these approaches is that they are
designed to tolerate soft errors in memory elements only and not in the combina-
tional logic.
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CHAPTER 3
SELECTIVE
TRANSISTOR-REDUNDANCY
BASED FAULT TOLERANCE
TECHNIQUE FOR
COMBINATIONAL CIRCUITS
This chapter is focused on designing combinational circuits for soft error toler-
ance with minimal area overhead. The idea is based on analyzing random pattern
testability of faults in a circuit and protecting sensitive transistors, whose soft
error detection probability is relatively high, until a desired circuit reliability is
achieved or a given area overhead constraint is met. Transistors are protected
based on duplicating and sizing a subset of transistors necessary for providing the
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protection. LGSynth'91 benchmark circuits are used to evaluate the proposed
algorithm. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm achieves better
reliability than other transistor sizing based techniques and the Triple Modular
Redundancy (TMR) technique with signicantly lower area overhead for 130nm
process technology at ground level.
It is observed that modular redundancy algorithms suer from high area over-
head as they either duplicate or triplicate the whole system followed by a voter.
Even if the duplication or triplication is applied selectively, the area overhead is
still high. On the other hand, symmetric transistor sizing approaches incur too
much area cost, while asymmetric sizing approaches did't consider the transient
hit at all possible locations. Asymmetric transistor sizing is applied to the most
sensitive gates of the circuit by considering that particles can hit the drain of any
transistor of a logic gate. A selective-transistor scaling method is proposed that
protects individual sensitive transistors of a circuit. A sensitive transistor is a tran-
sistor whose soft error detection probability is relatively high. This is in contrast
to previous approaches where all transistors, series transistors or those transistors
connected to the output of a sensitive gate, whose soft error detection probability
is relatively high, are protected. Transistor duplication and asymmetric transis-
tor sizing is applied to protect the most sensitive transistors of the circuit. In
asymmetric sizing, nmos and pmos transistors are sized independently. Reliability
is evaluated for dierent protection thresholds and area overhead constraints.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 highlights the
52
motivation and rationale behind the proposed approach, Section 3.2 presents the
proposed selective transistor-redundancy algorithm, an illustrative example is dis-
cussed in Section , simulation results are elaborated in Section 5.4, and nally the
paper is concluded in Section 7.1.
3.1 Eect of Energetic Particle Strike
When an energetic particle strikes a semiconductor, it ionizes the region around
it, resulting in the generation of electron-hole pairs. The charge due to the particle
strike is then transported by drift and diusion resulting in the establishment of
transient electric eld i.e., SET. The change in voltage observed at the output
due to SET depends on the energy and angle of incidence of energetic particle.
Source and drain regions are the most sensitive nodes to such events due to the
large eld around the junction regions which sweeps in the generated electron-holes
and result in large currents. If the energy of a striking particle is high enough, it
will ip the output of a gate resulting in a single event transient (SET) [3], [4].
To explain the selective transistor-redundancy principle, let us rst consider
the eect of an energetic particle striking a CMOS inverter. When the inverter
input is LOW and the energetic particle strikes the drain of an nmos transistor,
the output voltage is temporarily lowered. Whereas, when the inverter input is
HIGH and the energetic particle strikes the drain of a pmos transistor, the output
voltage is temporarily raised. In both cases, the output logic value of the inverter
can be changed to a wrong value if enough charge is collected. This is shown
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in Fig. 3.1, using 130nm Predictive Technology Model (PTM) [79]. Fig. 3.1a
illustrates the fault injection mechanism employed in this work. The output load
is assumed to be equal to an inverter load. The soft error is modeled by injecting
a current I of charge Q at the drain of a transistor. The direction of injected
current is from drain-to-body (bulk) in the nmos transistor and from body (bulk)-
to-drain in the pmos transistor. The double exponential current pulse I is used to
model the charge deposited due to a particle strike at the drain of nmos or pmos
transistor [80], [81] and is depicted as:
I(t) =
Q
(f   r)

e
  t
f   e  tr

(3.1)
Where Q is the charge deposited by a particle strike, f denotes the falling time
of the pulse, r denotes the rising time of injected current pulse and vary for each
process technology. The value of f is greater than r. The supply rail VDD is
connected to 1.3V. We will be taking 130nm technology as a case study in this
work, however, the technique is general and applicable to any process technology.
Fig. 3.1b illustrates the eect of a particle strike on the drain of an nmos
transistor when the true output of an inverter is HIGH. The particle strike at N1
will cause a sudden drop in the output voltage (-0.7V) of inverter. This type of
soft error will be modeled as a stuck-at-0 (sa0) fault at the output of the gate. To
protect from this fault, the pmos transistors of an inverter must be scaled enough
so that the output voltage becomes > VDD/2. Fig. 3.1c illustrates the eect of a
particle strike on the drain of a pmos transistor when the true output of an inverter
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(b) Eect of particle strike at nmos drain.
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(c) Eect of particle strike at pmos drain.
Figure 3.1: Eect of energetic particle strike on CMOS inverter at t = 5ns.
is LOW. The particle strike at P1 will cause a sudden rise in the output voltage
(1.9V) of inverter. This type of soft error will be modeled as a stuck-at-1 (sa1)
fault at the output of the gate. To protect from this fault, the nmos transistor of
an inverter must be scaled enough so that the output voltage becomes < VDD/2.
Now, consider the transistors arrangement shown in Fig. 3.2a where duplicate
pmos transistors are connected in parallel. The width of the redundant transistors
must also be increased to allow dissipation (sinking) of the deposited charge as
quickly as it is deposited so that the transient doesn't achieve sucient magnitude
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and duration to propagate to the output. If the output is currently high and an
energetic particle hits the drain N1 of the nmos transistor (with the same current
source used in the simulations shown in Fig. 3.1), this should result in a lowered
voltage observed at the output. But due to the employed transistor conguration,
the net negative voltage eect will be compensated, as evident from Fig. 3.2b,
resulting in a spike that has lesser magnitude as compared to the one shown in
Fig. 3.1b. The spike magnitude is reduced due to increased output capacitance
and reduced resistance between VDD and the output.
Consider another arrangement of transistors in Fig. 3.2c where redundant nmos
transistors are connected in parallel. If the output is low and the incident energetic
particle strikes the drain P1 of pmos transistor, then the raised voltage eect at
the output shown in Fig. 3.1c will be reduced as observed from Fig. 3.2d. This
reduction in the spike magnitude is due to the same reasons mentioned for the
nmos transistor.
Similarly, to protect from both sa0 and sa1 faults, the transistor structures
in Fig. 3.2a and Fig. 3.2c can be combined to fully protect a NOT gate. A fully
protected NOT gate oers best hardening by design, but at the cost of higher area
overhead and power. It must be noted that the optimal size of the transistor for
SEU immunity depends on the charge Q of the incident energetic particle.
Due to aggressive nodes and voltage scaling, the eect of transient fault is no
more constrained to a node where the incident particle strikes. This could result
in the possibility of deposited charge being simultaneously shared by multiple
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circuit nodes in the circuit [25{27] leading to the Single Event Multiple Upsets
or SEMUs, also referred to as Multiple-Bit Upsets or MBUs [3]. Consider the
inverter example in Fig. 3.1, if two particles strike at the drain of nmos and
pmos transistors simultaneously, then the charge collection at the nmos and pmos
transistors will oset each other, resulting in an insignicant change in voltage at
the output. Therefore, by duplication of transistors, it is intended to increase the
probability of multiple fault hits at the same gate, so that the victim transistors
could cancel the eect of each other. For that matter, LEAP [82] placement
technique can be utilized. This scheme places the drain contact nodes of nmos
and pmos transistors in an interleaved fashion so that multiple drain contact nodes
can act together to fully or partially suppress the SETs. Another advantage of
using parallel duplicate transistors is the defect tolerance of transistor stuck-open
faults for protected transistors.
3.2 Proposed Algorithm
In this section, the proposed selective transistor-redundancy (STR) algorithm
is presented. The algorithm protects sensitive transistors whose probability of
failure (POF) is relatively high. The proposed algorithm can be utilized in two
capacities: 1) apply protection until the POF of circuit reaches a certain threshold,
2) apply protection until certain area overhead constraint is met. We will rst
discuss dierent relations that realize the circuit POF. These relations are then
used in the proposed algorithm.
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(d) Reduced eect of particle strike at pmos drain.
Figure 3.2: Proposed protection schemes and their eect.
3.2.1 Circuit Probability of Failure
Let us rst dene the probability of failure of a transistor. In all discussions,
subscripts i and j refer to gate i and transistor j, respectively. The POFij of j
th
transistor of gate i is dened as the probability of circuit failure due to a fault
hitting the transistor. It is computed using the following relation:
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POFij = PDETij  PHITij (3.2)
Where PDETij is the probability of detecting a fault hitting transistor j of gate i
at a primary output, and PHITij is the probability that transistor j of gate i is hit
by a fault. The greater the transistor width/area is, the greater its hit probability
is.
PHITij is computed separately for nmos and pmos transistors as they have
dierent drain widths. Let NWij and PWij be the width of nmos and pmos
transistors, respectively, Area be the total circuit area, then the probability of a
transistor j of gate i to be hit by a fault, PHITij , is computed using the following
relation:
PHITij =
Wij
Area
Wij 2 fNWij; PWijg (3.3)
PDETij , as dened before, depends on two factors; 1) probability of input pat-
terns for which a fault that hits the transistor is propagated to the output of a gate
i.e., controllability conditions to excite the fault, 2) stuck-at fault observability
probability of the gate at one of the primary outputs of a circuit i.e., observability
probability. PDETij is computed using following relation:
PDETij = PExcitationij  PPropagationij (3.4)
Where PExcitationij denotes the probability that the fault is excited at gate i
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output due to a fault hit at transistor j. PPropagationij denotes the probability that
an error that is excited at the gate's output is observable at one of the primary
outputs. Let S be a set of patterns for which an error that strikes transistor j is
propagated to the output of gate i, then PExcitationij is computed as:
PExcitationij =
jSjX
k=1
Prob: Sk (3.5)
Where Prob: Sk denotes the probability of occurrence of k
th input pattern. SPICE
tool is used to nd the input patterns for which a transistor fault is excited and
observed at the gate output.
Similarly, PPropagationij can be computed using the following relation:
PPropagationij =
stuck   at  detection  probi
PCi
(3.6)
Where stuck   at  detection  probi denes stuck-at fault detection probability
of gate i and PCi is the controllability probability to produce logic value opposite
to the fault eect at the gate output. The fault simulator tool HOPE [83] is used
to compute the stuck-at fault detection probability and PCi of a gate i.
Finally, the circuit probability of failure POFC for a single fault is simply the
summation of POFs of all transistors n over all gates m of a circuit.
POFC =
mX
i=1
nX
j=1
POFij (3.7)
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Table 3.1: Parameters considered in the study.
Technology (T ) 130m = 0:13
nMOS width (NWij) 2 T = 0:26
pMOS width (PWij) 4 T = 0:52
Charge (Q) 0.3pC
3.2.2 Example: NAND Gate
A thorough case study for the 130nm process technology is performed to elab-
orate POFij. Here, we will consider the case of a 2-input NAND gate. The basic
process related parameters used in this study employ minimum feature size and
are shown in Table 3.1. It must be noted that in practical designs the minimum
widths of the transistors are adjusted to cater for the specications of desired
application. The value of charge Q considered here is 0:3pC which is the worst
case charge value deposited by the 130nm process technology [68].
For NAND gates, the sa0 fault excitation probability is computed for input
patterns where the output is logic \1". For a 2-input NAND gate, there is a max-
imum of four input combinations, f00; 01; 10; 11g. Therefore, the sa0 excitation
probability of the jth nmos transistor of gate i is computed based on the input
combinations producing logic value \1" at the output i.e., f00; 01; 10g.
Fig. 3.3 shows the CMOS structure of a 2-input NAND gate. A transient
with charge (Q) of 0:3pC injected at drain \N1" will always be propagated to the
output of the gate for input patterns f00; 01; 10g. Therefore, the fault excitation
probability for nmos transistor connected to input \A" in Fig. 3.3, computed using
Eqn. 3.5, is (3
4
) or 0:75. So, when a fault hits the nmos transistor \N1" of a 2-input
NAND gate, it will fail with a probability of (3
4
). This is because for 3 out of the
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4 possible input combinations, the gate will fail.
Logically, the transient hit at \N2" should only be excited to the output if
and only if the value of input \A" is logic \1" i.e., for input pattern 10, implying
fault excitation probability of (1
4
) or 0:25 . However, since the fault excitation
is highly dependent on the transient charge value, it is not necessarily true that
the fault injected at \N2" will not be excited for the input patterns f00; 01g. To
overcome the uncertainty regarding the fault excitation under all possible input
combinations, transistor level simulation using SPICE is performed. Based on
SPICE simulation, the transient fault injected at drain \N2" with charge (Q)
value of 0:3pC is observed at the output for input pattern f10g, only. Therefore,
the fault excitation probability for nmos transistor \N2" connected to input \B"
is (1
4
) or 0:25. Here, stuck   at   detection   probi = PCi, because the NAND
gate is a stand alone gate and is not connected to any other gate. Therefore, any
fault excited due to a fault hit at the transistor will make the gate/circuit fail.
So, PDETN1 = 0:75 and PDETN2 = 0:25.
Fig. 3.4 illustrates the sa1 scenario when a fault hits any of the pmos transistors
P1 or P2 of a 2-input NAND gate. In this case, the fault will be observed at the
output for input pattern f11g only. Again, stuck  at  detection  probi = PCi.
Thus, the fault excitation probability due to a fault hit at pmos transistors \P1"
or \P2" is (1
4
) or 0:25. This is because the gate will fail for 1 out of 4 possible
input combinations. So, PDETP1 = PDETP2 = 0:25.
The gate failure probability of a 2-input NAND gate can be computed using
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Vdd Vdd
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A
B
OUT
N1
N2
fault injection
fault injection
Figure 3.3: Stuck-at-0 case of 2-input NAND gate.
Vdd Vdd
A B
A
B
OUTfault injection
P1 P2
Figure 3.4: Stuck-at-1 case of 2-input NAND gate.
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Eqn. (3.7) as follows:
Gate Failure Prob: =
2X
j=1
PDETNij 
NWij
Area
+
2X
j=1
PDETPij 
PWij
Area
=
N1;N2z }| {
0:75 0:26 + 0:25 0:26
1:560

+
P1;P2z }| {
2 0:25 0:52
1:560

= 0:167 + 0:167
= 0:334
3.2.3 Selective Transistor-Redundancy (STR) Based De-
sign
The selective redundancy technique is applied to protect transistors of a circuit
that have relatively high POFij. Sensitive transistors that have relatively high
probability of failure are identied based on fault simulation of random input
patterns. Dierent arrangements of nmos and pmos transistors are proposed for
each gate for various transistor protection scenarios.
Algorithm 1 highlights the steps of the proposed method. Initially, POF of
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circuit under test is computed using Eqn. (3.7) by rst computing the POF of each
transistor using Eqn. (3.2). The proposed algorithm applies transistor protection
until the circuit POF reaches a pre-dened protection threshold, or a certain area
overhead constraint is met. Each time, the algorithm selects a transistor with the
highest POF. The eect of a transient fault on the selected nmos(pmos) transistor
is suppressed or reduced by duplicating and scaling the widths of a subset of
transistors necessary for providing the protection. For example, in a 2-input
NAND gate, protecting an nmos transistor requires duplicating and scaling its
corresponding pmos transistor connected to the same input. However, protecting
a pmos transistor requires duplicating and scaling both of the nmos transistors
in the gate. Once a transistor is protected, the POF of all transistors in the
circuit are updated. Protecting a transistor in a gate gi aects the selection/hit
probability of all transistors in the circuit. Therefore, after protecting a transistor
in a gate, the POF of the selected transistor is reduced signicantly, while the
POF of the remaining transistors may increase or reduce slightly. The circuit area,
POF of all transistors, and POFC are updated after each transistor protection
is applied. The transistor with maximum POFij is selected for protection in the
next iteration. The process is repeated until the desired protection threshold is
reached or the maximum area overhead constrain is met.
The protection threshold Th takes the value between [0%, 100%] and repre-
sents the reliability of the circuit required to be achieved. For example, a protec-
tion threshold of 99% implies applying the protection until POF of circuit is less
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Algorithm 1 : Selective Transistor-Redundancy Algorithm
Require: Gate level circuit, Th or OverHead
1: Th : Required circuit reliability in %
2: OverHead : Required area overhead in %
3: POFij : Circuit POF due to fault hit at j
th transistor of Gate i
4: POFC : Circuit probability of failure
5:
6: Compute random pattern fault detection probability of each gate gi using fault
simulator
7: For all transistors compute POFij using Eqn. (3.2)
8: Compute POFC using Eqn. (3.7)
9: TargetArea = CircuitArea + (CircuitArea  OverHead)
10: while ((POFC  (1  Th))or(CircuiArea < TargetArea)) do
11: Pick a transistor transij with the highest POFij
12: Protect transij
13: Update CircuitArea
14: Update POFij of transistors using Eqn. (3.2)
15: Update POFC using Eqn. (3.7)
16: end while
than or equal to (1   99%) = 0:01. Increasing Th will result in more transistors
being protected and vice versa.
3.2.4 Redundancy Models
In light of Algorithm 1, let's now explain the proposed CMOS implementations
of a 2-input NAND gate in Table 3.2. In this work, a library consisting of 2-, 3-
and 4-input NAND/NOR gates and an Inverter is considered. For brevity, the
case of a 2-input NAND gate will be discussed.
The proposed CMOS implementations of a 2-input NAND gate are shown in
Table 3.2. The rst row shows the names of dierent implementations of a 2-input
NAND gate, while the second row shows their corresponding implementations at
the transistor level. The rst numeric value \2" in the gate name (e.g. NAND21)
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denotes the number of inputs of a gate and the second numeric value, which
ranges from 1 to 5, is used to select the proper transistor level implementation of
a 2-input NAND gate.
In CMOS implementation of NAND21, pmos transistor P1 is duplicated, scaled
and connected in parallel to protect a fault that hits the drain of nmos transistor
N1. Similarly, to protect nmos transistors N1 and N2, pmos transistors P1 and
P2 are duplicated and scaled to protect from a fault that can occur at the drain
of any of the nmos transistors. Hence, the protection type for that gate will be
NAND22.
To protect from faults hitting the drain of pmos transistors, all the nmos tran-
sistors are required to be scaled and duplicated. This is due to the fact that pmos
transistors P1 and P2 are in parallel which makes them equally sensitive to a fault.
This implementation is called NAND23. NAND24 provides protection from faults
that can occur at any of the pmos transistors or at the nmos transistor N1. Finally,
to fully protect the 2-input NAND gate, all the transistors are duplicated along
with their widths increased. This type of protection is called NAND25. So, for a
2-input NAND gate, there are 5 distinct redundancy models.
For a 2-input NOR gate, similar arrangements can be used to create its redun-
dancy model. For 3- and 4-input NAND/NOR gates, 7 and 9 redundancy models
are created, respectively. The necessity to create a variety of redundancy models
for every possible scenario is to achieve as much area savings as possible. The
number of redundancy models is technology independent and allows the proposed
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I1
I2
I3
G1
G2
Figure 3.5: Example circuit.
algorithm to improve the reliability of circuit by applying ne grained protection
(protecting one transistor at a time) instead of protecting the whole gate at once
as has been proposed by other techniques [1,68]. It will be shown that due to this
ne granularity of protection, the area overhead can be signicantly reduced.
3.3 An Illustrative Example
Let us now consider an illustrative example to elaborate the application of the
proposed selective transistor redundancy scheme given in Algorithm 1. Fig. 3.5
shows a simple benchmark circuit consisting of 3 inputs, 1 output and a pair of
2-input NAND gates. First, let's compute all the required parameters as discussed
in previous sections. Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 show the fault detection probabilities,
controllability probabilities (PC0, PC1) and input pattern probabilities (ipp) of
all gates in the circuit.
Let's rst compute the POF of the circuit using Eqn. (3.7). With NWij =
0:26 and PWij = 0:52, the total area of the circuit is 3:12, which is the
summation of drain areas of all the transistors. So, initially for nmos transistors,
PHITN =
0:26
3:12
= 0:083 and for pmos transistors, PHITP =
0:52
3:12
= 0:166.
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Table 3.2: Proposed CMOS implementations of 2-input NAND gate.
Gate CMOS 1
NAND21
Vdd
OUT
Vdd
N2
N1
P1_1 P2P1_2
NAND22
Vdd
OUT
Vdd
P1_1 P1_2 P2_2P2_1
N1
N2
NAND23
Vdd
OUT
Vdd
P1 P2
N1_1 N1_2
N2_2N2_1
NAND24
Vdd
OUT
N1_1 N1_2
N2_1 N2_2
P1_1 P1_2
Vdd
P2
NAND
Vdd
OUT
Vdd
P2_2P2_1P1_2P1_1
N1_1 N1_2
N2_1 N2_2
1 Arrows indicate fault hit at the transistor
that is protected.
Table 3.3: Stuck-at fault detection probabilities.
Gate sa0 det. prob. sa1 det. prob. PC0 PC1
G1 0.375 0.125 0.25 0.75
G2 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.625
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Table 3.4: ipp at G1 and G2.
Input G1 G2
00 0.25 0.125
01 0.25 0.125
10 0.25 0.375
11 0.25 0.375
Keeping Table 3.2 in perspective, transistor G2-N1 refers to the nmos transistor
directly connected to the output of gate G2, G2-N2 refers to the nmos transistor
in gate G2 with drain connected to N1 and source connected to ground. With
jSjP
k=1
Prob: Sk = Prob00 + Prob01 + Prob10 = 0:125 + 0:125 + 0:375 = 0:625, sa0
detection prob. = 0:625, PC1 = 0:625, POFG2 N1 is computed using Eqn. (3.2)
as follows:
POFG2 N1 =
0:625 0:625
0:625
 0:26
3:12
= 0:625 0:083
= 0:0521
For G2-N2,
jSjP
k=1
Prob: Sk = Prob10 = 0:375. Therefore, POFG2 N2 will be:
POFG2 N2 =
0:375 0:625
0:625
 0:26
3:12
= 0:375 0:083
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= 0:031
For G2-P1 & G2-P2,
jSjP
k=1
Prob: Sk = Prob11 = 0:375, sa1 detection prob. =
0:375 and PC0 = 0:375. POFG2 P1 and POFG2 P2 will be:
POFG2 P1;G2 P2 =
0:375 0:375
0:375
 0:52
3:12
= 0:375 0:167
= 0:063
Similarly, POF of all transistors in gate G1 are:
POFG1 N1 =
0:75 0:375
0:75
 0:26
3:12
= 0:375 0:083
= 0:0311
POFG1 N2 =
0:25 0:375
0:75
 0:26
3:12
= 0:125 0:083
= 0:0104
POFG1 P1 =
0:25 0:125
0:25
 0:52
3:12
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= 0:125 0:167
= 0:0208
POFG1 P2 =
0:25 0:125
0:25
 0:52
3:12
= 0:125 0:167
= 0:0208
Finally, POF of circuit, obtained by summing POF of all transistors, is 0:2915
or 29:15%.
Let's now follow few iterations of Algorithm 1 to see how the protection is
applied to the circuit. It can be observed that G2-P1 and G2-P2 have the highest
POF, therefore, a fault on G2-P1 and G2-P2 is protected by duplicating and
increasing the widths of all the nmos transistors, as explained in Section 3.2.4.
Such kind of protection is referred to as NAND23, where both pmos transistors
are protected. Protecting G2-P1 and G2-P2 will lead to
jSjP
k=1
Prob: Sk = 0 for both
G2-P1 and G2-P2 and ultimately POFG2 P1 = 0 and POFG2 P2 = 0. The area
of nmos transistors G2-N1 and G2-N2 will increase from 0:26 to 1:612, as each
transistor is duplicated and scaled by a factor of 3:1, implying an area overhead of
1:352 and a circuit area of 5:824. The resulting POF of transistors after protecting
G2  P1 & G2  P2 will be:
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POFG2 N1 =
0:625 0:625
0:625
 1:612
5:824
= 0:625 0:276
= 0:173
POFG2 N2 =
0:375 0:625
0:625
 1:612
5:824
= 0:375 0:3239
= 0:104
POFG1 N1 =
0:75 0:375
0:75
 0:26
5:824
= 0:375 0:045
= 0:017
POFG1 N2 =
0:25 0:375
0:75
 0:26
5:824
= 0:125 0:045
= 0:0056
POFG1 P1 =
0:25 0:125
0:25
 0:52
5:824
= 0:125 0:089
= 0:0111
POFG1 P2 =
0:25 0:125
0:25
 0:52
5:824
= 0:125 0:089
= 0:0111
73
For transistors other than G2   P1 and G2   P2, only the hit rate at the
transistors will change as the circuit area is increased. The circuit POF after
protecting G2   P1 and G2   P2 is increased from 0:2915 to 0:3584 with gate
G2 protected as NAND23. The increase in circuit POF is due to the fact that
protecting pmos transistors of a NAND gate requires all the nmos transistors to be
scaled and duplicated, which makes nmos transistors more sensitive to the particle
strike due to increase in their area.
For the next iteration, G2   N1 has the highest POF and is selected for
protection by duplicating and scaling the P1 pmos transistor of gate G2. The
required scaling factor is 2.4, computed using SPICE. The resulting POF of the
circuit is decreased from 0:3584 to 0:1895 with a circuit area of 7:8. The POF of
remaining transistors is computed to be:
POFG2 N1 =
0:375 0:625
0:625
 1:612
7:8
= 0:375 0:206
= 0:077
POFG2 N2 =
0:375 0:625
0:625
 1:612
7:8
= 0:375 0:206
= 0:077
POFG1 N1 =
0:75 0:375
0:75
 0:26
7:8
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= 0:375 0:033
= 0:0124
POFG1 N2 =
0:25 0:375
0:75
 0:26
7:8
= 0:125 0:033
= 0:0041
POFG1 P1 =
0:25 0:125
0:25
 0:52
7:8
= 0:125 0:066
= 0:0083
POFG1 P2 =
0:25 0:125
0:25
 0:52
7:8
= 0:125 0:066
= 0:0083
The gate G2 is now marked as NAND24. The POF of G2   N1 is still not
0 as there remains an input pattern 10 for which it is not protected. For the
next iteration, G2   N2 is selected. Protecting G2   N2 will make G2 marked
as NAND25 i.e., fully protected against a single fault, with POF of G2 N1 and
G2 N2 equal to 0 and the POF of circuit reduced to 0:0265 with a circuit area
of 9:7760. Now, only gate G1 remains for protection.
If the desired circuit POF to achieve is 1% or alternatively 99% reliability
and continuing with applying Algorithm 1, both G1 and G2 will be marked as
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0. Initial POFC = 0.2915, Area (A) = 3.120
1. POFC = 0.3584, A = 5.82, Tr = G2-P1,G2-P2
2. POFC = 0.1895, A = 7.80, Tr = G2-N1
3. POFC = 0.0265, A = 9.77, Tr = G2-N2
4. POFC = 0.0378, A = 11.75, Tr = G1-N1
5. POFC = 0.0275, A = 14.45, Tr = G1-P2,G1-P2
6. POFC = 0, A = 16.43, Tr = G1-N2
Figure 3.6: Complete iteration log of example circuit.
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Figure 3.7: Circuit POF vs. iteration.
NAND25 i.e., fully protected to achieve 100% reliability against a single fault. The
complete iterations are shown in Fig. 3.6 and include the circuit POF (POFC),
circuit Area (A) and the transistor (Tr) selected for protection in each iteration
of the algorithm.
Fig. 3.7 shows the POF of two circuits plotted over the duration of achieving
1% POF (99% reliability). It can be seen that misex1 requires around 165 itera-
tions, whereas misex2 requires around 110 iterations of the algorithm to achieve
99% reliability against a single fault.
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3.4 Experimental Results
In this section, the impact of the proposed algorithm on the area and reliability
of LGSynth'91 benchmarks [84] is evaluated. The benchmarks consist of circuits
with varying complexity in terms of area, number of inputs and outputs. Sensitive
nodes (transistors/gates) in a circuit are identied based on the fault simulation
of random input vectors using the parallel fault simulator Hope [83]. The input
patterns are applied until stuck-at fault coverage of 95% is achieved. It was
found that 1 million random input patterns achieved more than 95% stuck-at
fault coverage for all benchmarks in this work.
Whenever cell hardening against soft errors is considered, the rst step is to
select a range of particles energy against which the tolerance is sought. In this
work, it is assumed that energy of the incident particle will always result in the
maximum deposition of charge. For that matter and to compare with other sizing
techniques, the values of Q = 0:3pC, f = 0:2ns and r = 0:05ns are used for all
simulations in this paper. The value of charge Q = 0:3pC is the maximum charge
that could be collected by the 130nm process technology [68]. The simulations
are performed for varying protection thresholds to nd the best tradeo between
area and reliability for each circuit. The number of faults injected in a protected
circuit is prorated according to its area overhead. Algorithm 9 is used to compute
the reliability of each circuit. The number of simulations count SIM is 5000
iterations for each fault injection scenario.
The LGSynth'91 benchmark circuits used in this work are represented in two-
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level pla formats, therefore, they are synthesized with single output optimization
using Espresso [85] tool and then mapped to 130nm technology using SIS [86]
to get the proper gate level representation of the circuit. The library used for
mapping consists of an Inverter and 2-, 3- and 4-input NAND and NOR gates.
The parameter phase in the logic synthesis process denes whether the output
function should be synthesized as an ON-set (phase=1) or an OFF-set (phase=0).
By default, each output is synthesized as an ON-set by the Espresso tool. Each
output is synthesized by synthesizing the phase with higher probability i.e., if
the output probability of 1 is higher than the probability of 0, then the value of
(phase=1) is set, otherwise, (phase=0) is set. This produces circuits with higher
reliability as shown in Table 3.5.
In Table 3.5, the rst column denotes the circuit names along with the number
of inputs and outputs in each circuit. The second and third major columns report
the reliability of circuits using default synthesis settings and the proposed majority
phase synthesis mechanism. The reliability of circuits is evaluated against 1, 2
and 5 faults, respectively. The Area of a benchmark is computed by summing the
drain area of all the nmos and pmos transistors.
78
T
ab
le
3.
5:
R
el
ia
b
il
it
y
of
or
ig
in
al
b
en
ch
m
ar
k
ci
rc
u
it
s.
C
ir
cu
it
(I
n
p
u
ts
,
O
u
tp
u
ts
)
T
ru
e
P
h
a
se
S
y
n
th
e
si
s
M
a
jo
ri
ty
P
h
a
se
S
y
n
th
e
si
s

A
re
a
2
A
re
a
1
(
)1
1
F
a
u
lt
2
F
a
u
lt
s
5
F
a
u
lt
s
O
ri
g
in
a
l
A
re
a
1
F
a
u
lt
2
F
a
u
lt
s
5
F
a
u
lt
s
al
u
4
(1
4,
8)
18
31
.4
4
96
.7
8%
92
.8
6%
83
.4
4%
14
29
.7
4
97
.8
9%
95
.8
6%
87
.4
4%
−
21
.9
3%
ap
ex
1
(4
5,
45
)
42
82
.2
96
.8
0%
92
.7
2%
82
.6
4%
46
02
.0
0
96
.7
2%
94
.2
0%
86
.4
0%
7.
47
%
ap
ex
2
(3
9,
3)
80
4.
18
99
.1
0%
97
.3
8%
94
.5
4%
60
9.
96
99
.2
0%
98
.0
4%
95
.4
2%
−
24
.1
5%
ap
ex
3
(5
4,
50
)
30
91
.9
2
96
.0
0%
93
.2
8%
84
.1
2%
30
25
.6
2
96
.8
8%
94
.7
6%
85
.6
6%
−
2.
14
%
ap
ex
4
(9
,
19
)
47
54
.1
95
.7
8%
92
.3
2%
82
.3
0%
45
75
.4
8
96
.2
0%
92
.7
4%
84
.1
6%
−
3.
76
%
b
12
(1
5,
9)
13
0.
26
88
.3
6%
78
.1
8%
54
.2
8%
12
1.
68
89
.1
0%
78
.2
2%
55
.3
0%
−
6.
59
%
cl
ip
(9
,
5)
37
2.
84
93
.2
4%
86
.4
0%
71
.4
4%
37
2.
84
93
.2
4%
86
.4
0%
71
.4
4%
0
%
co
rd
ic
(2
3,
2)
23
8.
68
98
.0
2%
96
.2
4%
90
.5
4%
24
1.
02
98
.1
0%
96
.2
8%
92
.1
4%
0.
98
%
ex
5
(8
,
63
)
94
8.
48
93
.2
8%
88
.6
4%
70
.7
0%
97
7.
34
93
.5
0%
88
.2
6%
71
.3
4%
3.
04
%
m
is
ex
1
(8
,
7)
13
9.
62
83
.4
0%
68
.9
2%
41
.7
4%
15
2.
88
84
.3
4%
71
.7
0%
48
.4
4%
9.
50
%
m
is
ex
2
(2
5,
18
)
22
5.
42
93
.3
6%
88
.0
2%
71
.8
0%
23
0.
88
93
.2
0%
88
.3
2%
69
.4
8%
2.
42
%
m
is
ex
3
(1
4,
14
)
24
10
.9
8
97
.4
8%
95
.5
6%
88
.5
8%
18
86
.8
2
97
.6
4%
95
.4
0%
88
.9
0%
−
21
.7
4%
rd
84
(8
,
4)
36
8.
94
91
.3
6%
84
.9
4%
65
.1
8%
49
6.
08
93
.3
8%
87
.2
2%
71
.4
0%
34
.4
6%
se
q
(4
1,
35
)
46
93
.2
6
98
.9
2%
98
.2
6%
95
.9
6%
49
70
.9
4
99
.0
5%
98
.2
2%
95
.7
4%
5.
92
%
sq
u
ar
5
(5
,
8)
11
1.
54
82
.5
0%
70
.0
4%
41
.0
4%
10
1.
40
83
.4
4%
69
.4
6%
42
.6
8%
−
9.
09
%
ta
b
le
3
(1
4,
14
)
30
73
.2
98
.1
2%
95
.5
2%
88
.5
4%
34
75
.6
8
98
.6
8%
97
.7
8%
94
.2
8%
13
.1
0%
ta
b
le
5
(1
7,
15
)
32
30
.7
6
97
.4
8%
96
.0
0%
88
.5
2%
35
35
.7
4
98
.7
0%
97
.7
2%
94
.5
2%
9.
44
%
z5
x
p
1
(7
,
10
)
24
8.
82
85
.9
6%
75
.3
8%
49
.3
6%
25
1.
16
87
.9
6%
75
.3
8%
52
.3
6%
0.
94
%
A
v
g
.
9
3
.6
6
%
8
8
.3
7
%
7
4
.7
1
%
9
4
.2
9
%
8
9
.2
2
%
7
7
.0
6
%
-0
.1
2
%
1
S
u
m
m
at
io
n
of
n
m
o
s
an
d
p
m
o
s
d
ra
in
w
id
th
s
2

A
re
a
=
  Orig
in
a
l
A
r
ea
 A
r
ea
1
A
r
ea
1
 1
00
79
Table 3.5 highlights the increase in reliability when the circuits are synthesized
w.r.t the majority phase. This is due to the increase in fault masking that may
occur as if the nal gate is an OR gate and has a value of \1", any fault propagating
through any of the other inputs will be masked. If the OR gate has at least two
inputs with a value of logic \1", all faults propagating through any of the inputs
will be masked. Thus, synthesizing the circuit to maximize the probability of
getting a logic 1 at the nal gate by synthesizing the majority phase will maximize
the probability of fault masking and hence improve reliability. Therefore, circuits
synthesized with the majority phase are the baseline circuits used in all simulations
in this work. It can be observed that for few benchmarks, reliability is above
90% for all fault injection scenarios. These benchmarks promise great reliability
improvement with slight area overhead.
Table 3.6 shows the results of applying Algorithm 1 on the benchmark circuits
and highlights the reliability of circuits for varying protection thresholds. A pro-
tection threshold of 98% implies that the circuit POF must be less than or equal
to (1   98%) = 0:02. Therefore, the applied protection threshold highly corre-
lates with the reliability achieved by the circuit for a single fault. In Table 3.6
under the 99% column, the minimum area overhead required for ex5 circuit to
achieve a reliability greater than or equal to 99% against a single fault is  140%.
For alu4, apex1, apex2, apex3, apex4, cordic, misex3, seq, table3 and table5
benchmarks under the 95% column in Table 3.6, zero area overhead implies that
these benchmarks achieve 95% reliability against single fault without any area
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Table 3.6: Reliability of circuits based on proposed STR technique with varying
protection thresholds against a single fault.
Circuit
95% 98% 99%
OH1 Rel OH Rel OH Rel
alu4 0% 97.89% 20.04% 98.44% 51.84% 99.02%
apex1 0% 96.72% 12.64% 98.10% 48.81% 99.10%
apex2 0% 99.20% 0% 99.20% 0% 99.20%
apex3 0% 96.88% 13.93% 98.05% 51.57% 99.08%
apex4 0% 96.20% 25.88% 98.30% 71.88% 99.02%
b12 86.50% 95.01% 149.02% 98.03% 197.69% 99.05%
clip 14.64% 95.00% 68.61% 98.11% 119.87% 99.08%
cordic 0% 98.10% 0% 98.10% 19.53% 99.00%
ex5 19.53% 95.62% 81.73% 98.12% 139.89% 99.02%
misex1 85.68% 95.07% 175.48% 98.01% 249.35% 99.02%
misex2 14.12% 95.24% 50.29% 98.36% 92.48% 99.20%
misex3 0% 97.64% 3.33% 98.10% 34.27% 99.18%
rd84 14.16% 95.10% 56.49% 98.02% 101.21% 99.24%
seq 0% 99.05% 0% 99.05% 0% 99.05%
squar5 107.79% 95.10% 206.15% 98.06% 286.51% 99.00%
table3 0% 98.68% 0% 98.68% 0.34% 99.24%
table5 0% 98.70% 0% 98.70% 1.70% 99.32%
z5xp1 68.22% 95.06% 143.69% 98.11% 202.88% 99.06%
Avg. 22.81% 96.68% 55.96% 98.31% 92.77% 99.11%
1 Area overhead (OH) =

Area After Protection
Original Area
  1

 100
overhead. Similarly, apex2, seq, table3 and table5 benchmarks also achieve 98%
reliability against single fault without any protection/area overhead. Only seq
circuit achieves 99% reliability without any overhead. The average area overhead
required by the proposed algorithm to achieve 95%, 98% and 99% reliability is
22.81%, 55.96% and 92.77%, respectively.
Next, the comparison is made between the proposed technique and the asym-
metric transistor sizing technique of sensitive gates in [1]. The transistor sizing
technique proposed by Lazzari et al. [1] asymmetrically sizes the transistors con-
nected to the output of a gate i.e., nmos and pmos networks are sized indepen-
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dently. The technique proposed by Lazzari et al. [1] is implemented as follows.
The sensitivity of a gate is measured by considering sa0 and sa1 fault detection
probabilities independently. Gates are then sorted according to their detection
probabilities. Algorithm 1 is then applied, but now the possible protections that
can be applied to a gate are restricted to transistors connected to the output of
a gate. For example, for a 2-input NAND gate possible protections are NAND21,
NAND23 and NAND24 only. After each protection applied to a gate, POFC of
circuit is updated using Eqn. 3.7. The process is repeated until the reliability/area
overhead requirement is met or all possible protections are applied to all gates.
The results of this technique are shown in Table 3.7. It can be observed
that by selectively protecting the transistors connected to the output of a gate,
benchmarks such as b12, clip, ex5, misex1, misex2, rd84, squar5 and z5xp1 are
unable to achieve 99% reliability against single fault. Benchmarks b12, misex1,
squar5 and z5xp1 are also unable to achieve 98% reliability. In addition to that,
the area overhead becomes signicantly higher in comparison to the proposed STR
technique even if the required reliability measure of 99% is achieved against single
fault.
The technique in [68] protects all sensitive gates symmetrically, i.e. all tran-
sistors in a sensitive gate are protected and are equally scaled. Comparison is
also made with the technique similar to [68] based on fully protecting sensitive
gates but with protecting transistors asymmetrically. Protecting transistors asym-
metrically has an advantage over symmetric protection due to the dierence in
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Table 3.7: Reliability of circuits based on Lazzari [1] gate sizing technique against
a single fault.
Circuit
95% 98% 99%
OH OH OH Rel OH Rel
alu4 0% 97.89% 70.33% 98.01% 218.64% 99.01%
apex1 0% 96.72% 55.42% 98.01% 312.95% 99.00%
apex2 0% 99.20% 0% 99.20% 0% 99.20%
apex3 0% 96.88% 43.37% 98.00% 333.11% 99.01%
apex4 0% 96.20% 108.59% 98.00% 483.00% 99.34%
b12 186.03% 95.05% 358.85% 96.78% 358.84% 96.78%
clip 43.15% 95.07% 203.47% 98.00% 321.62% 98.47%
cordic 0% 98.10% 0% 98.10% 122.59% 99.00%
ex5 33.97% 95.02% 349.78% 98.00% 429.32% 98.22%
misex1 197.69% 95.00% 322.86% 97.06% 322.86% 97.06%
misex2 17.05% 95.01% 394.03% 98.00% 504.89% 98.36%
misex3 0% 97.64% 4.18% 98.02% 211.21% 99.10%
rd84 43.98% 95.10% 237.37% 98.07% 456.35% 98.64%
seq 0% 99.05% 0% 99.05% 0% 99.05%
squar5 197.74% 95.02% 321.85% 97.13% 321.85% 97.13%
table3 0% 98.68% 0% 98.68% 0.82% 99.01%
table5 0% 98.70% 0% 98.70% 1.30% 99.01%
z5xp1 151.57% 95.02% 323.83% 97.62% 323.83% 97.62%
Avg. 48.40% 96.63% 155.22% 98.02% 262.40% 98.50%
characteristics of nmos and pmos transistors. The sensitivity of a gate is measured
as the sum of sa0 and sa1 fault detection probabilities. Gates are then sorted
according to their detection probabilities. Algorithm 1 is then applied by fully
protecting the gate with the highest detection probability. For example, a 2-input
NAND gate will be implemented as NAND25 in Table 3.2. After each protection
applied to a gate, POFC of circuit is updated using Eqn. 3.7. The process is
repeated until the reliability/area overhead requirement is met or all gates are
fully protected.
Table 3.8 highlights the area overhead incurred by fully protecting sensitive
gates asymmetrically against a single fault. It can be observed from Table 3.6
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Table 3.8: Reliability of circuits based on asymmetric gate sizing technique a
against single fault.
Circuit
95% 98% 99%
OH Rel OH Rel OH Rel
alu4 0% 97.89% 24.06% 98.01% 60.48% 99.18%
apex1 0% 96.72% 19.54% 98.20% 64.64% 99.28%
apex2 0% 99.20% 0% 99.20% 0% 99.20%
apex3 0% 96.88% 28.04% 98.02% 72.03% 99.18%
apex4 0% 96.20% 32.92% 98.05% 94.94% 99.12%
b12 89.40% 95.30% 173.50% 98.20% 264.83% 99.20%
clip 14.64% 95.22% 79.34% 98.11% 144.09% 99.19%
cordic 0% 98.10% 0% 98.10% 21.17% 99.06%
ex5 41.19% 95.11% 117.69% 98.19% 195.46% 99.10%
misex1 95.68% 95.19% 209.66% 98.13% 287.38% 99.10%
misex2 43.76% 95.34% 118.00% 98.06% 156.35% 99.11%
misex3 0% 97.64% 6.15% 98.10% 43.36% 99.20%
rd84 19.07% 95.01% 66.67% 98.11% 133.41% 99.02%
seq 0% 99.05% 0% 99.05% 0% 99.05%
squar5 112.46% 95.22% 231.08% 98.21% 327.28% 99.21%
table3 0% 98.68% 0% 98.68% 3.99% 99.24%
table5 0% 98.70% 0% 98.70% 4.41% 99.28%
z5xp1 72.59% 95.12% 156.79% 98.20% 235.18% 99.26%
Avg. 27.16% 96.70% 70.19% 98.30% 117.17% 99.17%
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and Table 3.8 that the proposed technique oers less area overhead as compared
to the asymmetric technique for all protection threshold scenarios. Also, under
the 99% column header in Table 3.6 and Table 3.8, it is evident that the proposed
technique achieves signicant area savings for 13 out of 18 benchmark circuits
with similar reliability measures.
The simulations are further extended to analyze circuits reliability against
multiple faults. The number of faults injected is correlated to the area of a circuit.
Table 3.9 shows the reliability achieved by prorating the 1, 2 and 5 faults for each
circuit according to its area. For example, if the area overhead is 131%, then the
actual area is increased by a factor of 2:31. So, 1, 2 and 5 faults in the original
circuit will prorate to 2:31, 4:62 and 11:55 faults in the protected circuit. For each
prorated fault, the circuit is simulated twice. For example, if the prorated faults to
be injected are 4.62, then the circuit is simulated twice, once by injecting 4 faults
and another by injecting 5 faults. The failure rate achieved by both fault injection
scenarios is then computed based on a weighted average to compute the nal
failure rate/reliability. It is interesting to observe that with the prorated faults,
the average reliability achieved by the proposed method with 99% protection is
above 96% for 1 and 2 prorated faults. The reliability measures achieved by
asymmetric sizing technique against prorated faults is shown in Table 3.10. It can
be observed that the average reliability achieved by the proposed scheme under
all fault injection scenarios and for all protection thresholds are better/close to
the asymmetric gate sizing technique.
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To further illustrate the advantage of the proposed STR technique against
techniques that fully protect sensitive gates, Table 3.11 shows the percentage
distribution of gates that have been protected with Single-Transistor protection
(1T) e.g., NAND21 from Table 3.2, Full Protection (FP) e.g., NAND25 from
Table 3.2 and No Protection (NP) for each circuit when Algorithm 1 is applied
for target reliability of 98% and 99%. It is clear from the table that for some
circuits the percentage of protected gates without full protection is signicant.
This percentage is even higher than the percentage of fully protected gates such
as apex2, apex3, cordic, misex2, table3 and table5.
Table 3.12 shows the reliability achieved by TMR algorithm. TMR algorithm
is evaluated under the same conditions as for Algorithm 1. The average area
incurred by TMR is always more than three times the original area. Comparing
to TMR, it can be observed that the average reliability achieved by the proposed
scheme under all fault injection scenarios and for all protection thresholds are
far better. With 95% protection threshold and an area overhead of just 22.81%,
better reliability is achieved by the proposed algorithm than TMR. This is due to
the fact that voters in TMR technique are not protected.
To improve the reliability of the TMR technique, the majority voters are pro-
tected by fully protecting the voters using proposed STR scheme. The results for
TMR with voter protection are shown in Table 3.12b. It can be observed that
the average reliability results have signicantly improved for dierent fault injec-
tion scenarios as compared to TMR without voter protection at the expense of
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additional average area overhead of  28:5%. In comparison to TMR with voter
protection, the proposed STR technique with 99% protection threshold achieves
comparable reliability with a signicantly lower area overhead.
For further evaluation, the proposed scheme is then compared to the
simulation-based synthesis technique [2]. The technique is based on maximizing
the probability of logical masking when a soft error occurs. This is done by ex-
tracting sub-circuits from an original multi-level circuit, and then re-synthesizing
each extracted sub-circuit to increase fault masking against a single fault, tak-
ing advantage of input probabilities and don't care conditions. Table 3.13 shows
the reliabilities obtained based on the original circuit, the circuits synthesized
by [2] and by the application of the proposed STR technique for the same area
overhead obtained by [2]. From Table 3.13, it is clear that the nal synthesized
circuits from [2] are unable to achieve 95% reliability against single fault except
for ex1010. This is a limitation of the technique in [2] as it improves reliability but
cannot achieve a given target reliability. The proposed STR technique achieves
slightly better results for all fault injection scenarios in comparison to the circuit
synthesized by the technique in [2]. However, the proposed STR technique has the
advantage that it can be applied to achieve any given target reliability or under
any given area overhead constraint.
It is worth mentioning that the technique in [2] and the proposed STR tech-
nique are complementary to each other. This is because the technique in [2] is
based on enhancing logical masking and is applied at the gate level while thr pro-
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posed STR technique is based on protecting sensitive transistors at the transistor
level through transistor sizing. Hence, applying both techniques could produce
better results than applying any of the techniques separately. To illustrate this,
Algorithm 1 is applied on both the original circuits and the synthesized circuits
obtained by [2] with target reliability of 99%. From Table 3.14, it is clear that
the proposed technique applied on top of the synthesized circuits obtained by [2]
result in signicant area savings as compared to applying STR alone on the orig-
inal circuits. This clearly indicates that the proposed method is scalable and can
be used to further improve other techniques.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a selective transistor-redundancy based fault tolerance tech-
nique for combinational circuits is proposed. The technique can be applied to
achieve a given circuit reliability or enhance the reliability of a circuit under a
given area constraint. The technique is based on estimating the failure probabil-
ity of each transistor and iteratively protecting transistors with the highest fail-
ure probability until the desired objective is achieved. Transistors are protected
based on duplicating and scaling a subset of transistors necessary for providing
the protection. Experimental results on LGSynth91 benchmarks demonstrate the
eectiveness of the proposed technique. Compared to existing transistor sizing
techniques, the proposed algorithm incurs signicantly less area overhead with
similar reliability measures. Better reliability results are also achieved in compar-
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ison to TMR with lower area overhead. Unlike TMR which has an area overhead
of at least 3 times the area overhead of the original circuit, the area overhead of
the proposed technique varies depending on the reliability of the original circuit.
For some circuits, high reliability (> 99%) is achieved with small area overhead
(< 10%). In addition, the reliability of the TMR technique has been enhanced
signicantly by protecting the voters based on applying the proposed technique.
Additionally, comparison with simulation-based synthesis technique further high-
lights the merit of the proposed method.
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Table 3.9: Reliability of circuits based on the proposed STR technique against
prorated faults.
(a) 1 prorated fault.
Circuit 95% 98% 99%
alu4 97.89% 98.11% 98.63%
apex1 96.72% 98.16% 98.66%
apex2 99.20% 99.20% 99.20%
apex3 96.88% 98.21% 98.43%
apex4 96.20% 97.85% 98.41%
b12 92.50% 95.74% 98.18%
clip 95.19% 97.39% 97.60%
cordic 98.10% 98.10% 98.98%
ex5 93.78% 96.25% 97.64%
misex1 92.62% 95.50% 97.15%
misex2 95.57% 97.33% 98.32%
misex3 97.64% 98.28% 98.61%
rd84 94.68% 97.96% 98.29%
seq 99.05% 99.05% 99.05%
squar5 91.50% 95.81% 97.10%
table3 98.68% 98.68% 99.20%
table5 98.70% 98.70% 99.08%
z5xp1 92.17% 96.22% 96.83%
Avg. 95.95% 97.59% 98.30%
(b) 2 prorated faults.
Circuit 95% 98% 99%
alu4 95.86% 96.46% 97.69%
apex1 94.20% 96.12% 97.07%
apex2 98.04% 98.04% 98.04%
apex3 94.76% 95.67% 97.30%
apex4 92.74% 95.21% 96.71%
b12 82.69% 91.39% 95.16%
clip 94.00% 94.50% 95.86%
cordic 96.28% 96.28% 97.73%
ex5 89.15% 93.49% 96.11%
misex1 83.51% 90.87% 94.57%
misex2 90.75% 94.40% 96.75%
misex3 95.40% 95.86% 97.53%
rd84 90.70% 93.83% 95.95%
seq 98.22% 98.22% 98.22%
squar5 81.17% 89.63% 94.73%
table3 97.78% 97.78% 98.05%
table5 97.72% 97.72% 97.58%
z5xp1 84.41% 91.08% 95.01%
Avg. 92.08% 94.81% 96.67%
(c) 5 prorated faults.
Circuit 95% 98% 99%
alu4 87.44% 90.26% 93.92%
apex1 86.40% 89.98% 93.47%
apex2 95.42% 95.42% 95.42%
apex3 85.66% 90.20% 93.52%
apex4 84.16% 88.12% 92.40%
b12 60.89% 79.48% 88.80%
clip 76.29% 85.16% 91.40%
cordic 92.14% 92.14% 95.25%
ex5 77.95% 83.77% 89.60%
misex1 62.12% 76.53% 86.88%
misex2 77.93% 88.25% 92.05%
misex3 88.90% 90.34% 94.37%
rd84 77.46% 86.07% 90.99%
seq 95.74% 95.74% 95.74%
squar5 58.77% 72.58% 84.07%
table3 94.28% 94.28% 95.15%
table5 94.52% 94.52% 95.99%
z5xp1 65.57% 80.45% 86.19%
Avg. 81.20% 87.40% 91.96%
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Table 3.10: Reliability of circuits based on asymmetric gate sizing technique
against prorated faults.
(a) 1 prorated fault.
Circuit 95% 98% 99%
alu4 97.89% 97.93% 98.72%
apex1 96.72% 97.92% 98.58%
apex2 99.20% 99.20% 99.20%
apex3 96.88% 97.46% 98.59%
apex4 96.20% 97.62% 98.10%
b12 92.81% 96.13% 98.19%
clip 94.77% 97.31% 98.26%
cordic 98.10% 98.10% 99.07%
ex5 92.90% 96.70% 98.15%
misex1 92.02% 95.40% 97.28%
misex2 93.46% 97.00% 98.72%
misex3 97.64% 98.40% 98.49%
rd84 94.45% 97.51% 98.70%
seq 99.05% 99.05% 99.05%
squar5 91.59% 95.56% 97.93%
table3 98.68% 98.68% 98.93%
table5 98.70% 98.70% 99.06%
z5xp1 92.03% 95.37% 97.77%
Avg. 95.73% 97.45% 98.49%
(b) 2 prorated faults.
Circuit 95% 98% 99%
alu4 95.86% 95.71% 98.18%
apex1 94.20% 95.18% 97.36%
apex2 98.04% 98.04% 98.04%
apex3 94.76% 95.64% 97.04%
apex4 92.74% 95.43% 96.27%
b12 84.23% 91.48% 95.76%
clip 88.73% 93.99% 96.38%
cordic 96.28% 96.28% 97.92%
ex5 88.39% 92.77% 96.18%
misex1 82.55% 91.37% 95.28%
misex2 87.84% 93.75% 96.51%
misex3 95.40% 96.14% 97.60%
rd84 90.22% 93.86% 96.64%
seq 98.22% 98.22% 98.22%
squar5 82.49% 90.35% 95.40%
table3 97.78% 97.78% 98.07%
table5 97.72% 97.72% 98.25%
z5xp1 85.25% 91.48% 94.73%
Avg. 91.71% 94.73% 96.88%
(c) 5 prorated faults.
Circuit 95% 98% 99%
alu4 87.44% 90.69% 94.00%
apex1 86.40% 90.05% 93.84%
apex2 95.42% 95.42% 95.42%
apex3 85.66% 88.26% 93.16%
apex4 84.16% 88.26% 91.94%
b12 62.81% 80.45% 90.68%
clip 76.06% 85.34% 91.15%
cordic 92.14% 92.14% 94.63%
ex5 73.93% 83.93% 90.25%
misex1 63.54% 77.23% 88.88%
misex2 71.17% 83.51% 90.92%
misex3 88.90% 91.27% 93.78%
rd84 76.22% 86.37% 91.58%
seq 95.74% 95.74% 95.74%
squar5 59.87% 74.52% 86.39%
table3 94.28% 94.28% 94.89%
table5 94.52% 94.52% 95.10%
z5xp1 66.50% 81.27% 88.09%
Avg. 80.82% 87.40% 92.25%
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Table 3.11: Distribution of protection schemes.
Circuit
# of
Gates
98% 99%
1T1 Full2 NP3 1T Full NP
alu4 832 0.36% 3.25% 95.91% 0.96% 9.74% 87.98%
apex1 2723 2.75% 1.54% 95.41% 5.25% 7.27% 86.49%
apex2 372 0% 0% 100% 0.54% 0% 99.46%
apex3 1791 6.09% 1.34% 92.29% 7.26% 6.98% 83.53%
apex4 2539 3.54% 4.37% 91.77% 8.82% 12.60% 77.79%
b12 88 1.14% 22.73% 73.86% 1.14% 36.36% 60.23%
clip 228 1.32% 14.04% 83.77% 0.88% 24.12% 70.61%
cordic 163 0% 0% 100% 1.23% 1.23% 96.32%
ex5 648 10.49% 7.10% 80.09% 12.35% 17.59% 67.75%
misex1 108 0.93% 35.19% 62.04% 0% 52.78% 44.44%
misex2 151 17.22% 8.61% 70.86% 17.22% 14.57% 64.24%
misex3 1100 2.18% 0.09% 97.64% 1.73% 3.91% 93.64%
rd84 296 1.69% 14.86% 82.77% 3.38% 22.97% 72.30%
squar5 71 0% 42.25% 53.52% 0% 54.93% 40.85%
table3 1953 0% 0% 100% 0.77% 0% 99.23%
table5 2020 0% 0% 100% 1.39% 0.05% 98.51%
z5xp1 176 1.70% 33.52% 64.20% 1.70% 46.02% 49.43%
1 % of gates with single transistor protection
2 % of gates with full protection
3 % of gates with no protection
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Table 3.12: Reliability of circuits based on TMR technique with prorated faults.
(a) TMR without voter protection.
Circuit OH 1 Fault 2 Faults 5 Faults
alu4 203.93% 99.24% 98.69% 94.67%
apex1 206.56% 98.23% 95.54% 89.50%
apex2 203.45% 98.84% 98.17% 94.09%
apex3 211.60% 96.18% 93.22% 81.57%
apex4 202.76% 99.49% 98.15% 95.67%
b12 251.92% 90.69% 80.89% 54.49%
clip 209.41% 98.11% 95.78% 84.77%
cordic 205.83% 98.83% 97.21% 95.60%
ex5 245.25% 91.15% 83.74% 62.89%
misex1 232.14% 90.81% 79.86% 51.91%
misex2 254.73% 81.55% 67.68% 36.96%
misex3 205.21% 98.78% 96.78% 90.70%
rd84 205.66% 98.75% 96.08% 84.78%
seq 204.94% 98.24% 97.28% 92.79%
squar5 255.38% 85.50% 73.56% 36.54%
table3 202.83% 99.00% 98.36% 95.33%
table5 202.98% 99.03% 98.26% 94.76%
z5xp1 225.16% 93.91% 87.78% 65.90%
Avg. 218.32% 95.35% 90.94% 77.94%
(b) TMR with voter protection.
Circuit OH 1 Fault 2 Faults 5 Faults
alu4 207.53% 99.78% 99.30% 97.07%
apex1 215.41% 99.72% 99.59% 98.05%
apex2 207.51% 99.93% 99.37% 98.44%
apex3 228.91% 99.59% 99.36% 98.22%
apex4 205.21% 99.60% 99.16% 97.91%
b12 329.44% 98.64% 95.30% 76.26%
clip 222.78% 99.75% 98.10% 90.49%
cordic 211.43% 99.79% 98.65% 95.97%
ex5 305.03% 99.67% 98.30% 96.34%
misex1 288.88% 98.53% 94.35% 73.16%
misex2 347.30% 99.37% 98.02% 92.85%
misex3 212.74% 99.73% 99.15% 97.47%
rd84 212.58% 99.47% 98.05% 89.84%
seq 210.86% 99.76% 99.63% 98.77%
squar5 356.21% 98.16% 91.33% 60.67%
table3 205.66% 99.84% 99.38% 98.53%
table5 206.14% 99.84% 99.44% 98.61%
z5xp1 268.10% 98.91% 95.87% 81.39%
Avg. 246.76% 99.45% 97.91% 91.11%
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Table 3.13: Comparison of circuit reliability for proposed STR technique with the
technique in [2].
Circuit
Original Synthesized by [2] STR applied to Original3
Area () S1 2 OH S 1P2 2P S 1P 2P
apex3 1994.46 84.16% 68.96% 31.68% 92.60% 89.18% 78.52% 93.15% 91.45% 82.78%
apex4 2532.66 87.06% 76.70% 50.79% 95.74% 92.63% 86.37% 96.20% 93.95% 87.60%
bench1 1313.52 82.32% 67.98% 34.98% 92.86% 91.18% 83.17% 93.46% 91.69% 84.10%
cps 1452.36 78.14% 59.78% 46.35% 91.64% 88.51% 77.85% 92.82% 89.33% 81.43%
duke2 535.86 79.22% 64.10% 30.86% 91.06% 87.83% 77.43% 91.90% 89.55% 78.42%
ex1010 4219.02 87.64% 79.18% 42.17% 95.52% 94.85% 89.88% 96.22% 95.75% 90.41%
exp 363.48 75.34% 56.72% 27.90% 89.48% 85.86% 74.10% 89.38% 86.98% 75.53%
misex3 883.74 87.36% 76.18% 29.30% 94.30% 93.44% 86.15% 95.12% 94.35% 85.88%
spla 475.8 81.08% 65.36% 18.85% 87.62% 86.02% 74.83% 89.92% 87.61% 75.82%
table3 991.38 85.74% 73.18% 29.19% 93.28% 92.08% 83.93% 94.12% 92.34% 85.47%
table5 1106.04 82.64% 68.56% 38.22% 94.30% 92.45% 85.69% 94.78% 92.26% 86.78%
test1 1040.52 82.00% 68.18% 37.18% 92.82% 89.95% 82.01% 93.78% 90.09% 83.60%
Avg. 82.73% 68.74% 34.79% 92.60% 90.33% 81.66% 93.40% 91.28% 83.15%
1 Single fault
2 1 prorated faults
3 STR applied to Original with area overhead constraint mentioned in column header \OH"
Table 3.14: Reliabilities of circuits based on applying proposed STR technique to
circuits obtained by the technique in [2].
Circuit
STR Applied to
Original with 99%
STR Applied to
Syntheized by [2] with 99%
OH Rel OH Rel
apex3 170.27% 99.10% 141.93% 99.05%
apex4 109.29% 99.02% 96.83% 99.10%
bench1 148.65% 99.01% 100.04% 99.09%
cps 164.66% 99.00% 160.33% 99.01%
duke2 140.69% 99.06% 135.10% 99.03%
ex1010 90.39% 99.10% 60.54% 99.01%
exp 168.03% 99.04% 149.10% 99.02%
misex3 81.65% 99.05% 75.92% 99.12%
spla 115.83% 99.05% 112.21% 99.00%
table3 89.77% 99.10% 67.00% 99.12%
table5 116.56% 99.10% 71.00% 99.13%
test1 165.14% 99.08% 115.49% 99.02%
Avg. 130.08% 99.06% 107.12% 99.06%
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CHAPTER 4
DOUBLE MODULAR
REDUNDANCY (DMR) BASED
FAULT TOLERANCE
TECHNIQUE FOR
COMBINATIONAL CIRCUITS
The objective in this chapter is to improve reliability of combinational cir-
cuits based on the double modular redundancy scheme. As opposed to TMR,
where each module is triplicated followed by a voter, each module in the pro-
posed Double Modular Redundancy (DMR) scheme is duplicated followed by a
NAND/AND masking gate. Modules are synthesized by either synthesizing the
true or the complement function to maximize soft error masking. Secondly, the
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proposed selective transistor redundancy technique in Chapter 3 is also applied
to the proposed DMR technique in order to further improve its reliability. In ad-
dition, improved application of DMR based on the use of C-element is illustrated.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 discusses the moti-
vation and implementation of the proposed DMR technique, Section 4.2 discusses
modular redundancy technique that employs C-element as a voter, simulation
results are elaborated in Section 5.4 and nally, the chapter is concluded in Sec-
tion 7.1.
4.1 Proposed Double Modular Redundancy
Fault Tolerance Technique
In this Section, a double modular redundancy (DMR) fault tolerance tech-
nique is proposed targeting the achievement of high reliability with reduced area
overhead. The technique is based on identifying the probability of occurrence of
logic values \0" and \1" at each primary output of a circuit. The consideration
made here is that the circuit consists of two-level logic, represented in sum-of-
products form. Next, dierent cases in relation to the output value probability of
occurrence to illustrate the proposed DMR technique are discussed.
If (Prob0 > Prob1) for an output Y , then the true value of Y will be im-
plemented as a sum-of-products circuit. Furthermore, the logic cone that has Y
as an output will be duplicated and the two duplicate outputs will be combined
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using an AND gate as a masking gate. To elaborate this rule, consider the case
when the output of a module produces a logic \0" value (case with highest prob-
ability). In this case, it is guaranteed t hat all single or multiple faults occurring
in a single module will be tolerated as the AND masking gate will produce the
correct output value due to the logic \0" value produced by the other module at
its second input. However, when the module output produces a logic \1" value
(case with lower probability), then at least one of the AND gates in the sum-of-
products representation of the Y module produces a logic \1" value. This will
mask all errors occurring on the other AND gates in the module as they are com-
bined using an OR gate which retains the correct output value. The only fault
that may not be protected for the AND gates is the one occurring on the AND
gate that produces logic value \1", assuming that a single AND gate produces a
logic \1" value. If there are more than one AND gate producing logic value \1",
then all faults occurring on AND gates will be protected. Faults occurring on
the OR gate in the sum-of-products module when the module produces an out-
put logic value \1" are not protected. Such unprotected faults occurring on the
OR gate and on the masking AND gate can be protected based on applying the
selective transistor redundancy (STR) technique from Chapter 3, which is based
on protecting sensitive transistors that have high detection probability by tran-
sistor duplication and sizing. Assuming two-level NAND-NAND implementation
of sum-of-products expression, faults occurring on the 2nd level NAND gate (im-
plementing the OR gate) needs to be protected when the output produced a logic
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value \1". This implies that the gate needs to be protected for soft errors occur-
ring on nmos transistors. As illustrated in Chapter 3, protecting nmos transistor
faults is much cheaper than protecting pmos transistor faults as for each protected
nmos transistor only the corresponding pmos transistor needs to be duplicated and
scaled.
If (Prob1 > Prob0) for an output Y , then the complement function Y will
be implemented for the output Y . The implemented Y function will then be
duplicated and the two duplicate outputs are combined using a NAND gate as a
masking gate. The rationale behind this rule is that if Prob1 > Prob0 and the
logic is implemented as Y , then Y will feed logic value \0" most of the time to the
NAND masking gate, which will provide protection against all faults occurring
in a single module. When the output produces the least probable value \0",
Y will produce the logic value \1", which will provide the protection of faults
occurring at all AND gates implementing the sum-of-products expression that are
not producing a logic \1" value in the case of a single AND gate producing a logic
\1" value. Implementing the function as Y for Prob1 > Prob0 using a NAND
masking gate case makes it equivalent to implementing the function Y using an
AND masking gate for the Prob0 > Prob1 case. It is worth noting that for this
case (i.e., Prob1 > Prob0), the proposed DMR technique is more eective than
the technique proposed in [7] which implements the true value of Y and combines
the two duplicate outputs using a masking OR gate. While using a masking OR
gate provides protection when the output produces the dominant logic \1" value,
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it provides no fault protection when the output produces the logic \0" value.
Algorithm 2 highlights the steps of the proposed DMR algorithm. Circuits
are synthesized using the Espresso [85] tool and then mapped using the SIS [86]
tool to a library consisting of 2-, 3-, 4-input NAND/NOR gates and an Inverter.
While synthesizing using Espresso, having phase=0 synthesizes the OFF-set of the
corresponding output function while having phase=1 synthesizes the ON-set. By
default, the ON-set of each output is synthesized i.e., phase=1 for each output, as
shown in line 6. Once the proper gate level representation of a circuit is obtained,
Prob0 and Prob1 at each output i is computed using simulations of 1 million
random input vectors, as shown in line 7. Then, Phasei for each output i is
assigned a value based on the condition in line 9. After Phasei is computed,
the original circuit is re-synthesized with the new/updated phase value for each
output. The synthesized module for each output is then duplicated and the two
outputs are combined using AND masking gate when Phasei = 1 and using
NAND masking gate when Phasei = 0 .
As an illustrative example of the proposed DMR algorithm, let us con-
sider a single output, Y0, sum-of-products circuit composed of 4 AND gates,
G0; G1; G2; G3, and one OR gate, F0, as shown in Fig. 4.1.
For the sake of argument, let's consider that Prob0(= 60%) > Prob1(= 40%)
at the output Y0. In this case, the logic cone having Y0 as an output will be
synthesized in sum-of-products form. Two copies of the circuit will be created
leading to two outputs Y01 and Y02. The two outputs are combined using a masking
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Algorithm 2 : Proposed DMR Algorithm
Require: Circuit in pla format
1: Probi0 : Probability of 0 at output i
2: Probi1 : Probability of 1 at output i
3: Phasei : Phase/polarity of output i to be synthesized
4: joutputsj : Number of primary outputs in circuit
5:
6: Synthesize ON-set of each output of the circuit
7: Compute Probi0 and Probi1 of each output using simulation
8: for (i = 1! joutputsj) do
9: if (Probi0 > Probi1) then
10: Synthesize output i with Phasei = 1
11: Duplicate synthesized output i module and connect the two outputs
using AND masking gate
12: else
13: Synthesize output i with Phasei = 0
14: Duplicate synthesized output i module and connect the two outputs
using NAND masking gate
15: end if
16: end for
G0
G1
G2
G3
F0
Y0
Figure 4.1: A simple two-level circuit.
AND gate, implemented as a NAND gate followed by an inverter as shown in
Fig. 4.2. Since 60% of the time, output values from gates F01 and F02 will be
\0", therefore, faults occurring on any single output module will be masked 60%
of the time as the output of the non-faulty module will produce logic value \0",
which will mask the propagation of the fault eect to the output.
Now, consider the case when 40% of the time the output of gates F01 and F02
produce logic value \1" as depicted in Fig. 4.3. To get logic \1" at the output of
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G01
F01
Y01
G11
G21
G31
G02
F02
G12
G22
G32
Y02
Y0
0
0
Masking 
gate
60% of time
Figure 4.2: Circuit after output module duplication and addition of masking AND
gate.
G01
F01
Y01
G11
G21
G31
G02
F02
G12
G22
G32
Y02
Y0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
Masking 
gate
25% of 40% of time
40% of time
Figure 4.3: Case 1 of 40% of the time logic \1" value is produced at the masking
gate input.
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F01
Y01
G11
G21
G31
G02
F02
G12
G22
G32
Y02
Y0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Masking 
gate
75% of 40% of time
40% of time
Figure 4.4: Case 2 of 40% of the time logic \1" value is produced at the masking
gate input.
gates F01 and F02, at least one logic \1" value is required at their inputs. Let's
assume that at least 25% of 40% of the time, constituting 10% of the total time,
at least two AND gates in each logic cone produce a logic \1" value as highlighted
in Fig. 4.3. No protection is required in this scenario because any single fault
striking any AND gate will be masked by the OR gates F01 or F02 due to having
at least one logic \1" value at their inputs.
Finally, consider the case when only one AND gate produces logic \1" value
in each logic cone as shown in Fig. 4.4, and assume that this happens for the 75%
of the 40% of time, i.e. 30% of the total time. Even in this case, for faults hitting
any of the AND gates producing logic value \0" will be masked. However, if a
fault strikes at the AND gate producing logic value \1", then this fault will not
be masked and will be observable at the output. Considering all these scenarios,
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it can be seen that based on the proposed DMR approach high reliability can be
achieved with nearly double the area overhead.
4.2 Improved C-Element Based DMR (DMR-
CEL)
In this section, an improved implementation of DMR is discussed where C-
element is used to combine the outputs of the two duplicate modules (DMR-CEL).
Furthermore, investigation is also performed to study the implact of transistor-
level protection applied to the C-element.
A C-element [54] consists of two inputs and one output. If both inputs are
0(1), then the output of C-element will be 0(1); otherwise the output preserves the
previously stored value. For the correct operation of the C-element, it is assumed
that once the input values become stable, they will not change their values until
the output changes. The output c of the C-element can be expressed in terms of
the inputs a and b and the complement of the current state of the output c by the
following boolean function [53]:
c = c  (a+ b) + a  b (4.1)
Several C-element implementations have been discussed and analyzed in de-
tail by Shams et al. [53]. In this work, the C-element implementation by Van
Berkel [11] is utilized and is shown in Fig. 4.5a. The advantages of this imple-
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(a) Without protection.
C
C
(b) With protection.
Figure 4.5: Van Berkel C-Element [11].
Protected 
C-Element
Y
Y
OUT
Figure 4.6: DMR-CEL: Logic cone synthesized based on true form.
mentation include being ratioless and symmetric with respect to the inputs. It
has been shown by Shams et al. [53] that symmetric implementation is the best
candidate for energy-ecient and high-speed designs.
The implementation of DMR-CEL for a circuit with a single output Y is shown
in Fig. 4.6. For this scheme, circuits are synthesized dierently than the proposed
DMR scheme mentioned in Algorithm 2. Here, each output i is synthesized based
on the majority phase i.e., if(Probi0 > Probi1) then Phasei = 0 and vice versa.
For the case when Probi0 > Probi1, an inverter is added at the output Yi to get
the true output value. The logic cone of Yi is duplicated and the two outputs
are fed to the C-element to generate the nal output. Synthesizing the majority
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phase for each module has the advantage of masking many faults occurring at the
rst level AND gates in a sum-of-products implementation of each output as has
been illustrated in Section 4.1.
The protected version of C-element against soft errors is shown in Fig. 4.5b,
where each transistor is duplicated and connected in parallel with each transistor
scaled (widths increased) with necessary scaling factors to provide protection. The
area of C-element using 130nm Predictive Technology Model (PTM) [79], which
is the drain width of all transistors, is 4:68. The protected version of C-element
shown in Fig. 4.5b has an area of 21:216. Therefore, the area overhead of the
protected C-element is
 
21:216
4:68
  1 100 = 353%.
The protected C-element provides protection against soft errors provided that
both it's inputs are error free i.e., having the same logic value. In case input values
to the C-element are not the same, i.e., one of the inputs is faulty, then a fault
hitting transistors in the C-element may or may not excite a fault at the output.
Fault excitation due to a particle strike at any of the transistors in the C-element
depends on the location of the strike and the true output value. For example,
if both inputs to the C-element (without protection) have logic value \1", then
the true output will be logic value \1". Now, if a particle strikes any of the pmos
transistors in the rst stage (not including the transistors in the inverter), then
C will be have the logic value \1" and then C will have the logic value \0" and
the fault will propagate to the output. But, in case of the protected C-element in
Fig. 4.5b, a fault hitting any of the pmos transistors will keep the node C having
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logic value \0" as the corresponding duplicated and scaled nmos transistors will
suppress the fault eect, which makes the output C retain its true logic value \1".
For faults hitting transistors in the inverter connected to the output C, they are
fully protected in the protected C-element while they are not in the unprotected
version. The same arguments apply for the case when both inputs to the C-
element have logic value \0" and faults strike any of the nmos transistors in the
rst stage.
4.3 Experimental Results
In this section, the impact of the proposed DMR and the improved DMR-CEL
algorithms on the area and reliability of LGSynth'91 benchmarks is evaluated. The
benchmarks consist of circuits with varying complexity in terms of area, number
of inputs and outputs. The LGSynth'91 benchmark circuits used in this work
are synthesized with single output optimization using Espresso [85] tool and then
mapped to a library that consists of an Inverter, and 2-, 3- and 4-input NAND
and NOR gates using SIS [86] tool. The reliability of a circuit is computed using
the method discussed in Chapter 6, which is based on gate-level simulation with
an accuracy of transistor-level simulation using SPICE.
The reliability of a circuit is computed against a single fault and prorated 1
and 2 faults for each circuit. The number of prorated faults is correlated to the
area overhead of a circuit. For example, if the area overhead is 131%, then the
actual area is increased from 1 to 2:31 times the original circuit. Therefore, 1, and
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2 faults in the original circuit will prorate to 2:31 and 4:62 faults in the protected
circuit. For each prorated fault, the circuit is simulated twice and the failure
rate (FR) is computed based on a weighted average to compute the nal failure
rate/reliability. For example, if the prorated faults to be injected are 4.62, then the
circuit is simulated twice, rst by injecting 4 faults and then by injecting 5 faults.
The failure rate is then computed as 0:38  FR(4faults) + 0:62  FR(5faults).
For each fault injection scenario, faults are injected randomly and simulation is
performed for 5000 iterations to compute the failure rate.
Table 4.1 shows the area overhead and reliabilities of circuits based on the
proposed DMR technique against a single fault and the prorated 1, and 2 faults.
The rst column denotes the circuit name along with the number of primary inputs
and outputs. The second and third columns show the area of the original circuit
and the circuit obtained by the proposed DMR technique, based on the summation
of nmos and pmos drain widths, respectively. The average area overhead of the
proposed DMR technique is 105:69%. The average reliability against a single fault
and 1 and 2 prorated faults is 98:48%, 97:02% and 94:20%, respectively.
Reliability of circuits obtained based on the proposed DMR technique can be
further enhanced based on the application of the STR technique from Chapter 3.
This technique can enhance the reliability of a circuit to any given reliability
requirement based on transistor duplication and sizing. The STR technique is
applied to the circuits obtained based on the proposed DMR technique with two
reliability thresholds: 99:5% and 99:8%. The threshold value denotes the reliabil-
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Table 4.1: Circuit reliability and area overhead based on the proposed DMR
technique.
Circuit
(In, Out)
Area ()1
DMR
Area ()
DMR
OH2
1F3 P14 P25
alu4 (14, 8) 1429.74 3772.86 163.88% 99.20% 97.49% 96.45%
apex1 (45, 45) 4602.00 8661.12 88.20% 98.90% 97.69% 95.30%
apex2 (39, 3) 609.96 1615.38 164.83% 99.70% 99.04% 98.49%
apex3 (54, 50) 3025.62 6300.84 108.25% 98.40% 97.45% 94.59%
apex4 (9, 19) 4575.48 9550.32 108.73% 99.05% 98.27% 96.31%
clip (9, 5) 372.84 745.68 100.00% 97.35% 94.35% 88.05%
cordic (23, 2) 241.02 361.14 49.84% 99.15% 98.60% 97.50%
ex5 (8, 63) 977.34 1994.46 104.07% 96.85% 93.72% 87.42%
misex2 (25, 18) 230.88 492.96 113.51% 95.85% 90.88% 83.88%
misex3 (14, 14) 1886.82 5370.30 184.62% 99.20% 98.62% 97.02%
rd84 (8, 4) 496.08 703.56 41.82% 96.25% 94.32% 88.75%
seq (41, 35) 4970.94 9463.74 90.38% 99.65% 99.09% 97.70%
table3 (14, 14) 3475.68 6179.16 77.78% 99.50% 99.26% 99.14%
table5 (17, 15) 3535.74 6496.62 83.74% 99.60% 99.46% 98.20%
Avg. 105.69% 98.48% 97.02% 94.20%
1 Summation of nmos and pmos drain widths
2 Area overhead (OH)=
 
DMR Area
Area   1
 100
3 Single Fault
4 Prorated 1 fault
5 Prorated 2 faults
ity of a circuit required to be achieved against a single fault. It is evident from
Table 4.2 that the desired reliability threshold is achieved for all circuits with
average area overhead of 137:82% and 180:57%, respectively.
Table 4.3 shows the area overhead and reliabilities of circuits obtained based on
applying the TMR technique without and with voter protection. Voters are fully
protected based on applying the STR technique from Chapter 3. In comparison
to the TMR without voter protection, it can be observed that the proposed DMR
technique achieves better reliability for prorated faults with signicantly lower
area overhead. Reliabilities of circuits designed based on TMR are reduced due to
soft errors hitting the non-protected voters especially when a circuit has a large
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Table 4.2: Circuit reliability and area overhead based on the combined application
of the proposed DMR and STR (Chapter 3) techniques.
Circuit
99.5% 99.8%
OH 1F P1 P2 OH 1F P1 P2
alu4 181.39% 99.60% 99.12% 98.45% 224.53% 99.92% 99.45% 98.62%
apex1 97.78% 99.55% 99.08% 97.45% 133.86% 99.88% 99.23% 98.50%
apex2 164.83% 99.70% 99.04% 98.49% 171.27% 99.96% 99.70% 98.99%
apex3 122.23% 99.52% 99.20% 97.56% 179.18% 99.80% 98.81% 98.13%
apex4 123.14% 99.51% 99.13% 97.33% 184.60% 99.82% 99.33% 98.26%
clip 217.66% 99.58% 99.03% 95.45% 308.56% 99.84% 99.23% 96.45%
cordic 57.11% 99.61% 99.45% 98.89% 101.55% 99.85% 99.50% 96.03%
ex5 205.90% 99.56% 98.77% 96.16% 301.05% 99.87% 99.21% 96.44%
misex2 170.61% 99.66% 99.20% 97.10% 244.46% 99.88% 99.40% 97.80%
misex3 184.91% 99.57% 99.13% 97.67% 218.99% 99.86% 99.22% 98.54%
rd84 151.91% 99.51% 99.22% 97.88% 201.69% 99.84% 99.38% 98.20%
seq 90.46% 99.60% 99.39% 98.35% 93.84% 99.81% 99.57% 99.06%
table3 77.78% 99.50% 99.26% 99.14% 78.91% 99.83% 99.85% 99.59%
table5 83.74% 99.60% 99.46% 98.96% 85.52% 99.81% 99.74% 99.29%
Avg. 137.82% 99.58% 99.18% 97.78% 180.57% 99.86% 99.40% 98.14%
number of outputs. For TMR with voters protection, it can be observed that the
average reliability has signicantly improved for dierent fault injection scenarios
as compared to TMR without voter protection at the expense of an additional
average area overhead of  28:5%.
Table 4.3: Circuit reliability and area overhead based on TMR technique.
Circuit
TMR without Voter Protection TMR with Voter Protection
OH 1F P1 P2 OH 1F P1 P2
alu4 203.93% 99.70% 99.24% 98.69% 207.53% 100% 99.78% 99.30%
apex1 206.56% 99.18% 98.23% 95.54% 215.41% 100% 99.72% 99.59%
apex2 203.45% 99.60% 98.84% 98.17% 207.51% 100% 99.93% 99.37%
apex3 211.60% 98.68% 96.18% 93.22% 228.91% 100% 99.59% 99.36%
apex4 202.76% 99.72% 99.49% 98.15% 205.21% 100% 99.60% 99.16%
clip 209.41% 99.42% 98.11% 95.78% 222.78% 100% 99.75% 98.10%
cordic 205.83% 99.62% 98.83% 97.21% 211.43% 100% 99.79% 98.65%
ex5 245.25% 96.90% 91.15% 83.74% 305.03% 100% 99.67% 98.30%
misex2 254.73% 93.56% 81.55% 67.68% 347.30% 100% 99.37% 98.02%
misex3 205.21% 99.12% 98.78% 96.78% 212.74% 100% 99.73% 99.15%
rd84 205.66% 99.60% 98.75% 96.08% 212.58% 100% 99.47% 98.05%
seq 204.94% 99.36% 98.24% 97.28% 210.86% 100% 99.76% 99.63%
table3 202.83% 99.66% 99.00% 98.36% 205.66% 100% 99.84% 99.38%
table5 202.98% 99.66% 99.03% 98.26% 206.14% 100% 99.84% 99.44%
Avg. 211.80% 98.84% 96.81% 93.92% 228.51% 100% 99.70% 98.96%
The average reliability of circuits designed using the combined application of
the proposed DMR technique and STR technique with 99:5% protection thresh-
old is slightly lower than the TMR technique with voter protection for all fault
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injection scenarios with signicantly less area overhead. However, with 99:8% pro-
tection threshold, reliability of circuits is comparable to the TMR technique with
voter protection but with signicantly less area overhead i.e., 180:57 as compared
to 228:51.
Table 4.4: Circuit reliability and area overhead based on DMR-CEL.
Circ.
DMR-CEL (un-protected CEL) DMR-CEL (protected CEL)
OH 1F P1 P2 OH 1F P1 P2
alu4 102.62% 99.34% 98.60% 97.02% 111.87% 100% 99.96% 99.84%
apex1 104.37% 99.10% 98.16% 96.73% 119.82% 100% 99.42% 99.98%
apex2 102.30% 99.62% 98.95% 97.91% 110.43% 100% 99.96% 99.90%
apex3 107.73% 98.26% 96.72% 93.77% 135.06% 100% 98.70% 99.88%
apex4 101.84% 99.54% 99.25% 98.39% 108.35% 100% 99.55% 99.86%
clip 106.28% 98.34% 97.08% 93.34% 128.45% 100% 98.90% 99.02%
cordic 103.88% 98.84% 97.89% 95.97% 117.61% 100% 99.10% 99.63%
ex5 130.17% 93.70% 85.79% 74.75% 236.76% 100% 97.97% 94.68%
misex2 136.49% 93.68% 85.81% 74.54% 265.41% 100% 98.79% 95.32%
misex3 103.47% 99.54% 98.52% 96.79% 115.74% 100% 99.80% 98.90%
rd84 103.77% 99.14% 98.07% 95.66% 117.11% 100% 99.80% 97.50%
seq 103.30% 99.32% 98.86% 96.89% 114.94% 100% 99.80% 99.47%
table3 101.89% 99.64% 99.39% 98.62% 108.55% 100% 99.88% 99.50%
table5 101.99% 99.48% 99.19% 98.23% 109.00% 100% 99.89% 99.50%
Avg. 107.86% 98.40% 96.59% 93.47% 135.65% 100% 99.39% 98.78%
The area overhead and reliabilities of circuits based on the application of the
improved DMR-CEL technique without and with C-element protection are shown
in Table 4.4. In comparison with the results obtained for the proposed DMR
technique in Table 4.1, the proposed DMR technique achieves better results as
compared to DMR-CEL with un-protected C-element. However, the reliability
of circuits based on DMR-CEL technique with protected C-element signicantly
improve as evident from Table 4.4. DMR-CEL with protected C-element oers
100% reliability against a single fault and achieves better reliability as compared to
TMR with voter protection with signicantly less area overhead. It also achieves
slightly better reliability than the one based on combined application of the pro-
posed DMR and STR techniques with 99:5% protection threshold for similar area
110
overhead. However, due to the complexity of the C-element, the impact on per-
formance is higher in comparison to the proposed DMR technique where only a
masking 2-input AND or 2-input NAND gate is added at each output.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, a soft error tolerant combinational circuit based on double
modular redundancy is proposed. The technique is based on identifying the prob-
ability of occurrence of logic values \0" and \1" at each primary output of a circuit.
Based on this, each output is synthesized in either the true or the complement
form, and is then duplicated and a masking AND or NAND gate is used to com-
bine the two duplicate outputs. The technique achieves higher circuit radiabilities
than TMR without voter protection with signicantly lower area overhead. It is
also demonstrated that the combined application of the proposed DMR technique
with the STR technique achieves comparable circuit reliabilities with signicantly
lower area overhead in comparison to TMR with fully protected voters.
Furthermore, an improved DMR based on the use of C-element (DMR-CEL) to
combine the duplicate outputs is also proposed. This scheme applies redundancy
by implementing the original and duplicated logic with majority phase. Relia-
bilities of circuits based on the proposed DMR are higher than those obtained
based on DMR-CEL without C-element protection. Reliabilities of circuits based
on DMR-CEL with protected C-element are similar to those obtained based on
TMR with voter protection with signicantly lower area overhead. It also achieves
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slightly better reliabilities than the combined application of the proposed DMR
technique and STR technique for similar area overhead with a protection threshold
of 99:5%. The advantage of the proposed DMR technique over DMR-CEL is that
it uses primitive gates as masking gates which have lower impact on performance
in comparison to the use of C-element.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS BASED FAULT
TOLERANCE TECHNIQUE
FOR COMBINATIONAL
CIRCUITS
In this chapter, an integrated soft error tolerance technique based on logical
implications and transistor sizing is proposed. A set of source and target nodes
with predened thresholds are selected and implications between these nodes are
extracted. Then, the impact of adding a functionally redundant wire (FRW) due
to each implication is evaluated. This is done based on identifying an implication
path and the gates along the implication path whose detection probabilities will
be reduced due to adding the implication FRW. Then, the gain of an implica-
tion is computed in terms of reduction in fault detection probabilities of gates
113
along an implication path. The implication with the highest gain is selected. The
process is repeated until the gain is less than a predetermined threshold. The
proposed implication-based fault tolerance technique enhances the circuit relia-
bility with minimal area overhead based on enhancing logical masking. However,
its eectiveness depends on the existence of such relations in a circuit and can
enhance circuit reliability upto a certain level. To enhance circuit reliability to
any required level, selective-transistor redundancy (STR) based technique is then
applied. This technique is based on providing fault tolerance for individual tran-
sistors with high detection probability based on transistor duplication and sizing.
Experimental results show that the proposed integrated fault tolerance technique
achieves similar reliability in comparison to applying STR alone with lower area
overhead.
The proposed implication-based fault tolerance technique is similar to the tech-
nique [63] in estimating the value of adding a FRW due to an implication. How-
ever, it is based on estimating the impact on fault detection probabilities. In
addition, detailed algorithm for identifying an implication path and the gates
along the path is provided. Furthermore, the fanouts of gates along an impli-
cation path and their reachability to the target gate is taken into consideration
during the estimation of the impact of adding an implication FRW on detection
probabilities of gates along the implication path. FRWs due to implications are
added either at the target gate or at its fanout gate allowing both invert and non-
invert implications without any restriction to the number of FRWs added at any
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gate. This is justied as the value of each implication is estimated and a FRW due
to an implication is added if the improvement in detection probabilities of gates
along an implication path is greater than a given threshold. Also, implications
are sorted in descending order of their values and the implication with the highest
value is added rst. After adding an implication, values of all other implications
are updated and the implication with the highest value is then selected.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1 the motivation
of the proposed method is presented, in Section 5.2 the proposed fault tolerance
technique is described, an illustrative example is given in Section 5.3, experimental
results are elaborated in Section 5.4 and the paper is concluded in Section 7.1.
5.1 Motivation
In this section, the basic principles of logic implications are briey explained.
Then, the dierences between proposed technique and other related techniques
are highlighted. These are illustrated based on the examples given in [62].
A logic implication from a source gate S to a target gate T indicates a ne-
grained invariant relationship that a logic value assignment at the source gate will
always enforce a consistent value assignment at the target gate i.e., (S = u) )
(T = v), where u; v 2 (0; 1). Such forced relations can be used to mask SETs.
To illustrate this, let us consider the example circuit in Fig. 5.1. For the target
gate G8, one obvious implication is (e = 1) ) (G8 = 0). This is because when
e = 1, then G3 = 1 and G8 = 0. Now, if a SET changes the value of any gate
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Figure 5.1: An example circuit.
along the implication path i.e., G3 or G8, then the faulty value will be G8 = 1.
However, the fault will only be observable at the primary output O1 only when
G9 = 1. Now, if an inverted FRW, dotted line in Fig. 5.1, is added to realize the
implication (e = 1) ) (G8 = 0), then the SET on gate G3 or G8 will always be
masked at gate G10 before being latched at the primary output O1. Similarly, a
fault hitting the added inverter ipping its value from 0 to 1 will also be masked
by G8 and will not propagate at the circuit output. However, protection is not
guaranteed when e = 0.
To reduce the impact on performance, the authors in [63] proposed to limit
the addition of FRWs to two wires for any target gate. However, this could have
a limitation on enhancing circuit fault tolerance. Hence, the proposed work is
not limited to such a restriction. For example, in the circuit of Fig. 5.1, there
are two additional implications to the target gate G8 i.e., (b = 1) ) (G8 = 0)
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and (h = 0) ) (G8 = 0). So, realizing these three implications by adding
FRWs to the masking gate G10 will improve the SET of gates along three dierent
implication paths. A masking gate is a gate that is driven by the target gate. In
the hindsight, now the masking gate G10 becomes a 5-input AND gate. If there
exists a technology limitation or performance impact, then this gate can be split
into smaller gates.
Determination of gates along an implication path is not a trivial task. Al-
though the authors in [63] used an implication path in their analysis, no de-
tails were given for determining an implication path and the gates along the
path. An implication might propagate from the source gate forward to the tar-
get gate, might traverse backward then forward or might not have a single path.
In Fig. 5.1, the implication path for the implication (b = 1) ) (G8 = 0), is
b ! fG1; G2g ! G6 ! G8. However, the implication path for the implication
(G4 = 0) ) (G8 = 0), is G4 ! e ! G3 ! G8. Furthermore, the implication
(h = 0) ) (G8 = 0) does not have a single implication path. The detection
probabilities of gates G3; G4; G5 and G7 will partially improve depending on the
applied input values. For example, when e = 1 and f = 0, detection probabilities
of these gates will not be improved by adding a FRW due to this implication at
the masking gate G10. This is because faults on these gates are already masked
by having a 1 at the output of G3. In this chapter, an algorithm for identifying
an implication path and the gates whose detection probabilities are impacted due
to adding a FRW based on a given implication is proposed.
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The techniques in [62] and [63] add FRWs only to the masking gate driven by
the target gate. In this paper, the proposed technique adds FRWs either to the
masking gate or to the target gate after evaluating the implication type and the
type of masking gate and the target gate.
Addition of FRWs improve the reliability of logic circuits by increasing logical
masking. However, the masking gates will remain unprotected and other tech-
niques need to be employed to enhance their fault tolerance. Furthermore, fault
tolerance enhancement is constrained by the existence of such relations. In order to
further improve circuit reliability, the selective transistor sizing (STR) technique
discussed in Chapter 3 is employed, which is based on transistor duplication and
sizing to provide protection of sensitive transistors with high detection probabil-
ity. The combined application of the proposed implication based fault tolerance
technique and the STR technique requires lesser area overhead as compared to
applying STR alone.
5.2 Proposed Fault Tolerance Technique
The proposed fault tolerance technique is based on the integration of an im-
plication based fault tolerance technique and selective transistor fault tolerance
technique. Firstly, a brief discussion is made regarding the proposed selective-
transistor redundancy (STR) technique from Chapter 3. Then, the proposed
implication based fault tolerance technique is presented.
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5.2.1 Selective Transistor Redundancy Based Fault Toler-
ance Technique
The transistor level fault tolerance technique in Chapter 3 protects individual
sensitive transistors of a circuit. A sensitive transistor is a transistor whose soft
error detection probability is relatively high. A transistor is protected if a required
criteria such as circuit probability of failure or area overhead is not met and the
probability of failure of the transistor is greater than the probability of failure of
other transistors in the circuit. The protection is applied to a transistor by dupli-
cating and sizing one or more transistors necessary for providing the protection
against particle strikes. This approach is eective in achieving a target circuit
reliability with lower area overhead as compared to other related fault tolerance
techniques.
5.2.2 Implications Based Fault Tolerance Technique
The proposed implication-based fault tolerance technique is shown in Algo-
rithm 3. Initially, the circuit is simulated with 1 million random input patterns
using HOPE [83] to get the probability of having a value of 1 and the probability
of having a value of 0 and stuck-at (i.e., stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1) fault detection
probabilities for all gates in the circuit.
Next, the set of source gates S and the set of target gates T are identied. To
reduce the computation time and to focus on identication of potentially useful
implications, only source gates that have probability of output value i.e, proba-
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bility of zero (P0) or probability of one (P1), greater than or equal to Th1 are
selected. It is observed from simulations that source gates that have P0 or P1
 0:3 are good candidates for implication FRW addition. Similarly, target gates
that have fault detection probability Th2 are selected. From simulations, a good
value of Th2 is found to be 0:4. Then, implications are identied between gates
in S and T using any implication learning technique such as direct implications
learning [87] and indirect implications learning [88{90].
Once implications are discovered, Algorithm 3 then evaluates each implication
by identifying the implication path for each implication and computing the gain in
the form of reduction of gate stuck-at fault detection probabilities for gates along
the implication path. Then the the implication with the best gain is selected and
a FRW based on the implication is added. The gain of all remaining implications
is then updated. The process of implication FRW addition is repeated until the
best implication gain Gain < 0:02. The details of each step of Algorithm 3 are
elaborated in the following subsections.
Implications Learning
There are two main methods to identify implications in a circuit and any one
of them can be employed in the proposed technique.
Direct implications are identied by assigning a value at a gate and iteratively
performing backward justication and forward propagation until every unjustied
gate is either justied, or there exist more than one possible justication for it.
FAN [87] is a well know algorithm to discover direct implications in a circuit.
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Algorithm 3 : Implications Based Fault Tolerance Technique
1: Th1: Gate probability threshold
2: Th2: Gate Stuck-at fault detection probability threshold
3: : Set of implications b/w S and T
4: Gsi ! Gti : Gates along the ithimplication path
5: Gain: Path gain due to implication FRW addition
6:
7: Simulate circuit to get initial gate value and stuck-at fault detection proba-
bilities
8: Identify set of source gates, S, with Prob(si0) or Prob(si1)  Th1
9: Identify set of target gates, T, with Pdet(ti)  Th2
10: Extract implication relations between gates in S and T
11: //Implications evaluation
12: for (each implication i 2 ) do
13: Identify implication path . Algorithm 6 & 7
14: Compute implication Gain . Eqn. 5.3
15: end for
16: //End of Implications evaluation block
17: repeat
18: //Implications addition
19: Select implication i with best gain
20: if (Gain  0:02) then
21: Add FRW for implication i . Algorithm 4 & 5
22: Update stuck-at fault detection prob. Gsi ! Gti
23: Update Gain for all remaining implications
24: end if
25: //End of Implications addition block
26: until (Gain < 0:02)
The identication of indirect implications is much harder than the direct im-
plications and implications are identied through learning by injecting tempo-
rary values at certain gates in the circuit and then examine their logical conse-
quences [88{90].
Rules for Addition of Implications FRWs
Once an implication is selected, a FRW is added between the source and the
destination gates. Previous methods of implications FRWs addition [62, 63] only
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Algorithm 4 : FRW Addition Rule for (S = u)) (T = 1)
1: M : Masking gate; Mi: Set of inputs of Masking gate
2: T: Target gate; Ti: Set of inputs of Target gate
3: cM : New masking gate; bT : New target gate
4: FOT : Number of fanouts of target gate
5:
L
: Logic XOR
6:
7: if (M = AND/NAND or FOT > 1 or M=) then
8: if (T = NOT) then
9: bT  NAND(Ti, (SLu))
10: else if (T = NAND) then
11: bT  NAND(Ti, (SLu))
12: else if (T = OR) then
13: bT  OR(Ti, (SLu))
14: end if
15: else
16: if (M = NOT) then
17: cM  NOR(Mi, (SLu))
18: else if (M = OR) then
19: cM  OR(Mi, (SLu))
20: else if (M = NOR) then
21: cM  NOR(Mi, (SLu))
22: end if
23: end if
add FRW to the masking gate. A masking gate is a gate that is connected to the
output of the target gate of an implication. In the proposed technique, a FRW
can be added to either the masking gate or the target gate. When an implication
is added to the masking gate, the masking gate is considered as the new target
gate. Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5 illustrate all rules required to add a FRW due
to an implication (S = u)) (T = v).
Algorithm 4 illustrates the implication FRW addition rules when a source value
u implies a target value v = 1. First, the algorithm checks whether the FRW can
be added to the masking gate or not. The FRW cannot be added to the masking
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gate if the target gate is connected to an output (i.e., there is no making gate)
or if the masking gate is of type AND/NAND. In addition, a FRW to a masking
gate is not added if the fanout of the target gate is > 1. This is because soft
errors on the target gate and other gates on the implication path may prorogate
across other fanout branches. If the FRW cannot be added to the masking gate,
then an attempt is made to add the FRW to the target gate. If the target gate is
of type NOT, then it will be changed into a NAND gate with the input of T (i.e.,
Ti) and the input S
L
u. The XOR operator
L
performs the inversion of the
source gate S when required. For example, if S = u = 1 and T = 1 and the target
gate is an inverter, then the FRW from source S must rst be inverted before
being added to the NAND gate. The relation (S
L
u) will become S
L
1 ) S,
which satises the condition for adding the FRW from source gate S to target
gate T . Similarly, when the target is a NAND gate, then an extra input with an
inverted or non-inverted source gate (S
L
u) is added to the target NAND gate.
Similarly, if the target gate is an OR gate, then an extra input with an inverted
or non-inverted source gate (S
L
u) is added to the target OR gate.
However, if the FRW can be added to the masking gate, then it is added as
follows. For T = 1, the FRW can only be added to the masking gate if it is of type
NOT, OR or NOR. Other cases will require the insertion of an OR gate, which is
avoided in this work. If the masking gate is a NOT gate, then it is converted to
a NOR gate with new inputs Mi (i.e., \T") and (S
L
u). If the masking gate is
of type OR or NOR gate, then the inverted or non-inverted source gate (S
L
u)
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Algorithm 5 : FRW Addition Rule for (S = u)) (T = 0)
1: M : Masking gate; Mi: Set of inputs of Masking gate
2: T: Target gate; Ti: Set of inputs of Target gate
3: cM : New masking gate; bT : New target gate
4: FOT : Number of fanouts of target gate
5:
L
: Logic XOR
6:
7: if (M = OR/NOR or FOT > 1 or M=) then
8: if (T = NOT) then
9: bT  NOR(Ti, (SLu))
10: else if (T = NOR) then
11: bT  NOR(Ti, (SLu))
12: else if (T = AND) then
13: bT  AND(Ti, (SLu))
14: end if
15: else
16: if (M = NOT) then
17: cM  NAND(Mi, (SLu))
18: else if (M = AND) then
19: cM  AND(Mi, (SLu))
20: else if (M = NAND) then
21: cM  NAND(Mi, (SLu))
22: end if
23: end if
is just added to the masking gate as an extra input.
Algorithm 5 illustrates the FRW addition rules when a source value u implies a
target value of v = 0. The discussion regarding Algorithm 4 can be well extended
for the rules given in Algorithm 5.
Implication Path Identication
Once an implication is identied, the next important step is to evaluate the
impact of adding a FRW due to the implication. Almukhaizim et al. [62] used
simulation to quantify the impact on gates sensitivity when an implication FRW
is added. Although they have tried to reduce the number of simulated input
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values, performing simulation to evaluate the value of each implication is a very
time consuming process and will not scale for large circuits. Rather than simu-
lating the circuit to evaluate the value of adding an implication FRW, Zhou et
al. [63] employed a relation to estimate the soft error rate (SER) of gates along an
implication path. However, they didn't elaborate on how an implication path is
identied. We will show next the details of how an implication path is determined
and the gates along the implication path whose fault detection probabilities are
reduced when an implication FRW is added.
Two algorithms are proposed to determine an implication path. The rst algo-
rithm, value propagation (VP), traverses gates and marks them from source gate
S to target gate T . Once the gates are marked, the implication path identication
(IPI) algorithm then determines the implication path. The VP and IPI algorithms
are illustrated in Algorithm 6 and Algorithm 7, respectively.
Value Propagation (VP) Algorithm Algorithm 6 illustrates the steps of the
VP algorithm. C and NC denote that for the current gate CG under consider-
ation, an input of the gate is having either a controlling or non-controlling logic
value. For example, an input value equal to 0 is a controlling value to a NAND
gate, whereas a value equal to 1 is a non-controlling input value. The propagating
P and non-propagating NP markings hold information regarding the probable
implication path. IP indicates the inversion polarity for the current gate, which
is 1 for NOT, NAND and NOR gates, while 0 for AND and OR gates. Algorithm 6
starts by identifying all gates reachable to the target gate i.e., gates in the cone
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logic of T and gates reachable to the source gate. Then, the output of the source
gate is marked with the value Pu. If the value u
L
IP is a non-controlling value
for the source gate, then all its inputs are marked with PuL IP . Then, all marked
inputs of the source gate reachable to the target gate are added to processQ.
Furthermore, all gates in the fanout of the source gate which are reachable to
the target gate are added to processQ. The algorithm then processes gates in
processQ until the queue becomes empty.
Next, a gate, CG, is selected from processQ. If inputs of CG are not marked
and u
L
IP = NC, then all inputs of CG are marked with the value PuL IP and
inputs reachable to the target gate are added to processQ. Otherwise, if any of the
inputs of the CG is propagating with controlling value, the gate will be marked
with PCL IP . For example, if one of the inputs of an OR gate is marked with P1,
then the gate will be marked with P1. However, for a NOR gate, if one of the
inputs is marked with P1, then the gate will be marked with P0. If all inputs to
a gate are propagating P with non-controlling value NC, then it will be marked
with PNCL IP . The path will switch from P to NP if none of the inputs of the CG
has a controlling value and not all of its inputs have non-controlling values. Once
the implication path becomes NP , it will remain NP . If the marking computed
for CG is dierent from its previous marking, fanouts of CG reachable to T and
not reachable to S will be added into processQ
Implication Path Identication (IPI) Algorithm The implication path
identication (IPI) algorithm is applied after VP algorithm. The purpose of IPI
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Algorithm 6 : Value Propagation (VP) Algorithm
1: P0 : Propagating 0; P1 : Propagating 1;
2: NP0: Non-propagating 0; NP1 : Non-propagating 1;
3: C : Controlling value; NC: Non-controlling value
4: u: Source gate value
5: IP : Set to 1 when a gate is inverting (i.e., NOT, NAND, NOR), otherwise
set to 0
6: processQ : Queue to process gates
7: CG : Current Gate being processed
8: MCG: Marking applied to the output of current gate
9:
10: Mark all gates reachable to the target gate T
11: Mark all gates reachable to the source gate S
12: CG = Source gate
13: MCG = Pu
14: if (u
L
IP = NC) then
15: Mark all inputs of CG with the value PuL IP
16: Add all inputs of CG reachable to T to processQ
17: end if
18: Add all fanouts of CG reachable to T to processQ
19: while (processQ 6= NULL) do
20: CG = pop(processQ);u is the value if CG
21: if (inputs of CG are not marked and u
L
IP = NC) then
22: Mark all inputs of CG with the value PuL IP
23: Add all inputs of CG reachable to T to processQ
24: else if (any input to CG = PC) then
25: MCG  PCL IP
26: else if (all inputs to CG = PNC) then
27: MCG  PNCL IP
28: else if (any input to CG = PNC) then
29: MCG  NPNCL IP
30: else if (any input to CG = NPC) then
31: MCG  NPCL IP
32: else if (all inputs to CG = NPNC) then
33: MCG  NPNCL IP
34: end if
35: if (New marking of CG 6= It's Previous marking) then
36: add fanouts of CG reachable to T and not reachable to S into processQ
37: end if
38: end while
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algorithm is to determine the implication path and the gates along the path whose
detection probabilities will be impacted by adding the implication FRW. Algo-
rithm 7 highlights the steps of the IPI algorithm.
The processQ holds the list of gates to be processed in each iteration, whereas
PathG list contains gates that are part of the implication path. The set of rules
established in Algorithm 7 will now be explained. The algorithm starts with
adding the target gate to processQ. If only one input to a gate is marked with
PC , then that input is added to the processQ and the process continues. It should
be observed that if two or more inputs of a gate are marked with PC , then the
inputs of this gate are not added to processQ. Fig. 5.2 illustrates this case. For
both circuits, the value of A = 0 or A = 1 is propagated to the output. Therefore,
if 2 or more inputs of the target gate are marked with PC , then there is no need to
protect the gates along the implication path(s) as faults on gates along one path
will be masked at the target gate due to the controlling logic value of the other
input. In case if two or more inputs are marked with NPC as shown in Fig. 5.3,
then, there is also no need to protect the gates along the implication path(s) due
to the masking at the target gate provided by the controlling value of other input.
Fig. 5.4 illustrates the application of rule 2. If all inputs of the target gate
are marked with PNC , then all the inputs are added to the PathG list. Therefore,
both G1 and G2 are added to the PathG list in this case. Other rules will be
explained through illustrative examples given in the next section.
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Algorithm 7 : Implication Path Identication (IPI) Algorithm
1: P0 : Propagating 0; P1 : Propagating 1;
2: NP0: Non-propagating 0; NP1 : Non-propagating 1;
3: C : Controlling value; NC: Non-controlling value
4: PI: Primary input
5: processQ : Queue to process gates
6: CG : Current Gate being processed
7: PathG: Implication path gates
8:
9: Add T to processQ
10: while (processQ 6= NULL) do
11: CG = pop(processQ)
12: if (CG 6= S and CG 6= T ) then
13: Add CG to PathG
14: end if
15: if (One input of CG is marked with PC) then
16: if (Input marked with PC is not PI and 62 processQ) then
17: Add input to processQ
18: end if
19: else if (All inputs of CG are marked with PNC) then
20: for (all inputs) do
21: if (Input is not PI and 62 processQ) then
22: Add input to processQ
23: end if
24: end for
25: else if (One input of CG is marked with NPC) then
26: if (Input marked with NPC is not PI and 62 processQ) then
27: Add input to processQ
28: end if
29: else if (All inputs to CG = NPNC) then
30: for (all inputs) do
31: if (Input is not PI and 62 processQ) then
32: Add input to processQ
33: end if
34: end for
35: end if
36: end while
37: Return PathG
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of having two inputs with PC markings.
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of having two inputs with NPC markings.
Evaluation of Implication FRW Gain
Once the implication path is determined, the next step is to evaluate the value
of adding a FRW due to an implication path based on updating the stuck-at
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Figure 5.4: Illustration of having two inputs with PNC markings.
fault detection probabilities of gates along the implication path. If the value v
of a gate Gi along an implication path is \0", then the stuck-at-1 (sa1) fault
detection probability of Gi is improved/modied. However, if the value of the
gate is \1", then the stuck-at-0 (sa0) fault detection probability of gate Gi is
improved/modied. The following equation is used to update or modify the stuck-
at fault detection probability of gate Gi along an implication path.
[Gisav = Gisav  (1  Pu) PRP (5.1)
Where Pu denotes the probability that the source gate S has a value of u and PRP
is the percentage of reachable paths from gate Gi to the target gate T computed
using the following relation:
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PRP =
# of reachable paths Gi ! T
# of paths Gi ! PO (5.2)
Where \# of paths Gi ! PO" denote the total number of paths from gate Gi to
primary output(s), \reachable path" denotes the number of paths from gate Gi
that are reachable to target gate T . Eqn. 5.2 is used to estimate the percentage
improvement in the fault detection probability of gate Gi as fault detection will
be improved for paths propagating through T but not across other paths not
propagating through T .
For each implication, Eqn. 5.1 is applied to update the stuck-at fault detection
probabilities of gates along the implication path. The gain of an implication is
then computed using Eqn. 5.3.
GainS!T =
X
8Gi2S!T
Gisa  
X
8Gi2S!T
Gi bsa (5.3)
Where Gi bsa denotes the new fault detection probability and Gisa denotes the old
fault detection probability of gate Gi.
5.3 Illustrative Examples
In this section, two examples are discussed in detail that encompass all aspects
of the proposed method discussed in Section 5.2. Consider the example shown in
Fig. 5.5, where an implication exists between source gate G4 and the target gate
G3. The masking gate in this example is gate G10. The rst step is to determine
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whether the FRW will be added to the target gate G6 or the masking gate. Since
the implication is of type (G4 = 0) ) (G3 = 0) and the masking gate G10 is
an AND gate, therefore the FRW will be added to the masking gate. The new
target gate T is now G10. The circuit with the added FRW (dotted line) is also
shown in Fig. 5.5. The masking gate G10 now becomes a 3-input AND gate with
an extra input connected to the source gate G4.
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Figure 5.5: Circuit with Implication (G4 = 0)) (G6 = 0).
Once the FRW is added, the next step is to determine the implication path.
Starting from the source gate, G4 is marked as propagating P with value 0 i.e.,
P0. Since source gate G4 is a NAND gate, the value of IP is equal to \1". The
condition in line 14 of Algorithm 6 i.e., (0
L
1 = 1(NC)), is satised, therefore
all inputs of G4 are marked with P0L 1 = P1. Primary inputs e and f are also
added to the processQ as they both have a reachable path to the target G10. So,
initially, G4 is marked as P0 and both primary inputs e and f are marked as P1.
G4 has only one fanout gate G7, which is reachable to the target G10, therefore
it is also added to the processQ due to the condition in line 18 of Algorithm 6.
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The processQ now contains values fe; f;G7g.
Next, e is selected as CG from the processQ. Since e is a primary input, all
the conditions from line 21 to line 32 are skipped. However, due to the statement
in line 35 of Algorithm 6, G6 is added to the processQ, because it is the only
fanout of e reachable to the target gate G10. The other fanout of e is the source
G4, therefore it is not added to the processQ. The processQ now consists of
ff;G7; G6g. In the next iteration, f is selected as CG. Again, all marking
conditions are skipped as f is a primary input. Since the only fanout for f is
the source G4, nothing is added to the processQ. So, the processQ now contains
fG7; G6g. In the next iteration, G7 is selected as CG. Since one of the inputs of
G7 is P0, i.e., satisfying the condition in line 24 of Algorithm 6, G7 is marked as
P0 i.e., MG7 = PC=0L IP=0 = P0. Both fanouts of G7 are added to the processQ
as they are reachable to the target gate G10. The updated processQ now consists
of fG6; G8; G9g.
Gate G6 is marked as P1 as its input is marked with P1. Gate G8, which
is the fanout of G6 is now added to the processQ. Updated processQ is now
fG8; G9; G8g. The inputs to G8 are marked as P1 due to G6 and P0 due to G7,
therefore due to the condition in line 24 of Algorithm 6, G8 is marked as P1. After
both fanouts of G8 are added, the updated processQ becomes fG9; G8; G1; G2g.
One of the inputs to gate G9 is marked as P0 due to G7, therefore, due to the
condition in line 28 of Algorithm 6, the output of G9 is marked as non-propagating
NP with value 0 i.e., MG9 = NPNC=0L IP=0 = NP0. Nothing is added to the
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processQ as the fanout of G9 is the target gate G10. In the next iteration, G8
is selected again but its marking will stay the same i.e., MG8 = P1. Thus, its
fanouts G1 and G2 are not added to the processQ. Both G1 and G2 have inputs
marked with P1, therefore both of them are marked as P1. G3 is now added to
the processQ. Finally, CG = G3 is selected for processing. All inputs of G3 are
P1 i.e., propagating with non-controlling value, therefore, due to the condition
in line 26 of Algorithm 6, G3 is marked as P0 i.e., MG3 = PNC=1L IP=1 = P0.
Nothing is added to the processQ as the fanout of G6 is the target G10. The
algorithm terminates as the processQ is now empty. The gate markings due to
VP algorithm are also shown in Fig. 5.5
Once the VP algorithm is nished, the IPI Algorithm (Algorithm 7) is applied
to determine the implication path and the gates protected by adding the implica-
tion FRW. The IPI algorithm starts from the target G10. Starting from G10, G3
is selected and is added to the processQ, as it has P0 marking, in accordance with
the rule mentioned in line 15 of Algorithm 7. Then, G3 is processed and is added
to PathG. Since both inputs of G3 are marked with P1, P with non-controlling in-
put NC = 1, therefore both G1 and G2 are added to processQ in accordance with
the rule mentioned in line 19 of Algorithm 7. Then, G1 and G2 get processed and
get added to PathG and G8 gets added to processQ. Then, gate G8 is processed
and is added to PathG. Since G8 has two inputs with markings P1 and P0, the
path with the propagating value is selected i.e., G6. Finally G6 is processed and
is added to PathG. The algorithm now terminates as the input to G6 is a primary
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input. The implication path now consists of gates (G6! G8! (G1; G2)! G3).
Once the implication path gates are identied, the next step is to update
the stuck-at fault detection probabilities of gates using Eqn. 5.1. So, for gates
along the implication path, G6sa0; G8sa0; G1sa0; G2sa0 and G3sa1 fault
detection probabilities are improved, respectively. Gate G6 has two paths to
the primary output G10 i.e., (G6 ! G8 ! G1 ! G3 ! G10) and (G6 !
G8 ! G2 ! G3 ! G10) and all the paths are reachable to the target gate
G10. Therefore, PRP of G3 is \1". In fact, in this example, the PRP of all
gates along the implication path is \1". Before adding the implication FRW,
the stuck-at fault detection probabilities of gates along the implication path are
f0:281; 0:563; 0:781; 0:781; 0:781g. After the addition of the implication FRW, the
estimated stuck-at fault detection probabilities using Eqn. 5.1 along the implica-
tion path are f0:211; 0:422; 0:586; 0:586; 0:586g. Based on actual fault simulation
using HOPE [83], the improved stuck-at fault detection probabilities are found out
to be f0:188; 0:468; 0:656; 0:656; 0:656g. It is clear that the estimated values and
the values computed using HOPE [83] are close to each other. The estimated im-
plication path gain computed using Eqn. 5.3 is 0:796 while the path gain obtained
using HOPE [83] simulation is 0:563.
Let us next consider the example shown in Fig. 5.6, where an implication exists
between source wire h and the target gate G3. The masking gate in this example
is gate G10. The FRW will be added to the masking gate and the new target
gate T is now G10. The circuit with FRW (dotted line) is also shown in Fig. 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Indirect implication path discovery.
Starting from h, processQ consists of fG5; G9g. When selected, G5 is marked
with P1 at its input is marked with P0. When G7 is added, processQ becomes
fG9; G7g. Currently, only one input to G9 is marked as P0 due to h, therefore,
G9 is marked NP0 due to condition in line 26 of Algorithm 6. Since the output of
G9 is target G10, nothing is added to the processQ. The processQ now consists
of fG7g only. G7 is marked with NP1 as its input is a non-controlling value.
Both fanouts of G7 are added to the processQ and it will become fG8; G9g. G8
is processed next and is marked with NP1 and its fanouts are added to the queue.
processQ becomes fG9; G1; G2g. G9 is selected for the second time now and
this time both its inputs are marked as NP1 due to G7 and P0 due to h. The
marking of G9 changes from NP0 to NP1 due to the controlling input value from
G7. G1 and G2 are then processed and are also marked with NP1. The processQ
now consists of fG3g only. Finally, when selected, G3 is marked with NP0. VP
algorithm now terminates as the target is reached and processQ become empty.
The marking of gates due to VP algorithm is also shown in Fig. 5.6. It must be
137
noted that when a path becomes non-propagating NP it remain NP until the
target is reached.
The IPI algorithm is now applied to determine the implication path. It can
be observed from Fig. 5.6 that both inputs of G10 are NP . The only clue for the
IPI algorithm now is to take the path with controlling value i.e., condition in line
25 of Algorithm 7. Therefore, G3 is selected and then added to the processQ and
to PathG. All inputs of G3 have NC value, therefore, due to condition in line 29
of Algorithm 7, both G1 and G2 are added to the processQ and PathG. When
processing G1 and G2, G8 is added to the path gates list PathG and processQ.
Continuing in this fashion, G7 and G5 are also added to the PathG. Algorithm 7
now terminates as the source h is reached and also the processQ becomes empty.
The implication path now consists of gates (G5! G7! G8! (G1; G2)! G3).
So, for gates along the implication path, G5sa0; G7sa0; G8sa0; G1sa0; G2sa0
and G3sa1 fault detection probabilities are improved, respectively. Before
FRW is added, stuck-at fault detection probabilities of gates along the impli-
cation path are f0; 0; 0:563; 0:781; 0:781; 0:781g. The improved stuck-at fault
detection probabilities of implication gates computed using HOPE [83] are
f0; 0; 0:281; 0:406; 0:406; 0:406g. The estimated stuck-at fault detection probabili-
ties computed using Eqn. 5.1 are f0; 0; 0:281; 0:391; 0:391; 0:391g. The estimated
path gain computed using Eqn. 5.3 is 1:452 while the actual gain obtained using
HOPE [83] simulation is 1:407. It is clear that the estimated values are very close
to the simulated values obtained using HOPE [83].
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It should be observed that since this is an indirect implication, not all the
identied gates along the implication path will be protected. This is because
when G4 = 1, all the identied gates by the implication path will be protected by
reducing their fault detection probabilities. However, when G4 = 0, this implies
that e = 1 and G6 = 1. Thus, faults occurring on G5 and G7 are already
masked by having G6 = 1 without adding the FRW. Thus, in this case only gates
fG8; G1; G2; G3g are protected. The IPI algorithm will identify also gates G5 and
G7 although they are partially protected.
5.4 Experimental Results
In this section, the impact of the proposed technique on the area and reliability
of LGSynth'91 [84] benchmarks is evaluated. The benchmarks consist of circuits
with varying complexity in terms of area, number of inputs and outputs. The
LGSynth'91 benchmark circuits used in this work are synthesized with single
output optimization using Espresso [85] tool and then mapped to a library that
consists of an Inverter and 2-, 3- and 4-input NAND and NOR gates using SIS [86]
tool to get the proper gate level representation of the circuit. The reliability of a
circuit is computed using the method discussed in Chapter 6
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The reliability of a circuit is computed against a single fault and the prorated
1 and 2 faults for each circuit. The number of prorated faults is correlated to
the area of a circuit. So, for example, if the area overhead is 131%, then the
actual area is increased by 2:31 times. Therefore, 1, 2 and 5 faults in the original
circuit will prorate to 2:31, 4:62 and 11:55 faults in the protected circuit. For
each prorated fault, the circuit is simulated twice. For example, if the prorated
faults to be injected are 4.62, then the circuit is simulated twice, rst by injecting
4 faults and then by injecting 5 faults. The failure rate is then computed as
0:38 FR(4faults)+ 0:62 FR(5faults). For each fault injection scenario, faults
are injected randomly and simulation is performed for 5000 iterations to compute
the failure rate.
The implications are applied to a circuit until an implication gain of a circuit is
< 0:02. Based on simulations, it is observed that a threshold value of 0:02 oers the
best compromise between area overhead and reliability improvement of a circuit.
Once FRWs due to selected implications are added, the probability of failure
(POFC) of the nal circuit is then computed using Eqn. 3.7. Table 5.1 shows the
circuits area overhead and reliability achieved by the proposed implication based
fault tolerance technique. The column header \# Imp." denotes the number of
implications applied to each circuit. The column \% Red." denotes the percentage
reduction in the failure rate of each circuit. The average reliability of all circuits
is improved as compared to the original circuits. The average area overhead
incurred as a result of implications FRWs addition is 4:58% and the average
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number of implications is 46:50. Except for alu4 and b12, the POFC of all the
other benchmarks is reduced by at least 14%. The columns \P1" and \P2" show
the reliability of circuits against prorated 1 and 2 faults, respectively. It is clear
that the average reliability achieved by the proposed technique against prorated
faults is better than the reliability of original circuits against 1 and 2 faults.
Table 5.2: Circuits reliability and area overhead based on STR technique (Chap-
ter 3) with varying protection thresholds against a single fault.
Circuit
95% 98% 99%
OH Rel OH Rel OH Rel
alu4 0% 97.89% 20.04% 98.44% 51.84% 99.02%
apex1 0% 96.72% 12.64% 98.10% 48.81% 99.10%
apex2 0% 99.20% 0% 99.20% 0% 99.20%
apex3 0% 96.88% 13.93% 98.05% 51.57% 99.08%
apex4 0% 96.20% 25.88% 98.30% 71.88% 99.02%
b12 86.50% 95.01% 149.02% 98.03% 197.69% 99.05%
clip 14.64% 95.00% 68.61% 98.11% 119.87% 99.08%
cordic 0% 98.10% 0% 98.10% 19.53% 99.00%
ex5 19.53% 95.62% 81.73% 98.12% 139.89% 99.02%
misex1 85.68% 95.07% 175.48% 98.01% 249.35% 99.02%
misex2 14.12% 95.24% 50.29% 98.36% 92.48% 99.20%
misex3 0% 97.64% 3.33% 98.10% 34.27% 99.18%
rd84 14.16% 95.10% 56.49% 98.02% 101.21% 99.24%
seq 0% 99.05% 0% 99.05% 0% 99.05%
squar5 107.79% 95.10% 206.15% 98.06% 286.51% 99.00%
table3 0% 98.68% 0% 98.68% 0.34% 99.24%
table5 0% 98.70% 0% 98.70% 1.70% 99.32%
z5xp1 68.22% 95.06% 143.69% 98.11% 202.88% 99.06%
Avg. 22.81% 96.68% 55.96% 98.31% 92.77% 99.11%
The proposed implication based fault tolerance technique is based on enhanc-
ing logical masking and is applied at the gate level. One limitation of logical
masking techniques is that they are unable to improve the reliability of a circuit
beyond a certain point. So, in order to further improve the reliability, circuit-level
techniques such as gate/transistor resizing has to be employed. Therefore, the
142
reliability of circuits in Table 5.1 is further enhanced by applying STR technique
from Chapter 3. Table 5.2 shows the reliability and area overhead of circuits when
STR is applied to the original benchmark circuits for 95%, 98% and 99% protec-
tion threshold. Protection threshold refers to the target reliability required to be
achieved by a circuit against a single fault. In the proposed integrated approach,
the implication based fault tolerance technique is applied rst followed by the
STR technique if the original circuit does not satisfy a required reliability.
Table 5.3 shows the circuits reliability and area overhead resulting from the
application of the proposed integrated approach for 95%, 98% and 99% protection
threshold. It can be observed from Table 5.3 that the area overhead is reduced for
all protection thresholds in comparison to the application of the STR technique.
This is due to the fact that the addition of FRWs increases logical masking of faults
and hence when STR is applied, fewer transistors require protection to achieve
the desired reliability. Signicant area savings are achieved for b12, clip, ex5
and z5xp1 benchmarks with 95% threshold as shown in Table 5.3 in comparison
to the results in Table 5.2. With 98% threshold, alu4, apex1, apex3, b12, ex5,
and misex2 in Table 5.3 achieve signicantly lower area overhead with similar
reliability in comparison to the results in Table 5.2. Similarly, for 99% threshold,
benchmarks such as alu4, apex1, apex3, apex4, b12, cordic, ex5, misex2 and
misex3 have signicantly lower area overhead as compared to their counterparts
in Table 5.2, and again with similar reliability measure.
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Table 5.3: Circuits reliability and area overhead based on proposed integrated
approach against a single fault.
Circuit
95% 98% 99%
OH Rel OH Rel OH Rel
alu4 0% 97.89% 7.23% 98.40% 29.01% 99.03%
apex1 0% 96.72% 4.26% 98.05% 31.94% 99.18%
apex2 0% 99.20% 0% 99.20% 0% 99.20%
apex3 0% 96.88% 6.17% 98.1% 37.97% 99.03%
apex4 0% 96.20% 18.19% 98.20% 57.99% 99.01%
b12 23.80% 95.11% 90.30% 98.10% 154.19% 99.09%
clip 8.45% 95.09% 58.88% 98.07% 104.13% 99.06%
cordic 0% 98.10% 0% 98.10% 13.46% 99.1%
ex5 5.26% 95.55% 58.77% 98.1% 107.86% 99.07%
misex1 77.21% 95.12% 169.29% 98.04% 253.54% 99.01%
misex2 11.26% 95.3% 33.90% 98.28% 77.18% 99.15%
misex3 0% 97.64% 1.20% 98.1% 19.49% 99.09%
rd84 16.13% 95.09% 57.31% 98.03% 98.71% 99.04%
seq 0% 99.05% 0% 99.05% 0% 99.05%
squar5 105.73% 95.10% 196.75% 98.01% 285.13% 99.02%
table3 0% 98.68% 0% 98.68% 0.20% 99.12%
table5 0% 98.70% 0% 98.70% 0.46% 99.20%
z5xp1 58.84% 95.11% 129.34% 98.09% 189.46% 99.05%
Avg. 17.04% 96.70% 46.20% 98.29% 81.15% 99.08%
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, an integrated fault tolerance technique based on the combined
application of an implication based fault tolerance technique and selective tran-
sistor redundancy technique is proposed. An implication based fault tolerance
technique has been proposed. It is based on identifying implications between a
set of candidate source and target gates. Then, for each implication the gain in
reduction of gate fault detection protabilities is estimated. The implication with
the highest gain is selected and its corresponding functionally redundant wire
is added. The process is repeated until the gain is less than a given threshold.
Experimental results show that the proposed implication based fault tolerance
technique reduces the failure rate of circuits with an average of 20% with an av-
erage area overhead of less than 5%. Moreover, the integrated application of the
proposed implication based fault tolerance technique and the selective transis-
tor redundancy technique achieve signicantly lower area overhead in comparison
to applying the selective transistor redundancy technique alone with the same
achieved reliabilities.
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CHAPTER 6
RELIABILITY EVALUATION
A novel method to compute the reliability of a circuit at the gate level is pro-
posed in this chapter. The proposed gate level method provides similar results in
comparison to transistor level simulations (using SPICE) with orders of magni-
tude reduction in CPU time. The eect of a transient fault hitting a transistor
will be observable at one of the primary outputs with a certain probability. This
probability is a function of controllability probability i.e., existence of an input
pattern to excite a fault, and observability probability i.e., a fault excited at a site
is observable at one of the primary outputs. The motivation here is to propose
a probabilistic model that captures this eect at the gate level. The proposed
technique bridges the gap between circuit level simulations performed at the tran-
sistor level using SPICE and gate level simulations, which could be done using any
gate level simulator. Simulations performed at the gate level make an underlying
assumption that the eect of a transient fault results in a bit ip at the output
of a gate or in the memory. In this realm, we propose probability of fault
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injection, which quanties the probability with which a fault must be injected
at the gate level so that SPICE level and gate level simulation results are highly
matched
A thorough case study for the 130nm process technology is performed to elab-
orate the proposed reliability evaluation scheme. The basic process related pa-
rameters used in this study are shown in Table 6.1.
6.1 Reliability Evaluation Architecture
The reliability evaluation framework, shown in Fig. 6.1, consists of two ma-
jor blocks; 1) technology independent block, and 2) technology dependent block.
The purpose of the technology independent block is to analyze a given benchmark
circuit to compute three important parameters for all gates; 1) input pattern prob-
ability (.ipp) , 2) stuck-at detection probability (.prob), and 3) fault injection
probability (.inj). The input patterns observable at the input of each gate along
with their probability of occurrence and stuck-at fault detection probabilities are
computed by performing simulation of 1 million random test vectors using the
parallel fault simulator Hope [83]. The fault injection probability denotes the
probability with which a fault must be injected at the gate level as a stuck-at
fault. All of these parameters are saved in a database for later usage.
The technology dependent part consists mainly of the library gates comprising
NAND/NOR gates with varying input congurations and an INVERTER. The
purpose of this block is to observe the behavior of dierent process technologies,
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Figure 6.1: Reliability Evaluation Architecture.
e.g. 45nm, 32nm etc., against a specic charge value. This block computes the
eect of an induced current of charge (Q) for every transistor of the gate in the
library. The input patterns that result in a gate value ip when a transistor is hit
are then saved in the propagation (.prop) le. In fact, we can compute and save
the behavior of dierent technologies against dierent charge (Q) values, and this
has to be done only once.
Now, the fault injection probability of a gate in a circuit can be computed for
any process technology. It must be noted that the initial analysis of a circuit has
to be done only once. The only limitation to this approach is that, if a circuit
changes, the analysis for the technology independent part has to be repeated as
well.
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The following subsections contain the detailed elaboration of the reliability
evaluation framework.
6.2 Probability of Fault Injection
The fault injection probabilities of a gate depend on the Conditional Fault Ex-
citation Probability (CFEPij) and probability of hit/selection. A general relation
to compute CFEPij of j
th transistor of a gate i can be derived as follows. Let S
be a set of patterns for which an error is excited to the output of a gate and PCi
be the controllability probability to produce a logic value opposite to the fault
eect at the gate output. Then CFEPij can be dened as:
CFEPij =
jSjP
k=1
Prob: Sk
PCi
=
PExcitationij
PCi
(6.1)
The CFEPij of any MOS transistor depends on the process technology and the
charge of the incident particle. Therefore, in order to get the exact CFEPij
probability for each MOS transistor, transistor level simulations are performed
using SPICE.
Now, the sa0 fault injection probability of gate Gi is computed using the
following equation:
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Gi sa0 inj: Prob =
nX
j=1
0BB@CFEPNij  NWijnP
k=1
NWik
1CCA (6.2)
Where n is the total number of nmos transistors in gate Gi, NWij is the width of
the drain of jth nmos transistor and CFEPNij is the conditional fault excitation
probability due to a fault hit at the jth nmos transistor of gate i.
Similarly, the sa1 fault injection probability of gate Gi is computed as follows:
Gi sa1 inj: Prob =
pX
j=1
0BB@CFEPPij  PWijpP
k=1
PWik
1CCA (6.3)
Where p is the total number of pmos transistors in gate Gi, PWij is the width of
the drain of jth pmos transistor and CFEPPij is the conditional fault excitation
probability due to a fault hit at the jth pmos transistor of gate i.
With PExcitationN1 = 0:75, PExcitationN2 = 0:25, PExcitationP1 = 0:25,
PExcitationP2 = 0:25, PC0 = 0:25 and PC1 = 0:75, the sa0 and sa1 injection
probabilities of a 2-input NAND gate are computed by applying Eqn. 6.2 and
Eqn. 6.3 as follows:
Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
2X
j=1
CFEPNij 
NWij
2P
k=1
NWik
=
0:75
0:75
 0:26 + 0:25
0:75
 0:26
2P
i=1
0:26
= 0:667
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Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
2X
j=1
CFEPPij 
PWij
2P
k=1
PWik
=
1 0:52 + 1 0:52
2P
i=1
0:52
= 1
Let's now compute the fault injection probabilities of NAND21 shown in Ta-
ble 3.2. PDETN1 is reduced to 0:25 as there is only one pattern, f10g, for which
\N1" is not protected; therefore, CFEPN1 =
0:25
0:75
= 1
3
. The sa0 fault injection
probability will be:
Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
2X
j=1
CFEPNij 
NWij
2P
k=1
NWik
=
0:25
0:75
 0:26 + 0:25
0:75
 0:26
2P
i=1
0:26
= 0:333
The sa0 fault injection probability of NAND21 is reduced from 0:833 to 0:333
due to protecting the fault that occurs at the drain of N1 transistor.
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The area of P1 1 and P1 2 pmos transistors is 2:4  PW . The sa1 fault
injection probability remains the same as computed below:
Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
3X
j=1
CFEPPij 
PWij
3P
k=1
PWik
=
2 1 2:4 0:52 + 1 0:52
(
2P
i=1
2:4 0:52) + 0:52
= 1
6.3 Fault Injection Mechanisms
Two fault injection mechanisms are applied in this work. The rst method
performs fault injection at the transistor level and measures the magnitude of
voltage Vout at the output. The second method deals with injecting the fault at
the gate level by injecting a stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-1 fault at the gate output.
6.3.1 Transistor Level
The current I of charge Q is injected at the drain of a transistor. The direction
of injected current is from drain-to-body in the nmos transistor and from body-to-
drain in the pmos transistor. The magnitude and pulse width of injected current is
modeled using Eqn. 3.1. Algorithm 8 highlights the steps of failure rate/reliability
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computation at the transistor level. In this algorithm, a set of m transistors are
selected for fault injection using Roulette Wheel (RW) algorithm [91,92]. The RW
algorithm selects transistors that have higher area with high probability. For each
random input vector, the outputs are saved before and after the fault injection
and are then compared to check for correctness. The failure rate and reliability
of circuit are then computed after SIM simulations are performed.
Algorithm 8 : Transistor-level Failure Rate Computation
Require: Transistor-level netlist
1: SIM : Simulation Count
2: Fm : Failure rate of the circuit with m faults
3: Relm : Reliability (%) of the circuit with m faults
4: K : Failure Count
5: R : Output of circuit with no fault injection
6: Rf : Output of circuit after fault injection
7: RW : Roulette Wheel algorithm
8: K  0
9: for (i = 1! SIM) do
10: Generate a random test vector V
11: Apply V to the circuit
12: Simulate the circuit and save the output in R
13: RW(m) . Select m transistors using Roulette Wheel Algorithm
14: Inject faults in selected m transistors
15: Apply V to the circuit with faults injected
16: Simulate and save the output in Rf
17: if (R 6= Rf ) then increment K
18: end for
19: Fm =
 
K
SIM

20: Relm(%) = (1  Fm) 100
6.3.2 Gate Level
Faults injected at the gate level assume a stuck-at fault model. When a fault
is injected at a gate output, it can be either a stuck-at-1 fault (i.e., connected
to Vdd) or a stuck-at-0 fault (i.e., connected to ground). Algorithm 9 is used to
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Algorithm 9 : Gate-level Failure Rate Computation
Require: Gate level netlist
1: SIM : Simulation Count
2: sa0Gi : Stuck-at-0 injection probability of Gate Gi
3: sa1Gi : Stuck-at-1 injection probability of Gate Gi
4: R : Output of circuit with no fault injection
5: Rf : Output of circuit after fault injection
6: RW : Roulette Wheel algorithm
7: Fm : Failure rate of circuit with m faults
8: Relm : Reliability (%) of circuit with m faults
9: K : Failure Count
10: rand1() : Uniformly distributed random number  (0,1)
11: rand2() : Uniformly distributed random number  (0,1)
12:
13: K  0
14: for (i = 1! SIM) do
15: Generate a random test vector V
16: Apply V to the circuit
17: Simulate the circuit and save the output in R
18: G RW(m) . Select m gates
19: for (j = 1! G) do . Iterate through G gates
20: if ((sa0Gj + sa1Gj) == 0) then
21: Don't inject any fault . Gates protected
22: else if

rand1()  sa0Gj
sa0Gj+sa1Gj

then
23: if (rand2()  sa0Gj) then
24: Inject sa0 fault at the gate Gj output
25: end if
26: else
27: if (rand2()  sa1Gj) then
28: Inject sa1 fault at the gate Gj output
29: end if
30: end if
31: end for
32: Apply V to the circuit with faults injected
33: Simulate and save the output in Rf
34: if (R 6= Rf ) then increment K
35: end for
36: Fm =
K
SIM
37: Relm(%) = (1  Fm) 100
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compute the circuit failure rate/reliability at the gate level. To inject m faults in
a circuit, m gates are selected randomly using a Roulette Wheel (RW) algorithm.
For each gate selected for fault injection, the following is performed. First, if both
the sa0 and sa1 fault inject probabilities are 0, then no fault will be injected as the
gate will be be fully protected. Otherwise, a selection is made between injecting a
sa0 fault or a sa1 fault according to the ratio of their fault injection probabilities.
The selected fault will be injected based on its fault injection probability. Fig. 6.2
illustrates the idea of injecting stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1 fault at the gate-level.
gate2
gate1
X gate2
gate1
AND
0
(a) Stuck-at-0 fault.
gate2
gate1
X gate2
gate1
OR
1
(b) Stuck-at-1 fault.
Figure 6.2: Fault injection mechanism at gate-level.
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6.3.3 Comparison b/w Transistor Level and Gate Level
Simulations
To illustrate the accuracy of gate-level simulations, a comparison between tran-
sistor level and gate level simulations is shown in this section for few benchmark
circuits. The transistor level simulations are performed using SPICE. Fig. 6.3-6.5
demonstrates the close match between the reliability obtained by SPICE and gate
level simulations for the three compared benchmark circuits: apex2, apex3 and
apex4. A circuit reliability is evaluated after performing 1000 iterations for each
fault injection case.
Time is another factor that must be taken into account while evaluating a
circuit for reliability. The time taken by SPICE simulations becomes exorbitantly
high as the number of transistors is increased. The apex4 benchmark took around
4 days for SPICE simulations, while it took 30 minutes of gate level simulations,
hence achieving a speedup of  167x. It can be observed from Fig. 6.6 that as the
number of transistors is increased, the speedup achieved by gate level simulations
also increases signicantly.
6.4 Reliability Evaluation of NAND Gates
In this section, we will discuss dierent protection scenarios applied at the
transistor-level for 2-input NAND gate. Two cases have been discussed before,
but we will discuss them here again for the sake of completeness. The taxonomy
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Figure 6.4: apex3 Reliability
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used here is then used by the selection algorithm mentioned in Chapter 3 to mark
gates for protection at the gate level. The basic process related parameters are
mentioned in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Parameters considered in the study.
Technology (T ) 130m = 0:13
nMOS width (NWij) 2 T = 0:26
pMOS width (PWij) 4 T = 0:52
Charge (Q) 0.3pC
6.4.1 NAND2
The NAND2 is a 2-input NAND gate as shown in Fig. 6.7. The total area of
a 2-input NAND gate is;
Area = 2NW + 2 PW
= 2 0:26 + 2 0:52
= 1:560
Using SPICE and applying Eqn. 6.1, set S for nmos transistors N1 and N2 is
observed to be;
SN1 = f00; 01; 10g =) CFEPN1 = 0:75
0:75
= 1
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fault injection
Figure 6.7: 2-input cmos NAND
SN2 = f10g =) CFEPN2 = 0:25
0:75
= 0:33
Again, it is considered that all input patterns are equally likely to occur. sa1
fault injected at any of the pmos transistor of a NAND gate will always be observed
at the gate output. Then, set S for pmos transistors P1 and P2 will be;
SP1 = f11g =) CFEPP1 = 0:25
0:25
= 1
SP2 = f11g =) CFEPP2 = 0:25
0:25
= 1
Now, applying Eqns. 6.2 and 6.3 to compute sa0 and sa1 injection probabilities
of a 2-input NAND gate;
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Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
2X
j=1
CFEPNij 
NWij
2P
k=1
NWik
=
1 0:26 + 0:33 0:26
2P
k=1
0:26
= 0:667
Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
2X
j=1
CFEPPij 
PWij
2P
k=1
PWik
=
1 0:52 + 1 0:52
2P
k=1
0:52
= 1
So, at the gate level simulations, the sa0 and sa1 faults must be injected with
probabilities 0:667 and 1, respectively. PDETij for all transistors will be;
PDETN1 =
0:75
1
= 0:75
PDETN2 =
0:25
1
= 0:25
PDETP1 =
0:25
1
= 0:25
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PDETP2 =
0:25
1
= 0:25
The theoretical gate failure probability of 2-input NAND gate can be computed
using Eqn. 3.7 as follows:
Gate Failure Prob: =
2X
j=1
PDETNij 
NWij
Area
+
2X
j=1
PDETPij 
PWij
Area
=
N1;N2z }| {
0:75 0:26 + 0:25 0:26
1:56

+
P1;P2z }| {
2 0:25 0:52
1:56

= 0:167 + 0:167
= 0:333
Finally, gate failure probability obtained by SPICE and gate level simulations
is shown below. The results are obtained by running the reliability evaluation
algorithm. The close match between theoretical and simulated failure probability
of the 2-input NAND gate veries the correctness of proposed fault injection
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method.
Probability of failure (Spice) = 0:384
Probability of failure (Gate) = 0:37
6.4.2 NAND21
In NAND21, the protection of sa0 faults against the transient fault at the
drain of nmos transistor N1 is provided by duplicating the pmos transistor P1
and scaling the widths of duplicated P1 1 and P1 2 transistors by the factor  to
suppress the transient, as shown in Fig. 6.8. To protect sa0 faults at the drain of
N1, the value of  is increased incrementally until the output voltage V > V DD=2
and is derived empirically using SPICE.
Vdd
OUT
Vdd
N2
N1
P1_1 P2P1_2
protected fault
Figure 6.8: CMOS conguration of NAND21 gate
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The motivation to duplicate a transistor is to make a circuit more vulnerable to
single event multiple upsets (SEMU). In SEMU, the eect of transient fault is no
more constrained to a node where the incident particle strikes. This could result in
the possibility of deposited charge being simultaneously shared by multiple circuit
nodes in the circuit. In fact, this situation is quite benecial to the proposed
scheme. For example, if a fault hits the drain of N1 transistor of a 2-input NAND
gate and also makes any of the pmos transistor conducting due to its high current
value, then, N1 and one of the pmos transistor will start conducting. In this case,
the fault will never propagate to the output, as the two conducting transistors
will just cancel the eect of each other. Let's now evaluate the reliability and
compute the fault injection probability of NAND21 gate.
pmos Scaling factor () = 2.4
Area = 2NW + 2  PW + PW = 3:536
Then,
SN1 = f10g =) CFEPN1 = 0:25
0:75
= 0:33
SN2 = f10g =) CFEPN2 = 0:25
0:75
= 0:33
SP1 1;P1 2 = f11g =) CFEPP1 1;P1 2 = 0:25
0:25
= 1
SP2 = f11g =) CFEPP2 = 0:25
0:25
= 1
Fault injection probabilities will be;
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Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
2X
j=1
CFEPNij 
NWij
2P
k=1
NWik
=
0:33 0:26 + 0:33 0:26
2P
k=1
0:26
= 0:333
The area of P1 1 and P1 2 pmos transistors is  PW = 2:4 PW . The sa1
fault injection probability, then, can be computed as follows;
Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
3X
j=1
CFEPPij 
PWij
3P
k=1
PWik
=
2 2:4 0:52 + 1 0:52
(
2P
i=1
2:4 0:52) + 0:52
= 1
The failure probability of NAND21 gate will be;
Gate Failure Prob: =
2X
j=1
PDETNij 
NWij
Area
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+
3X
j=1
PDETPij 
PWij
Area
=
N1;N2z }| {
0:25 0:26 + 0:25 0:26
3:536

+
P1 1;P1 2z }| {
2 0:25 2:4 0:52
3:536

+
P2z }| {
0:25 0:18
3:536

= 0:250
Finally, gate failure probability obtained by SPICE and gate-level simulations
is;
Probability of failure (Spice) = 0:257
Probability of failure (Gate) = 0:248
6.4.3 NAND22
In NAND22, the protection from sa0 faults against the transient hit at the
drain of nmos transistors N1 or N2 is provided by duplicating the pmos transistors
P1 and P2. The widths of duplicated P1 1, P1 2, P2 1 and P2 2 are also scaled
by the factor  as shown in Fig. 6.9.
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Figure 6.9: CMOS conguration of NAND22 gate
pmos Scaling factor () = 2.4
Area = 2NW + 4  PW = 5:512
Then,
SN1 =  =) CFEPN1 = 0
SN2 =  =) CFEPN2 = 0
SP1 1;P1 2 = f11g =) CFEPP1 1;P1 2 = 1
SP2 1;P2 2 = f11g =) CFEPP2 1;P2 2 = 1
Fault injection probabilities will be;
Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
2X
j=1
CFEPNij 
NWij
2P
k=1
NWik
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= 0
The area of each of P1 1, P1 2, P2 1 and P2 2 pmos transistors is  PW =
2:4 PW . The sa1 fault injection probability, then, can be computed as follows;
Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
4X
j=1
CFEPPij 
PWij
4P
k=1
PWik
=
2  0:52 + 2  0:52
4P
k=1
 0:52
= 1
The failure probability of NAND22 gate will be;
Gate Failure Prob: =
2X
j=1
PDETNij 
NWij
Area
+
4X
j=1
PDETPij 
PWij
Area
= 0 +
P1 1;P1 2;P2 1;P2 2z }| {
4 0:25  0:52
5:512

= 0:226
168
Finally, gate failure probability obtained by SPICE and gate level simulations
is
Probability of failure (Spice) = 0:226
Probability of failure (Gate) = 0:231
6.4.4 NAND23
NAND23 provides protection from sa1 faults only by duplicating and scaling all
the nmos transistors. Fig. 6.10 shows the arrangement of transistors in NAND23.
Vdd
OUT
Vdd
P1 P2
N1_1 N1_2
N2_2N2_1
protected faults
Figure 6.10: CMOS conguration of NAND23 gate
nmos Scaling factor () = 3.1
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Area = 4 NW + 2 PW = 4:264
Then,
SN1 1;N1 2 = f00; 01; 10g =) CFEPN1 1;N1 2 = 0:75
0:75
= 1
SN2 1;N2 2 = f10g =) CFEPN2 1;N2 2 = 0:25
0:75
= 0:333
SP1 =  =) CFEPP1 = 0
SP2 =  =) CFEPP2 = 0
Fault injection probabilities will be;
Gi sa0 inj: Prob =
2X
j=1
CFEPNij 
NWij
2P
k=1
NWik
=
2 1  0:26 + 2 0:333  0:26
4P
k=1
 0:26
= 0:833
Gi sa1 inj: Prob =
2X
j=1
CFEPPij 
PWij
2P
k=1
PWik
= 0
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The failure probability of NAND23 gate will be;
Gate Failure Prob: =
4X
j=1
PDETNij 
NWij
Area
+
2X
j=1
PDETPij 
PWij
Area
=
N1 1;N1 2z }| {
2 0:75  0:26+
N2 1;N2 2z }| {
2 0:25  0:26
4:264
+ 0
= 0:473
Finally, gate failure probability of NAND23 obtained by SPICE and gate level
simulations is found to be;
Probability of failure (Spice) = 0:474
Probability of failure (Gate) = 0:480
6.4.5 NAND24
NAND24 provides protection from faults that can occur at any of the pmos
transistors or at the rst nmos transistor i.e N1. Fig. 6.11 shows the arrangement
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of transistors in NAND24.
Vdd
OUT
N1_1 N1_2
N2_1 N2_2
P1_1 P1_2
Vdd
P2
Figure 6.11: CMOS conguration of NAND24 gate
nmos Scaling factor (1) = 3.1
pmos Scaling factor (2) = 2.4
Area = 4 1 NW + 2 2  PW + PW = 6:240
Then,
SN1 1;N1 2 = f10g =) CFEPN1 1;N1 2 = 0:25
0:75
= 0:33
SN2 1;N2 2 = f10g =) CFEPN2 1;N2 2 = 0:25
0:75
= 0:33
SP1 1;P1 2 =  =) CFEPP1 1;P1 2 = 0
SP2 =  =) CFEPP2 = 0
Fault injection probabilities will be:
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Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
4X
j=1
CFEPNij 
1NWij
4P
k=1
1NWik
=
2 1
3
 1  0:26 + 2 13  1  0:26
4P
k=1
1  0:26
= 0:333
sa1 injection probability will be zero as they are protected.
Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
3X
j=1
CFEPPij 
2PWij
3P
k=1
2PWik
= 0
The failure probability of NAND24 gate will be:
Gate Failure Prob: =
4X
j=1
PDETNij 
1NWij
Area
+
2X
j=1
PDETPij 
2PWij
Area
=
N1 1;N1 2z }| {
2 0:25 1  0:26+
N2 1;N2 2z }| {
2 0:25 1  0:26
6:240
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= 0:129
Finally, gate failure probability of NAND24 obtained by SPICE and gate level
simulations is found to be;
Probability of failure (Spice) = 0:130
Probability of failure (Gate) = 0:135
6.4.6 NAND25
The redundancy and scaling of transistors in NAND25 combines the NAND22
and NAND23 schemes to protect from both sa0 and sa1 faults. Fig. 6.12 shows
the CMOS representation of NAND25.
nmos Scaling factor (1) = 3.1
pmos Scaling factor (2) = 2.4
Area = 4 1 NW + 4 2  PW = 8:216
Fault injection probabilities will be zero for both sa0 and sa1 faults as they
will be suppressed by transistors arrangement in NAND25.
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Figure 6.12: CMOS conguration of NAND25 gate
Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
4X
j=1
CFEPNij 
1NWij
4P
k=1
1NWik
= 0
Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
4X
j=1
CFEPPij 
2PWij
4P
k=1
2PWik
= 0
The failure probability of NAND25 gate will be;
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Gate Failure Prob: =
4X
j=1
PDETNij 
1NWij
Area
+
4X
j=1
PDETPij 
2PWij
Area
= 0 + 0
= 0
Finally, gate failure probability of NAND25 obtained by SPICE and gate level
simulations is found to be;
Probability of failure (Spice) = 0
Probability of failure (Gate) = 0
6.5 Reliability Evaluation of NOR Gates
In this section, we will discuss dierent protection scenarios applied at the
transistor level for 2-input NOR gate.
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6.5.1 NOR2
The NOR2 is a 2-input NOR gate as shown in Fig. 6.13. The total area of a
2-input NOR gate is;
OUT
Vdd
P2
P1
N1 N2
fault injection
fault injection
Figure 6.13: 2-input cmos NOR
Area = 2NW + 2 PW
= 2 0:26 + 2 0:52
= 1:560
Using SPICE and applying Eqn. 6.1, set S for pmos transistors P1 and P2 is
observed to be:
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SP1 = f01; 10; 11g =) CFEPP1 = 0:75
0:75
= 1
SP2 = f01g =) CFEPP2 = 0:25
0:75
= 0:333
sa0 fault injected at any of the nmos transistor of a NOR gate will always be
observed at the gate output. Then, set S for nmos transistors N1 and N2 will be;
SN1 = f00g =) CFEPN1 = 0:25
0:25
= 1
SN2 = f00g =) CFEPN2 = 0:25
0:25
= 1
Now, applying Eqn. 6.2 and Eqn. 6.3 to compute sa0 and sa1 injection prob-
abilities of a 2-input NOR gate;
Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
2X
j=1
CFEPNij 
NWij
2P
k=1
NWik
=
1 0:26 + 1 0:26
2P
k=1
0:26
= 1
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Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
2X
j=1
CFEPPij 
PWij
2P
k=1
PWij
=
1 0:52 + 1 0:52
2P
k=1
0:52
= 0:667
So, at the gate level simulations, the sa0 fault must always be selected while
sa1 fault, if selected, must be injected with probability 0.667.
PDETij for all transistors will be:
PDETN1 =
0:25
1
= 0:25
PDETN2 =
0:25
1
= 0:25
PDETP1 =
0:75
1
= 0:75
PDETP2 =
0:25
1
= 0:25
The theoretical failure probability can be computed using Eqn. Circuit Prob-
ability of Failure as follows:
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Gate Failure Prob: =
2X
j=1
PDETNij 
NWij
Area
+
2X
i=1
PDETPij 
PWij
Area
=
N1;N2z }| {
2 0:25 0:26
1:560

+
P1;P2z }| {
0:75 0:52 + 0:25 0:52
1:560

= 0:083 + 0:333
= 0:416
Finally, gate failure probability of NOR2 obtained by SPICE and gate level
simulations is shown below and shows that the theoretical failure probability and
empirical gate failure probabilities are very close to each other.
Probability of failure (Spice) = 0:413
Probability of failure (Gate) = 0:418
6.5.2 NOR21
In NOR21, the protection from sa1 faults against the transient fault at the
drain of pmos transistor P1 is provided by duplicating the nmos transistor N1
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and scaling the widths of duplicated N1 1 and N1 2 by the factor , as shown
in Fig. 6.14. For protection against sa1 faults, the value of  is increased incre-
mentally until the output voltage (V) < VDD=2 and is derived empirically using
SPICE.
OUT
Vdd
P1
P2
N1_1 N1_2 N2
protected fault
Figure 6.14: CMOS conguration of NOR21 gate
nmos Scaling factor () = 2
Area = 2 NW +NW + 2 PW = 2:340
Then,
SN1 1;N1 2 = f00g =) CFEPN1 1;N1 2 = 1
SN2 = f00g =) CFEPN2 = 1
SP1 = f01g =) CFEPP1 = 0:25
0:75
= 0:33
SP2 = f01g =) CFEPP2 = 0:25
0:75
= 0:33
181
The area of N1 1 and N1 2 pmos transistors is NW = 2NW . The sa0
and sa1 fault injection probability is computed as follows;
Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
3X
j=1
CFEPNij 
NWij
3P
i=1
NWik
=
2  0:26 + 1 0:26
(
2P
k=1
 0:26) + 0:26
= 1
Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
2X
j=1
CFEPPij 
PWij
2P
k=1
PWik
=
0:33 0:52 + 0:33 0:52
2P
k=1
0:52
= 0:333
The failure probability of NOR21 gate will be;
Gate Failure Prob: =
3X
j=1
PDETNij 
NWij
Area
+
2X
i=1
PDETPij 
PWij
Area
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=N1 1;N1 2z }| {
2 0:25  0:26
2:340

+
N2z }| {
0:25 0:26
2:340

+
P1;P2z }| {
0:25 0:52 + 0:25 0:52
2:340

= 0:250
Finally, gate failure probability obtained by SPICE and gate level simulations
is
Probability of failure (Spice) = 0:252
Probability of failure (Gate) = 0:241
6.5.3 NOR22
In NOR22, the protection from sa1 faults against the transient hit at the drain
of pmos transistors P1 or P2 is provided by duplicating the nmos transistor N1
and N2. The widths of duplicated N1 1, N1 2, N2 1 and N2 2 are also scaled by
the factor  as shown in Fig. 6.15.
pmos Scaling factor () = 2
Area = 4 NW + 2 PW = 3:120
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OUT
Vdd
 P1
P2
N1_1 N1_2 N2_1 N2_2
protected fault
protected fault
Figure 6.15: CMOS conguration of NOR22 gate
Then,
SN1 1;N1 2 = f00g =) CFEPN1 1;N1 2 = 1
SN2 1;N2 2 = f00g =) CFEPN2 1;N2 2 = 1
SP1 =  =) CFEPP1 = 0
SP2 =  =) CFEPP2 = 0
The area of each of N1 1, N1 2, N2 1 and N2 2 nmos transistors is NW =
2NW . The sa0 fault injection probability, then, can be computed as follows;
Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
4X
j=1
CFEPNij 
NWij
4P
k=1
NWik
=
2  0:26 + 2  0:26
4P
k=1
 0:26
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= 1
Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
2X
j=1
CFEPPij 
PWij
2P
k=1
PWik
=
0 0:52 + 0 0:52
2P
k=1
0:52
= 0
The failure probability of NOR22 gate will be;
Gate Failure Prob: =
4X
j=1
PDETNij 
NWij
Area
+
2X
i=1
PDETPij 
PWij
Area
=
N1 1;N1 2z }| {
2 0:25  0:26
3:120

+
N2 1;N2 2z }| {
2  0:25 0:26
3:120

+ 0
= 0:167
Finally, gate failure probability obtained by SPICE and gate level simulations
is
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Probability of failure (Spice) = 0:168
Probability of failure (Gate) = 0:169
6.5.4 NOR23
NOR23 provides protection from sa0 faults only by duplicating and scaling the
pmos transistors. Fig. 6.16 shows the arrangement of transistors in NOR23 gate.
OUT
Vdd
N1 N2
P1_1
P2_1 P2_2
P1_2
protected faults
Figure 6.16: CMOS conguration of NOR23 gate
nmos Scaling factor () = 4.4
Area = 2NW + 4  PW = 9:672
Then,
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SN1 =  =) CFEPN1 = 0
SN2 =  =) CFEPN2 = 0
SP1 1;P1 2 = f01; 10; 11g =) CFEPP1 1;P1 2 = 0:75
0:75
= 1
SP2 1;P2 2 = f01g =) CFEPP2 1;P2 2 = 0:25
0:75
= 0:333
Fault injection probabilities will be;
Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
2X
j=1
CFEPNij 
NWij
2P
k=1
NWik
=
0 0:26 + 0 0:26
2P
k=1
0:26
= 0
Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
4X
j=1
CFEPPij 
PWij
4P
k=1
PWik
=
2 1  0:52 + 2 1  0:52
4P
k=1
 0:52
= 0:833
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The failure probability of NOR23 gate will be:
Gate Failure Prob: =
2X
j=1
PDETNij 
NWij
Area
+
4X
i=1
PDETPij 
PWij
Area
= 0 +
P1 1;P1 2z }| {
2 0:75  0:52+
P2 1;P2 2z }| {
2 0:25  0:52
9:672
= 0:473
Finally, gate failure probability of NOR23 obtained by SPICE and gate level
simulations is found to be:
Probability of failure (Spice) = 0:477
Probability of failure (Gate) = 0:470
6.5.5 NOR24
NOR24 provides protection from all sa0 faults by duplicating and scaling the
pmos transistors, but provide protection from sa1 faults only if the transient hits
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pmos transistor P1. Fig. 6.17 shows the arrangement of transistors in NOR24
gate.
Vdd
P2_1 P2_2
P1_1 P1_2
N1_1 N1_1 N2
OUT
Figure 6.17: CMOS conguration of NOR24 gate
nmos Scaling factor (1) = 2
pmos Scaling factor (2) = 4.4
Area = 2 1 NW +NW + 4 2  PW = 10:452
Then,
SN1 1;N1 2 =  =) CFEPN1 1;N1 2 = 0
SN2 =  =) CFEPN2 = 0
SP1 1;P1 2 = f01g =) CFEPP1 1;P1 2 = 0:25
0:75
= 0:33
SP2 1;P2 2 = f01g =) CFEPP2 1;P2 2 = 0:25
0:75
= 0:33
Fault injection probabilities will be;
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Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
3X
j=1
CFEPNij 
1NWij
3P
k=1
1NWik
= 0
Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
4X
j=1
CFEPPij 
2PWij
4P
k=1
2PWik
=
2 0:33 2  0:52 + 2 0:33 2  0:52
4P
k=1
2  0:52
= 0:333
The failure probability of NOR24 gate will be:
Gate Failure Prob: =
2X
j=1
PDETNij 
1NWij
Area
+
4X
i=1
PDETPij 
2PWij
Area
= 0 +
4X
i=1
PDETPij 
2PWi
Area
=
P1 1;P1 2z }| {
2 0:25 2  0:52+
P2 1;P2 2z }| {
2 0:25 2  0:52
10:452
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= 0:219
Finally, gate failure probability of NOR24 obtained by SPICE and gate level
simulations is found to be;
Probability of failure (Spice) = 0:218
Probability of failure (Gate) = 0:220
6.5.6 NOR25
The redundancy and scaling of transistors in NOR25 combines the NOR22
and NOR23 schemes to protect from both sa0 and sa1 faults. The Fig. 6.18 shows
the CMOS representation of NOR25.
OUT
Vdd
P2_1
P2_1
P2_2
P2_1
N1_1 N1_2 N2_1 N2_2
Figure 6.18: CMOS conguration of NOR25 gate
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nmos Scaling factor (1) = 2
pmos Scaling factor (2) = 4
Area = 4 1 NW + 4 2  PW = 11:232
Fault injection probabilities will be zero for both sa0 and sa1 faults as they
will be suppressed by transistors arrangement in NOR25.
Gi sa0 inj: Prob: =
4X
j=1
CFEPNij 
1NWij
4P
k=1
1NWik
= 0
Gi sa1 inj: Prob: =
4X
j=1
CFEPPij 
2PWij
4P
k=1
2PWik
= 0
The failure probability of NOR25 gate will be:
Gate Failure Prob: =
4X
j=1
PDETNij 
1NWij
Area
+
4X
i=1
PDETPij 
2PWij
Area
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= 0 + 0
= 0
Finally, gate failure probability of NOR25 obtained by SPICE and gate level
simulations is found to be:
Probability of failure (Spice) = 0
Probability of failure (Gate) = 0
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed about the reliability evaluation framework em-
ployed in this work to compute the reliability of proposed techniques. It is ob-
served that the proposed gate-level technique achieves reliability measures very
close to the transistor-level simulations (performed using SPICE) with orders of
magnitude less CPU time. Finally, in depth study of each transistor-level protec-
tion scheme is discussed in detail for 2-input NAND and NOR gates. The same
idea can be extended for the 3,4-input NAND and NOR gates.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION & FUTURE
WORK
7.1 Conclusion
The development of an integrated soft error tolerance framework to mitigate
soft errors in combinational circuits is implemented in this work. The framework
consists of three techniques. Each technique applies redundancy in dierent de-
sign space of digital system for soft error tolerance. Additionally, to evaluate the
reliability of logic circuits, a novel reliability evaluation technique is also imple-
mented that achieves reliability measures similar to the circuit level simulations
(using SPICE) with orders of magnitude less CPU time. Following objectives are
achieved in this work:
Selective Transistor-Redundancy (STR) Based Fault Tolerance Technique
In this method, a selective transistor-redundancy based fault tolerance
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technique for combinational circuits is implemented. The technique can
be applied to achieve a given circuit reliability or enhance the reliability
of a circuit under a given area constraint. The technique is based on esti-
mating the failure probability of each transistor and iteratively protecting
transistors with the highest failure probability until the desired objective
is achieved. Transistors are protected based on duplicating and scaling a
subset of transistors necessary for providing the protection. Experimental
results on LGSynth91 benchmarks demonstrate the eectiveness of the
proposed technique. Compared to existing transistor sizing techniques, the
proposed algorithm incurs signicantly less area overhead with similar relia-
bility measures. Better reliability results are also achieved in comparison to
TMR with lower area overhead. Unlike TMR which has an area overhead of
at least 3 times the area overhead of the original circuit, the area overhead
of the proposed technique varies depending on the reliability of the original
circuit. For some circuits, high reliability (> 99%) is achieved with small
area overhead (< 10%). In addition, the reliability of the TMR technique
has been enhanced signicantly by protecting the voters based on applying
the proposed technique. Additionally, comparison with simulation based
synthesis technique further highlights the merit of the proposed method.
Double Modular Redundancy (DMR) Based Fault Tolerance Technique
In this method, a soft error tolerance technique for combinational circuits
based on double modular redundancy is implemented. The technique is
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based on identifying the probability of occurrence of logic values 0 and 1 at
each primary output of a circuit. Based on this, each output is synthesized
in either the true or the complement form, and is then duplicated and
a masking AND or NAND gate is used to combine the two duplicate
outputs. The technique achieves higher circuit radiabilities than TMR
without voter protection with signicantly lower area overhead. We have
also demonstrated that the combined application of the proposed DMR
technique with STR technique achieves comparable circuit reliabilities
with signicantly lower area overhead in comparison to TMR with fully
protected voters.
Furthermore, an improved DMR method based on the use of C-element
(DMR-CEL) to combine the duplicate outputs is also implemented. This
scheme applies redundancy by implementing the original and duplicated
logic with majority phase. Reliabilities of circuits based on the proposed
DMR are higher than those obtained based on DMR-CEL without C-element
protection. Reliabilities of circuits based on DMR-CEL with protected C-
element are similar to those obtained based on TMR with voter protection
with signicantly lower area overhead. It also achieves slightly better re-
liabilities than the combined application of the proposed DMR technique
and STR technique for similar area overhead with a protection threshold of
99:5%. The advantage of the proposed DMR technique over DMR-CEL is
that it uses primitive gates as masking gates which have lower impact on
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performance in comparison to the use of C-element.
Implication Based Redundancy Insertion Fault Tolerance Technique
An implication based fault tolerance technique has been implemented. It
is based on identifying implications between a set of candidate source and
target gates. Then, for each implication the gain in reduction of gate fault
detection protabilities is estimated. The implication with the highest gain
is selected and its corresponding functionally redundant wire is added. The
process is repeated until the gain is less than a given threshold. Experi-
mental results show that the proposed implication based fault tolerance
technique reduces the failure rate of circuits with an average of 20% with an
average area overhead of less than 5%. Moreover, the integrated application
of the proposed implication based fault tolerance technique and the selective
transistor redundancy technique achieve signicantly lower area overhead
in comparison to applying the selective transistor redundancy technique
alone with the same achieved reliabilities. The combined application of
implication and STR based soft error tolerance technique results in less
area overhead in comparison to if STR is applied alone.
An Integrated Soft Error Tolerance Framework Finally, an integrated
framework is developed that combines the STR technique with the DMR
and the Implication based fault tolerance technique. It is observed that the
DMR and the Implication based fault tolerance techniques are unable to
improve the reliability of circuits beyond a certain point. Therefore, the
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hybrid approaches consisting of DMR+STR and Implication+STR are also
implemented. It is observed that the hybrid method signicantly improves
the reliability, and in case of Implication+STR, it even results in less area
overhead in comparison to if STR is applied alone.
Gate-level Reliability Evaluation Technique A novel method to compute
the reliability of a circuit at the gate level is implemented. The circuit
level simulations performed using SPICE are accurate but become very slow
as the circuit size increases. However, there isn't much of an impact of cir-
cuit size in gate level simulations. The proposed technique bridges the gap
between the circuit level simulations and the gate-level simulations. The
proposed gate level reliability evaluation method achieves similar results in
comparison to transistor level simulations with orders of magnitude reduc-
tion in CPU time.
7.2 Future Work
As for the future work, following directions can be adopted:
• So far, researchers are used to apply a single technique for soft error tol-
erance. It has been observed in this work that if gate level soft error tol-
erance techniques are combined with the transistor sizing technique, then,
this results in better reliability improvement with lower area overhead in
comparison to if any of the technique is applied alone. In transistor sizing
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technique, it is always very costly to protect for the fault on parallel tran-
sistors. The reason for this is that, all the corresponding series transistors
have to be duplicated and scaled and this results in signicantly higher area
overhead just to protect only one type of fault. So, the future direction here
is to apply protection for the faults on parallel transistors at the gate level
(using modular redundancy, enhancing logical masking etc) fault tolerance
techniques. In order to protect the faults on transistors connected in series,
transistor sizing technique (STR) can be applied.
• Another future direction could be the potential application of the proposed
Double-Modular Redundancy (DMR) scheme in high speed circuits like
arithmetic circuits. DMR guarantees at least 95% reliability. For the re-
maining 5% failure rate, a fault detection module can be developed to detect
a fault when it occurs and then the previous instruction is executed again.
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